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TOUCHE ROSS & CO.
111 EAST WACKER

DRIVE

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60601

July 8, 1971
Mr. Francis M. Wheat, Chairman
Study Commission on Establishment of
Accounting Principles
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
634 South Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90014
Dear Chairman Wheat:

Enclosed is the official statement of Touche Ross & Co.
with regard to the reconstitution of the Accounting Principles
Board or its successor. The statement is essentially the same as
the draft letter dated June 25 which was supplied to you and your
group at our meeting in Chicago.
The Touche position paper does not deal with the possible
creation of an appeal mechanism, in which you indicated considerable
interest. My personal views on that subject are these:

1.

In the present professional environment, I regard the
APB as having primary responsibility for formulation
of standards, with the SEC constituting an appeal
mechanism of a sort in areas of both professional
principle and discipline.

2.

I reject the possibility of a professional volunteer
appeal group within the American Institute of CPAs as
being a somewhat Impractical and unconvincing super
board

3.

It is difficult for me to understand how, within the
Executive Branch of the Government, an appeal group
could be constituted in such a way as not to cause
confusion within the White House orbit, as between the
SEC and some kind of an appeal mechanism. However,
it is my understanding that the report of the
President’s Advisory Council on Executive Reorganiza
tion, Chaired by Roy Ash, deals with this problem in
relation to all administrative agencies.
It could well
be that adoption of the Ash recommendations would
solve part of the problem. Perhaps a study of that
report will give your group some present suggestions
with respect to a layering of accounting responsibility
within the Executive Branch.

4.

If there is to be an appeal procedure -- and the idea
does have considerable merit -- then I could best con
ceive that some special court within the judiciary
might be the most workable and objective approach to
the subject. After all, at the present time, the
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Mr. Francis M. Wheat -2:

July 8, 1971

natural succession of appeal is from the SEC to the
regularly constituted court system (as in the
Appalachian Power matter).

As I told you in the Commission hearing held in our office, Touche
has not addressed itself explicitly to the appeal problem because
we regard improvement and strengthening of the APB itself as a first
and primary professional effort.
We appreciate very much the time you spent with us and the
opportunity to be heard.
If there is anything further we can do by
way of follow-on conversations, any of our partners would be pleased
to cooperate.
Sincerely,

Robert M. Trueblood
Chairman, Board of Directors

RMT:jb
Encls.

cc:

Michael Pinto (10 copies with
enclosures)
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STATEMENT OF TOUCHE ROSS & CO.
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

Controversy over accounting principles and criticism of
the operation of the Accounting Principles Board has existed for
some time. Touche Ross & Co. has made various suggestions for
improving the methodology of accounting principle formulation and
for reformation of the APB. We are pleased that the Board of
Directors of the American Institute of CPAs has established a
Commission for this work and has specified a broad and comprehensive
charter. The Wheat Commission, and its charter of study, has the full
support of Touche Ross.
In the course of its work, the Commission will examine the
history of the formulation of accounting principles within the
Institute and will study alternative approaches in great detail.
As it is impossible for us to present a balanced summary of the
many aspects of this problem in any brief statement, we will be
pleased to meet with, or contribute to the input of the Commission,
in any manner which may be desired.

Touche Ross has made public on numerous occasions its
position on needed reformation of the APB. This statement will pro
vide a summary of our views which can serve as a basis for more
extensive discussions.

THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES ENVIRONMENT

Accounting, in its highest professional form, is a dynamic
and conceptual discipline.
It is conceptual in the sense that it
must convert data into information by placing that data in proper
context. It is dynamic in the sense that the concepts incorporated
within the discipline have changed over time and can be expected to
change even more dramatically in the future.
At the same time, the application of these concepts takes
place in a growing and changing economic environment which imposes
immediate short-term time constraints on professional deliberations.
The affairs of the market place cannot wait upon the formulation of
accounting theorems and postulates and frequently demand pragmatic
solutions to immediate problems. Yet, these solutions, initial or
as modified, must ultimately relate to each other in some logical
framework if the affairs of the market place are to be communicated
to the public in a timely and comprehensible context.

We believe, then, that two major problems must be addressed
in the formulation of accounting principles or rules. In the longer
run, the concepts underlying the accounting discipline must be
identified and set forth so that the practitioner is able to convert
economic data accurately into information which serves the needs of
his public.
In the short run, individual accounting problems need
to be resolved on a day-to-day basis with or without the benefit of
an established conceptual framework. Ultimately short-term solutions
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- 2will either be consistent with such a conceptual framework or will
be revised. Accordingly, it is imperative that accounting principles
(or standards, or conventions, or whatever they may be called) be
established by a body of totally committed, outstanding professionals
who act in the present with full awareness of the needs of the future.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION1
The public accountant, works for his clients under the con
straints of public responsibility. Other client relationships are,
indeed, possible.
The CPA, however, assumes as his ultimate client the
general public.
The CPA, thereby, takes upon himself a judicial or
arbitrating role in the reporting of economic transactions at the enter
prise level. The CPA serves the public by attesting to the acceptability
of reported transactions. The CPA serves his client by bringing to bear
the public requirements which that client will ultimately have to satisfy.
In this function, the public accounting profession has perhaps the
broadest possible coverage of economic activities -- dealing with
companies in every segment of the economy.

We believe that it is important to preserve and enhance the
independence of the public accounting profession. To do this, the
profession must remain self-regulating — both ethically and techni
cally. We believe that the determination of accounting rules and
principles outside of the profession may result in reduced independence
within the profession.
If public accountants have no responsibility
for. the appropriateness of accounting treatment — but only for
conformance with established rules — it is likely that their role
will evolve to one of advocacy rather than independence. We expect
the activities and functions of the public accountant to change over
time. We believe, however, that the diminution of the CPA’s independent
force in the business environment would be a significant social loss.
THE PUBLIC TRUST
The role we have described for the public accountant is one
of continued and enhanced public responsibility. The accounting
principles and rules set forth to guide or direct the activities of
the profession must be determined under the most severe constraints
of the public interest. We believe, therefore, that the body establish
ed for this purpose must be independent of client, accounting firm, or
any other private interests and must function in an open, public-like
manner.

The body which establishes accounting principles must, as
a primary responsibility, serve the needs of the public.
It must inter
pret and identify public needs and act to meet the time constraints
Inherent in individual situations. This body must recognize the needs
and problems of industry, government, and the accounting profession
1.

For a useful definition of a profession, see Abraham Flexner, "Is
Social Work a Profession?”, School and Society, Volume I, No. 26,
p. 904.
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itself — but it must always be responsive first to the needs of the
public.

THE TOUCHE PROPOSAL2
Touche Ross believes that the best solution to the problem
of establishing accounting principles is the creation of a small fulltime Accounting Principles Board. Such a group would be chartered to
deal with new developments involving accounting and accountability as
they emerge, to conduct a significant level of research in development
of the underlying conceptual framework of the accounting discipline, and
to anticipate future accounting needs that will be imposed by the public.

Reconstitution of the Board

We recommend that a five or seven man full-time and fullycompensated group of the best professional accountants in
the country be appointed to the Accounting Principles Board.
Membership should be without consideration of firm affiliation
or other background so long as each member has the required
ability and an appreciation of practice considerations. Each
member should dissociate himself from his prior affiliation —
be it a practicing firm, university, or business enterprise.
Structure

The small top level Board should be supported heavily by
competent staff, with significant involvement of the financial,
business, and academic communities.

Scope of Activities
The profession must accept full responsibility for leadership
in financial reporting and accounting at all levels — early
warning systems, fundamental research, applied research,
evolvement of objectives and principles, and practice pro
nouncements.
The historic separation of accounting and auditing cannot be
logically sustained. Accordingly, the reconstituted Board
should, as a minimum, have surveillance over the proper content
of the auditors’ report.
Consideration should be given to
having the Board define research needs, objectives, principles,
and procedures in auditing.

The current practice of involving the business community in
early discussions of projected opinions is helpful and should
continue. However, we believe it would be a mistake to look
2.

For further detail, see Robert M. Trueblood, "Ten Years of the APB”,
Touche Ross Tempo, September, 1969.
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to the business community or to other accounting organiza
tions for significant leadership in solution of the
profession’s larger technical problems. The practicing
profession, through the Institute and the reconstituted
Board, can neither share nor delegate its own main
responsibility in these matters.
Levels of Performance
The boundaries between research specification of overall
objectives and purposes, formulation of principles, and
applications in practice should be well defined and carefully
observed.

In the pyramidal structure of a revised Board operation, the
broad base would be staff and research.
The full-time Board would itself undertake the design or
approval of a framework of objectives and purposes. The
Board would formulate statements of principles compatible
with established objectives. Under the surveillance of the
Board, practicing firms and the AICPA staff would add the
necessary details of procedural application. The SEC would
continue to exercise its monitoring, its back-up authority,
and its catalytic role.

Resources
We expect that full accomplishment of the reconstituted
Board’s objectives might cost as much as $8,000,000 or
$10,000,000 annually. Although this is a considerable in
crease over past institutional expenditures, the major
public accounting firms in the country today in fact spend
this much, in the aggregate, in direct, contributed, and
Imputed costs for AICPA support and in practice research and
guidance.
If all firms were willing to look towards the
Institute and its reconstituted Board for guidance, information
research, and leadership — and if all firms were willing to
pool their resources in support of concentrated and coordinated
activities — the overall additional cost to any individual
firm would be minimal. Under such funding, the Board would
have the serious obligation to issue frequent and full
reports on its research, deliberations, and activities to all
members and to all firms.

We believe that up to 50% of the proposed budget should be
devoted to research, with academic Institutions assuming a
prominent role in research activities. We realize that it is
unlikely that basic research will result in immediate practice
opinions. Accordingly, the Board must be prepared to spend
money freely, but not indiscriminately, in large research
efforts with little prospect of immediate payoff.
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This statement is made constructively — in the spirit and
vigor of youth and growth, without institutional or proprietary bias or
dogma. Any requests for elaboration or clarification will be gratefully
considered.

Robert M. Trueblood
Chairman, Board of Directors
Touche Ross & Co.
July 8, 1971
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

as Viewed by
Allan Craig
Director, Bureau of Accounts
and Statistics
Civil Aeronautics Board 1

1.

Establishing accounting principles--scope of the task.
a. Enunciation of principles assesses professing responsibility whereas
promulgation of standards, alone, invites evasion of principles;
b. Principles delineate common denominator elements of immutable laws which
remain immutable whether observed or unobserved;

c. Standards are judgment guidance mechanisms to the use of
and vary with the purposes served;

principles

d. Principles, being immutable, provide the accounting truth system with
a definition base which, through its enveloping disclosure principles, must
be sufficiently broad to meet any information need;
e. Standards, as judgment mechanisms, facilitate particular accounting
applications but are unreliable as guidelines for extension of basic account
ing precepts;2/ and

f. Standards and principles are frequently motivated by counterchecking
forces which can be effectively mobilized only through independent bodies.
2. Should the primary responsibility for establishing accounting standards re
side in a governmental body or a nongovernmental body?

a. Principle articulation represents a coalescence of multisourced beliefs
which transcend government;

1/

2/

The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Civil Aeronautics
Board or any other staff member.
The emphasized "financial" and "operating" lease differentiation standards,
for example, provide no guidance to the more relevant leasing question of
delineating the investment or timing aspects of prepaid and postpaid right
purchases regardless of their limits. Further, the stated objective of
reasonableness in the imputation of interest exposure draft is hardly an
acceptable principle in all circumstances for ascribing something to a trans
action beyond that which is self-described. Moreover, the idea that a given
precept may be true prior to a selected date but untrue after that date can
hardly contribute to confidence in the professed truth system.
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b. Standard promulgations range from specialized to generalized application
instruments inherently within the purviews of a hierarchy of authoritative
government, public and private bodies;
3

c. Principles are self-authoritative and enforceable, up to excommunica
tion, within the community accepting their organized system of belief;
d. Standards are authoritative by edict and enforceable, up to banishment,
within the community subject to the police powers of their prescribing bodies;

e. Government is an accounting user, is not immune to principles and
through its individual specialized arms may be equal to, but is no more
competent than, other organized bodies;
f. Regulatory bodies, and particularly the SEC, have statutory needs which
must be and can be accommodated within essential generalized accounting
standards without sacrificing those standards;

g. Regulatory standards, public standards and professional standards for
accounting are intertwined but distinctive and can only be acknowledged
and reconciled through a process of pre-development liaison;
h. Professionalism is essentially independence, standing on visible prin
ciples, which can collectively speak only through quasi-public spokesmenbodies transcending any individual government, public or private bodies; and
i. Spokesman-authority for accounting principles and the responsibility
which accompanies authority already reside predominantly, even though not
exclusively, within the AICPA--the sponsor of those conceptions upon which
United States practice certification and practice enforcement universally
rest.

3.

Composition of a nongovernmental standards Board.

a. Accounting credibility is accepted when authoritative objectivity is
readily apparent through checks and balances between the following four
pronged accounting formulation processes (see attached Chart):

3/

(1)

Authoritative counseling on needs (the governed).

(2)

Authoritative enunciation and monitoring of the belief system
(the legislators).

(3)

Authoritative sponsoring and monitoring of uniform practices
(the executives).

The July-August 1971 CPA carries (page 4) a particularly pertinent question
concerning the parallax of accounting principles accompanying a shift of
vantage points as between the United Kingdom and the United States.

- 3 (4)

Authoritative enforcement of the belief system and its implement
ation practices (the judiciary).

b. Accounting Advisory Counsel membership must deliberately elicit needs
of the full spectrum of accounting use—within economic regulation as well
as the financial market;
c. Accounting Principles Board membership should reflect legal and economic
expertise as well as accounting expertise;
d. Accounting Standards Board membership should contain regulatory expertise
and its staffing could serve all the conceptualized AICPA bodies in suffi
cient depth to satisfy internal research and external inquiries--using
groups represented on the Accounting Advisory Counsel for significance
screening; and
e. Financing could come, with budgeting limited to receipts, from primary
beneficiaries in combinations of the following:

4.

(1)

Fees for membership.

(2)

Fees for each AICPA examination sitting.

(3)

Royalties for each certified statement issued by a qualified AICPA
member.4/

(4)

Fees for disseminated information.

(5)

Fees for special services.

(6)

Grants from public and private institutions.

Methods of operation of a nongovernmental standards Board.

a. Flexible procedures must be accorded each accounting body to elicit
effectively the widest feasible authoritative views;
b. Public hearings can provide a wide spread feeling of participation and
can focus public attention but are not effective to a deliberation or co
alescing of ideas and should be used sparingly as judgment indicates to
each particular body;
c. Public participation in a meaningful sense requires that knowledgeable
views be publicly solicited, disclosed and weighed through full and open
responsible proposal, respondent comment, authoritative issue-disposing
opinion and appeal processes;

4/

As a corollary, the standard certification statement could cite the practi
tioner’s qualifications in AICPA membership as well as the State(s) of
certification.
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-4d. Delegation of authority is essential to balanced, expeditious actions
and could empower an Accounting Standards Board to:
(1)

Issue Tentative Accounting Principles Opinions to become opinions
of an Accounting Principles Board unless review is undertaken by
that body within 60 days;

(2)

Promulgate standard practices and interpretations subject to appeal
of conformance with accounting principles within 30 days to the
Accounting Principles Board;

(3)

Answer inquiries and provide technical staff support to all
accounting formulation and enforcement programs; and

(4)

Review and accept or reject appeals of any actions taken by either
itself or the Accounting Principles Board and, if accepted, either
transmit recommended action to the Accounting Principles Board or
modify involved Accounting Standards Board actions.

e. Abrogation of authority need not follow delegation of authority and the
widest feasible forum of expression consonant with responsible timely action
can be accorded the public and each member or body of the organized account
ing authority group along the following lines:

5.

(1)

Review of any actions by the Accounting Standards Board, including
Tentative Accounting Principles Opinions and rejections of appeals
could be initiated by any one member of the Accounting Principles
Board, any three members of the Accounting Advisory Counsel or any
two of its own members, and

(2)

Review of any actions taken by the Recounting Principles Board
could be returned for reconsideration by that body upon request
within 60 days by all Accounting Standards Board members, two
thirds of the Accounting Advisory Counsel members or by a majority
of its own members.

Accounting research support for a nongovernmental standards Board.
a. Abstract research as contrasted with action research is rarely accepted
or financially supported;

b. Action research is the essence of rationalizations behind enunciating
principles, promulgating standards, or adjudicating conflicts in their
implementation;
c. Conduct of research is a continuing process within a multiplicity of
diverse authorities and groups;
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- 5 d. Research functions as work processes involve largely reviewing, abstract
ing, compiling and organizing the ideas expressed or actions taken by diverse
authorities and groups;
e. Research findings are elements of decision-making advanced, delineated
by and channeled through the crucible of multiple group views;
f. Opinions represent the coalescence of views and research findings under
the expertise for synthesis inherently provided by the multiple bodied
decision-makers;

g. Research programs, as distinct from decisional processes, are susceptible
of very wide value judgments in relation to budgetary allotments of reason
ably accessible finances; and
h. Research financing should be held to that essential to decision-making
and dissemination of basic information which cannot be requested of existing
instrumentalities or brought to bear upon particular matters through the
21 members of the projected Counsel and Boards.

Attachment

Chart

"Body"___________

—

Membership: Nine
Representation: Industry;
practice; education; Govt
regulation; Govt operations
Function: Consultation
initiated and responsive

(unpaid)

Accounting Advisory Counsel

___________Public

Membership: 'Five
Representation: At least
one w/Govt regulatory
background
Function: Research; rules;
interpretation; proposed
principle opinions

Accounting Standards Board
(paid - full time)

discipline

Profession

(unpaid)

Enforcement
Panel

Allan Craig
Director, Bureau of
Accounts & Statistics
Civil Aeronautics Board

---------------------------

credentials

:

Functions
Accept or
reject practicing

•Authorities

Government Practicing

Functions: Issue and
revoke licenses

State Licensing Boards

Accounting Principles Board
(paid - per diem)
Membership: seven
Representation: at least 2
each w/legal & economic
backgrounds
Function: Promulgate prin
ciples; review appeals

Government "Bodies"

Quasi-Public "Body" (AICPA)
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Why Aren't We

Solving Our Problems?
RICHARD T. BAKER
Managing Partner of Ernst & Ernst

Since the title of my comments is “Why Aren’t We Solving Our
Problems?’’, many of you are probably anticipating another blast
at the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants. While it would be easy for me to be
critical of the recent trend of the Board towards making narrow,
restrictive, and illogical rules, the basic fault for this does not lie
solely with the APB. The Board has been operating in an atmos
phere which has not been conducive to the acceptance of broad
principles. Unfortunately, when the Board has attempted to pro
mulgate such principles, the practicing public accountants and the
related statutory authorities have not always insisted that they be
put into practice. 1 believe that this is the real reason why we
haven’t solved our problems.
One of the outstanding examples of public accountants and
statutory authorities not insisting that APB pronouncements be
followed is the manner in which business combinations were
treated during the 1960's. I believe it would be worthwhile to
review some of the pronouncements of the Board and its pre
decessor committee and to observe the effectiveness of them. In
1950, the predecessor committee issued an Accounting Research
Bulletin which unanimously approved the pooling of interest
concept and the conditions under which its use would be appro
priate. In 1957 another bulletin — No. 48 — was issued extending
and clarifying the pooling concept. In 1965, in Opinion No. 6, the

Board unanimously reaffirmed the pooling concept set forth in the
1957 bulletin. Once more in 1966, in Opinion No. 10, the Board
reviewed ARB No. 48 and made no changes in the basic concept
of poolings except to confirm the general practice of recognizing
poolings consummated after the end of the year but before the
issuance of financial statements.
With this amount of attention directed by the APB to the
problems of business combinations during the hectic Sixties, it
would be reasonable to assume that the accounting for business
combinations was well under control. But was this really true? As
some of you knew at the time, and as all of us have learned since,
this was an issue completely out of control. From the early to the
mid-Sixties, actual practice had so eroded the concepts of the
1957 pronouncement that almost all of the so-called criteria for a
pooling of interest were disregarded. As a result of this complete
deterioration, almost any combination could be a pooling unless
cash or its equivalent was used as the medium of exchange. Even
when cash was used there came into being a creature known as a
part-pooling, part-purchase which amounted to a half-man, half
woman approach. As far as I am concerned this has to rank as
our all-time low point in debasing accounting principles.
During the mid-Sixties, a senior staff member of the Securities
and Exchange Commission stated in a paper prepared for a pro
fessional development course that ARB No. 48 had “ . . . been
interpreted with increasing liberality over the years, so that many
transactions previously considered to be a purchase may now be
treated as a pooling or a part-purchase, part-pooling.” He went on
to state that “The general principle has been that any combination
may properly be treated as a purchase, but that a pooling is per
missive only and not mandatory.”
Is there any wonder that the APB, after reiterating the principles
to be followed on business combinations, would become discouraged
with the manner in which these principles were ignored in actual
practice, with the full acquiescence of a statutory authority?
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All of us remember the puzzled and indignant reaction of the
general investing public during the late 1960’s when it became
increasingly aware of the disservice caused by the failure to follow
the designated principles for business combinations. Even then, it
was this adverse public reaction to a slumping stock market which
identified the problem rather than the actions of practicing
accountants or statutory authorities.
The business combination issue in the Sixties thus contributed
significantly to the serious credibility gap that exists in financial
reporting today. Since the APB had repeatedly endorsed the
accounting philosophies to be used for business combinations,
the logical question is “Why weren't they followed?’’. This failure,
I believe, represents the most significant problem we have in
accounting today. It would be well for us to take a careful look
to see what happened.
The criteria for poolings were eroded gradually — case by case.
First the relative size test went out the window. Next continuity of
management was ignored. Then continuity of business was
considered to be unimportant. Then came the creative packages of
convertible securities of literally all types and varieties; and finally,
warrants and even more imaginative schemes to effect poolings.
This continued until we no longer had a logical basis to be followed
in accounting for business combinations. Each time financial
statements containing a further breach of the pooling principles
were made public and went unchallenged, they became the new
low-water mark for everyone to try to lower even further. This
situation finally climaxed in 1970 when APB Opinion No. 16 was
adopted which, while blessing the pooling concept, spelled out
extremely rigid rules — no longer “principles” but “rules” to be
followed in the determination of accounting for mergers.
To make absolutely certain that there would be no erosion of
the rules promulgated by Opinion No. 16, the Nev/ York Stock
Exchange, mindful of the disregard of previous opinions, decided
not to depend solely upon the practicing accountants or the
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statutory authorities to determine whether or not a business com
bination qualifies as a pooling. Before it will approve listing of
common stock to be issued in a pooling transaction, the Exchange
now requires a statement from the applicant explaining in detail
how the combination complies with each of the many pooling
rules. A written, favorable opinion from the independent account
ants must accompany this statement. The Exchange then makes
its own independent judgment on whether or not the combination
qualifies as a pooling.
The president of the American Institute recently had this to say
about Opinion No. 16:
“These are not new rules in accounting for poolings of interest.
We had an accounting guide on poolings many years ago.
Neither the accounting profession nor the Securities and Ex
change Commission supported the criteria that was established.
As a result the criteria was no longer effective. So the APB took
a stronger stand on the accounting for mergers and acquisitions.
It established new criteria which isn’t identical but almost the
same as the old guideline.”
While many of us engaged in the practice of public accounting
feel that the trend of the APB towards making “rules” in place of
“principles” is wrong and harmful, in view of what happened to
the principles espoused for business combinations, it is under
standable why the Board has changed the thrust of its role.
One final comment about Opinion No. 16. The Board faced a
major dilemma in deciding whether or not the new rules adopted
in 1970 should be made retroactive to correct the abuses in re
cording prior business combinations. The Board knew that many
balance sheets contained assets which had been booked during the
1960’s on an inconsistent basis as a result of the pooling break
down. Should the Board insist on retroactive application of
Opinion No. 16 so that assets would be uniformly stated, or should
it close its eyes to the mess and make the opinion non-retroactive?
The Board concluded that no attempt should be made
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to go back and straighten out prior business combinations.
Much has been and is being said about the desirability of uni
formity and most of the discussion is generally directed toward
obtaining uniformity between companies. Because improper pool
ings have not been corrected, many instances of non-uniformity
exist today — not only between companies, but within individual
companies in valuing assets acquired in business combinations.
Many transactions have been recorded as poolings in the past
which would not qualify today, which means that the carrying
amount of the assets have been recorded on a completely different
basis than similar assets will be recorded in future business com
binations. It is interesting to note that the reports of certifying public
accountants continue to show the familiar “consistent with prior
year” where in many cases this undoubtedly is not necessarily
correct.
I believe the breakdown of accounting for business combinations
occurred primarily because there were two separate and distinct
bodies—the APB and the SEC—attempting to establish accounting
principles, with the practicing accountants not only going along
with the SEC on a case-by-case basis but in many cases either
originating or encouraging the fragmentation of the principles.
These two separate and distinct bodies attempting to establish
accounting principles is the primary reason, I believe, why we aren’t
solving our problems.
The investment credit issue points out another example of a
confusing and intolerable situation caused by divided responsibility
for determining accounting principles. Without attempting a
complete post-mortem on that issue, let’s look at the following
chronology:
1. The Revenue Act of 1962 provided for an investment credit.
2. In December of that same year the APB issued Opinion
No. 2 which in part stated that:
a. of two possible methods for including the investment
credit in net income, one should be used and the other
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should not be used; and
b. there are two “equally appropriate” methods for balance
sheet presentations.
3. One month later, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release
No. 96 which in part stated that:
a. the Commission will accept either of the two methods
for including the investment credit in net income; and
b. it is the Commission’s opinion that one of the alterna
tive balance sheet presentations should not be used.
4. In March 1964 the APB issued Opinion No. 4 which stated
in part that:
Because of what happened after the issuance of Opinion
No. 2, including specifically the issuance by the SEC of its
accounting release, the Opinion has not attained general
acceptance; therefore, the alternative method for including
the investment credit in net income is also acceptable.
As a result of having two separate groups involved in establishing
accounting principles, a very confusing and chaotic situation
resulted.
Finally, I would like to examine some of the recent actions
which have been initiated in an attempt to identify and solve our
problems. As a result of a conference in January of this year, at
which 21 accounting firms were represented, the AICPA appointed
two study groups. One, called the “Study Group On How Account
ing Principles Should Be Established”, is comprised of seven
members headed by former Securities and Exchange Commissioner
Francis M. Wheat. Professor David Solomons, of the University
of Pennsylvania, who will be speaking at this meeting, is also a
member of the group.
While we have had many other AICPA-appointed study groups
or committees in the past which have accomplished little in solving
our basic problems, there is a significant difference in the com
position of this group. For the first time, the AICPA has included
a lawyer, a financial analyst, and a prominent industrialist. All
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After the American Accounting Association was informed that
the Institute was making its own study, it tabled any further
action pending completion of the Institute’s report.
So now we are faced with at least one additional study regard
ing the development of accounting principles and how they are to
be implemented. Everyone involved in accounting and financial
reporting is anxiously awaiting the results of this study. Herbert
Knortz, president of the International Association of Financial
Executives and senior vice president and comptroller of Inter
national Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, said in a recent
article:
“Credibility is the fragile asset of accounting management and
the public accountant. In the interest of the public weal, this
credibility must be preserved. An avalanche of public dissent
is already trembling on the brink. In my opinion, change is
going to take place and half measures are unlikely to succeed.
Therefore, financial professionals must make certain that
accounting principles become representative of the views of all
and that credible financial reports are assured through principles
which are rooted in economic realism.’’
1 agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Knortz’s views. The Institute’s
study group has an opportunity to lead the way in eliminating
the confusion regarding the establishment of accounting principles.
It cannot do this merely by making routine suggestions for changes
in the Accounting Principles Board. This was done before by other
study groups with no ascertainable improvement.
In order to make major progress, I believe that the study group
will have to include the following as part of its recommendations:
1. There should be only one group determining accounting
principles and this group should restrict itself to principles
and not to rules.
2. This new principle-making body should be selected by a
committee comprised of such people as the presidents of the
American Institute of CPAs, the American Accounting
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Association, the New York Stock Exchange, the Federation
of Financial Analysts, and The Financial Executives Institute.
The principle-making body should include representatives
whose backgrounds are other than strictly accounting, such
as economists, financial analysts, and other financial experts.
This would, of course, eliminate the requirement that mem
bership be confined to CPAs.
3. Practicing professional accountants and their clients must
accept and follow the principles that would be promulgated
by this new principle-making body. It should then follow
that statutory authorities, such as the SEC, should not
attempt to establish accounting principles on a case-by-case
basis, but should concentrate their activities on making
sure that reporting companies and their independent
accountants follow and disclose compliance with the
prescribed principles.
If the foregoing recommendations were made and adopted, we
would be on our way to solving our problems. We would be able
to eliminate the confusion that presently exists for companies and
their independent accountants as a result of being caught between
conflicting decisions of two rule-making bodies. This manner of
operation would call for much more professional courage and
independence on the part of practitioners in insisting that proper
accounting be followed, and would result in far better financial
reporting by the business community.
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STEPHEN A. ZEFF
Professor of Accounting
Tulane University
The following proposal is intended to address one of the principal

criticisms directed at the work of the Accounting Principles Board, to-wit,
the slowness with which it turns out Opinions.

This proposal provides for

a Board of (about) twenty-four members, divided into panels of eight members

each.

Each panel would deal with specific questions before the Board, and

its decisions would be definitive and final.

The full Board would rule on

questions of precept—underlying accounting and reporting objectives and

concepts—that constitute the framework within which the three panels would
issue Opinions on specific accounting and reporting questions.

Appeals

from decisions of the panels may be made to the full Board only when it is

alleged that the panel’s decision is not consonant with the precepts
enunciated by the full Board, where it is contended that the Board has not

ruled on a pertinent precept, or where the validity of a precept ruled
upon at a prior time is itself under challenge.

be obliged to rule on all such appeals.

The full Board would not

A procedure should be devised

comparable to the certiorari petitions to the U.S. Supreme Court.

COMMENTS.

(1)

At the base of this proposal is the belief that not

all Big Eight Firms should be represented on any one panel.

Since the

inception of the enlarged Committee on Accounting Procedure in 1938, the

large CPA firms, lately the Big Eight, have always been represented.

This

policy was perhaps desirable when, in the early days of the old Committee,

it was imperative to gain their support in achieving "general acceptance."
Today, in view of the "Special Bulletin," under which members of the

Institute are obliged (once the amendment to the Code of Professional Ethics
is passed) to disclose departures from recommendations of the Board, the

active participation of all Big Eight

Firms

1

in each decision of the Board

2

is no longer the imperative it once was.

Furthermore, it must be decided

whether the Board is to be a ’’deliberative body” or more so a political
body in which each large firm may "lobby" for its favored opinion.

In

recent years, the view has gained ascendancy that the Board is indeed
deliberative and that general principles and objectives are needed to

guide its work.

It should no longer be seen as a body in which decisions

are predicated on what each member "likes," regardless of overall objec

tives, agreed-upon concepts, and the preponderance of empirical evidence.
Unless accounting advances beyond this stage of special pleading and
personal briefs, it will not solve its central problems.
Several representatives of Big Eight Firms, perhaps as many as four,
could be on any panel.

The membership of each panel would not alter from

decision to decision, except as the composition of the Board itself changes.
The U.S. accounting profession could learn from the experience in

Canada and Great Britain, where the membership of counterpart committees
does not necessarily include representatives of all the biggest firms at

all times.

The 1970-71 Accounting and Auditing Research Committee (Canada)

had no representative from Deloitte & Co.

In 1969-70, it had no representa

tives from Touche Ross & Co. and McDonald, Currie & Co.

In 1970-71, the

Accounting Standards Steering Committee (Great Britain) was without repre
sentatives from Whinney, Murray & Co., Arthur Young, McClelland Moores & Co.
and Arthur Andersen & Co.

Moreover, two of the Committee's eleven members

were partners in Touche Ross & Co., one from London and the other from
Birmingham.

Representation from the Big Eight has been a blind spot in the profes
sion for too long.

Foremost among the criteria should be the quality and

3

representativeness (of the profession and other sectors) of members of the
Board.

That all the large firms be represented at all times should be dis

tinctly subsidiary, if it should be a criterion at all.
(2)

In some sense, the notion of panels formally acknowledges the key

role played by subcommittees in the present Board.

These smaller bodies do

the great share of the investigatory and drafting work, and much depends on
the effectiveness with which they carry out their tasks.

One supposes that

considerable time is consumed in meetings of the full Board in hearing the

divergent points of view of eighteen members, and he wonders if the time is

all well spent.

A smaller body composed of able individuals not only would

call on the views of a fair number of qualified persons, it would be likely

to act much more expeditiously than can the present Board.

It would seem

that more would be gained by the Board’s ability to cover a wider range of

vexing questions in

a

shorter period of time, than would be lost by the

absence of some eight or ten points of view in each panel (i.e., in compari

son with an 18-member Board which would deal with all questions).

The

Board’s current practice of holding formal hearings on controversial subjects
would give each panel the opportunity of becoming exposed to viewpoints not

already espoused by its members.
I realize that this proposal ignores other issues: should the Board
remain within the Institute, should members include non-CPAs, and the like.

These issues must be resolved on their merits, and I do not propose to

address them at this time.

I have deliberately abbreviated the presentation

of this proposal in order to conserve the Commission’s time.

On request

from the Commission, I would be pleased to comment further along this line.
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DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTANCY

COLLEGE OF COMMERCE

25 EAST JACKSON BOULEVARD
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

UNIVERSITY

WEbster 9-3525

September 29, 1971

Mr. Michael A. Pinto
Administrative Secretary
of the Study Group
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Pinto:
This letter is intended as an input for the Group’s deliber
ations rather than as the expression of a wish to participate in
the public hearings.

In seeking an answer to the first ’pertinent question', it
may be helpful to review how the term "accounting principles” first
found its way, 39 years ago, into the suggested form of accountant’s
report. The enclosed xerox copy from Memoirs and Accounting Thought
of George O. May,[Paul Grady, editor (New York, N.Y., The Ronald
Press, 1962), pages 73 and 74,]
states that in the early drafts "the
words ’principles’ and ’practices’were used almost interchangeably”,
and that ”it was natural that the form of report should use either
the word ’practices’ or ’principles’”.

In common use, the word ’’principle” has inherent in it the
quality of a generalization (cf. Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, Unabridged, page 1803); ’’accounting principles”, on the
other hand, is primarily a reference to a collection of detailed,
specific pronouncements of the APB and its predecessor committee.
The word ’’principles” in ’’accounting principles” represents, then, a
term of art whose meaning, namely: a collection of detailed specifics,
differs materially from the meaning it has in common usage, namely:
a generality.

Precedent exists for revising accountancy’s terms of art if they
tend to cause confusion in the minds of less sophisticated users of
accounting information: Gone are the contra-asset ’’reserve”, and
’’earned surplus”. Adoption of the term ’’principle” in the original
accountant’s report does not appear to have been based on conceptual
considerations. There seems little reason to retain ’’principles”
if ’’standards” (or procedures, or practices, or what-have-you ) can
express the same thought with less ambiguity.
Sincerely yours,

FL:mlw

Fred La
Associate Professor
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From: Paul Grady, ed., Memoirs and Accounting Thought of George O. May
(New York, N.Y., The Ronald Press, 1962), pages 73 and 74.

Perhaps the words of greatest interest in the certificate arc: "In ac
cordance with accepted principles of accounting consistently maintained

by the company during the year under review." 1 discussed the word
“principles” in an article which appeared in the Journal of December,
1937, commenting on the essay of Mr. Gilbert R. Byrne which had ap
peared in the November issue of the Journal. Mr. Hurdman dealt with
the words “consistently followed by the company during the year under
review” in his paper at the 1938 meeting of the Institute. It will be ob
served that the Committee spoke of the five propositions contained in
Exhibit I to the letter of September 22, 1932 as “principles.”
In 1931, when the Special Committee on Development of Accounting
Principles was considering whether these propositions should be accepted
formally by the Institute membership, the appropriateness of the term
“principle” was questioned by Mr. Lewis Ashman, and in its report
printed in the 1931 yearbook the Committee used the expression “rules
or principles.” Its successor, the Committee on Accounting Procedure, in
its first bulletin dropped the word "principle” and substituted the head
ing “rules formerly adopted.”
A reference to the correspondence between the Exchange and the In
stitute which preceded the suggestion of the form of report or certificate
will show that the words “principles” and “practices” were used almost
interchangeably. Tims, in describing the history of accounting develop
ments, the Institute committee in its letter of September 22, 1932 spoke
generally of “conventions” and “principles.” The Stock Exchange, in its
letter to corporations of January 31, 1933, asked six questions, the last of
which was—
Whether such system in their opinion conforms to accepted accounting
practices, and particularly whether it is in any respect inconsistent with any
of the principles set forth in the statement attached hereto. (Italics supplied)
The nine accounting firms, in their letter of February 24, 1933 used
this language:
Your sixth question, apart from the specific reference to the principles
enumerated, aims, we assume, to insure that companies arc following account
ing practices which have substantial authority back of them. (Italics supplied)

They also expressed their agreement with the five general principles
enumerated in the memorandum.
In the Institute’s letter of December 21, 1933 it agreed that any form
of accountant’s report should answer the questions contained in the Stock
Exchange letter of January 31, 1933.
In these circumstances, it was natural that the form of report should
use either the word “practices” or “principles.” The earlier drafts gen
erally used the former, but in the final draft the word “principles” pre _
vailed.
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Office of the Controller

United
Aircraft
October 6, 1971

American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
Study on Establishment of
Accounting Principles
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10019

Dear Sirs:
Statement of Views on Establishment
of Accounting Principles

We are pleased to have the opportunity to express our
views on how to improve procedures for establishing accounting
principles. We believe this study is a most important endeavor
which hopefully will lead to better and more informative financial
reporting.
During the past few years, it has appeared to us that
the Accounting Principles Board, in some respects, may not have
been as responsive as desirable to the accounting and financial
requirements of industry. It is not entirely clear as to why this
may have occurred, although there appears to have been a tendency
on the part of the APB to give too little weight to the fact that
the company, rather than the auditor, is primarily responsible for
financial and accounting operations including the preparation and
publication of financial statements. Also, there may have been a
tendency to forget that a primary purpose of accounting is to
provide financial discipline in operating the business and that
company management has the primary responsibility to administer
such discipline.

As a result, it sometimes seems as if it is thought that
it is primarily the security analyst who requires meaningful finan
cial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles and that little attention is given to the
needs of creditors, stockholders and management. Therefore, in
presenting our comments and suggestions to improve the means for
establishing accounting principles, we presume that the purpose of
accounting and financial statements is to serve all interested
parties.

EAST HARTFORD 8, CONNECTICUT

UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION
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Our observations lead us to believe that a body entrusted
with accounting rulemaking
*
should not be restricted to certified
public accountants mostly engaged only as auditors.
It would appear
that an accounting rulemaking body should include individuals having
direct responsibility for financial and accounting matters as well
as those responsible for auditing.
There is also a question as to whether the establishment
of accounting principles should continue to be the sole responsi
bility of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
which is almost completely devoted to the practice of public account
ing. Additionally, we question whether it is fair to saddle Institute
members with all the significant costs of conducting necessary re
search and promulgating accounting principles.
In raising these
questions, we do not suggest that the AICPA does not have a responsi
bility for accounting principles -- on the contrary, we would hope
that the Institute would continue as an active participant in this
area, but in partnership with others who have similar responsibilities.
We suggest that a reorganized APB be created to include,
by formula, a broader representation consisting of individuals from
both public accounting and industry with perhaps minority repre
sentation from the banking industry and from the investment community.
It would appear about eleven members might meet the test of being
representative and at the same time be a workable group. Such a
Board might consist of four auditors in the active practice of public
accounting, four financial executives who would be the chief financial
and/or accounting officers of publicly owned companies and one member
employed in the banking industry.
In addition, to further enhance
the breadth of a new Board, inclusion of one member representing the
major stock exchanges, and one member representing the Securities
and Exchange Commission, would be appropriate.
We would suggest that only the public accounting members
be required to be certified public accountants although each member
should have had extensive experience in financial and accounting
affairs.

Since it is doubtful whether the AICPA should properly
sponsor such a broadly based body, we suggest that consideration be
given to having the Board be administered jointly by the major stock
exchanges in the United States. These institutions more than any
others have the most extensive contact with both company and stock
holder. We envision that the exchanges would be responsible for
the appointment of each member, strictly within the confines of
the eleven member formula, but would be expected to consider most
* It is a misnomer to call APB pronouncements "Opinions” when in
fact these documents practically have the effect of law, at
least as far as publicly owned companies are concerned.
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- 3 seriously nominations by interested groups. For example, it
would seem appropriate that the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants suggest names for the auditor appointees.
Similarly, the Financial Executives Institute would possibly
suggest qualified financial executives for appointment. The
American Bankers Association and the Securities Exchange Commission
could nominate members, and exchanges themselves could have sole
responsibility for naming one member.

It would appear necessary for the Board to have a fulltime research staff, the costs of which would be borne by the
exchanges out of their fees charged to listed companies.

We recognize that the means by which these suggestions
might be best carried out require careful study and effective
communications with all affected institutions. However, in order
to achieve any significant improvement in APB operations, we believe
that it is most desirable that the representation on the Board be
broadened to include the direct participation of stockholders, the
auditing profession, and industry financial executives. We suggest
that the Study Committee pursue such a course.

C. B. Preston
Controller

k
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AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

WRITTEN STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY A. CARL TIETJEN
The title, Establishment of Accounting Principles, as

well as a reading of the charge to the committee, raise a question

of whether the study may fall short of maximum usefulness because
it is too narrow.

The title and charge seem to imply that the

thirty-seven year old concept of ’’generally accepted accounting
principles” is untouchable, and that the only issue relates to who

should determine such principles and in what manner.

However, the

charge fortunately contains this sentence: "It will also involve

consideration of entirely new approaches."

The committee’s

"Memorandum of Pertinent Questions" also holds promise of a broader
study.

Therefore, this paper was prepared on the assumption that

the committee is open to any and all suggestions for improvement

in financial reporting.
The first step should be to drop the term "generally
accepted accounting principles." This concept started out as
little more than a nice sounding phrase, but over the course of

several decades it has gravitated inevitably and with increasing
speed toward a rule book, ever thicker and more complex.

One need

look no further than the half century of experience with the

internal revenue code to conclude that improved financial reports

are not likely to come from detailed mandatory prescriptions.
Technique is important in financial reporting but of even
greater importance is the integrity of the people involved.

All

experience with tax practice and financial reports seems to indi
cate that "the greater the rules, the lower the integrity."
Therefore, at this time the profession should move toward empha
sizing and strengthening the integrity factor, with less emphasis

on detailed technical rules.

Present techniques are quite adequate
to produce useful financial reports, if the people preparing such
reports desire that they be useful.

The present concern in the financial community with the
credibility of financial reports arises not nearly so much from
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technical shortcomings as it does from a low order of integrity on

the part of some managements and a misguided sense of professional
ism of some independent accountants.

While the transgressors are

a minority, the belief seems to be widespread that this minority
has been growing.

In the writer’s opinion, that is the most

important reason behind the creation of the present study group.

What is most needed by both management and independent

accountants at this time is not further escalation of technical
rules but broad standards that will give them sound guidance in
"what they are attempting to do," not "how to do it."

In seventy-

five years the organized accounting profession has never set forth
the goals of financial reporting.

If a client were to ask the

simple and logical question, "what must I do to achieve excellence

in my financial reporting?"—there is nothing the AICPA has pro
duced that could be handed to him that would be responsive to his

question.
With respect to broad standards or goals, fortunately
the accounting profession has a precedent in its auditing standards
which were formulated over twenty years ago.

This was a reasonable

effort toward answering the "what" question in the auditing area.
During the years since auditing standards were adopted the profes
sion has issued a number of technical auditing statements for the

purpose of satisfying the "how" question in specific situations
that arose in applying the broad standards.

Most independent

accountants seem to share the writer’s view that auditing standards
and the supporting interpretive statements have been quite success

ful in raising the quality of auditing practice over a period of
two decades.

It is proposed that the narrow outmoded concept of
"generally accepted accounting principles" be abandoned and re
placed by a broader concept consisting of three interrelated
elements as described hereafter:
1. Accounting standards, to be adopted officially by the AICPA

and incorporated in its educational and other programs.

These standards would give broad guidance to management and
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independent accountants with respect to their responsi

bilities for financial reporting, and would become the

basis for accountants’ opinions.

(Appendix A)

2. A broad-based review board or council, with a membership
large enough to include at least one representative of
each of the principal groups having a stake in financial

reports, including, of course, management and the

accounting profession.

Its basic objective would be to

uphold accounting standards by reviewing apparent devi
ations and taking appropriate action where required.
(Appendix B)

3. A technical group (currently the APB) whose function
would be to supply such technical guidance as was re

quired to support accounting standards.

It is believed

that adoption of standards and creation of a strong

review body would remove from the technical group much
of the pressure now centered on the APB, which has been
attempting to cover too much ground too quickly, and in

effect,taking over a large part of the responsibility for
financial reporting from the managements and independent
accountants of individual companies.

(Appendix C)

It will be recognized that this approach is one of
enlightened self-regulation, which fundamentally would continue to

place responsibility for financial reporting in the hands of the
accounting profession and its clients. Granting that financial

reporting in the sixties fell short of the ideal, the writer
nevertheless believes strongly that a free profession and free

business should be given every chance to justify continuance of
their logical roles in financial reporting and in our society as
a whole.
* * *

Appendix D gives summary information on the writer’s
experience and qualifications.

New York, N. Y.
October 7, 1971

A. CARL TIETJEN
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APPENDIX

ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

Attached is a reprint of a recent comprehensive article

which discusses the need for accounting standards and includes,
on pages 8 and 9, a tentative codification of such standards.

The accounting standards contemplated here are, of
course, standards in the same sense as were the auditing standards

proposed in 1947 by the AICPA Auditing Procedure Committee when
they stated:

’’Auditing standards may be said to be differentiated
from auditing procedures in that the latter relate
to acts to be performed, whereas the former deal
with measures of the quality of the performance of
those acts, and the objectives to be attained in the
employment of the procedures undertaken.”
It has become common in recent years to refer to
pronouncements of the APB as ’’standards.”

It takes only brief

reflection to realize that these pronouncements deal with

accounting practices or methods, not standards in the qualitative
sense as defined so clearly by the Auditing Procedure Committee.

Accounting practices and methods are, of course, important, but
they should be viewed in their proper perspective as merely acts

to be performed in attaining the quality standards.
Accounting standards will not be a panacea, but they

should form a sound basis for progress in the quality of finan
cial reporting.

In practice, standards would have the effect

of giving the independent accountant equal responsibility with
management for financial reports, and thus strengthen his
position of independence greatly.
Qualitative standards are desirable in any complex

activity where personal integrity and competence are major
factors. Standards appeal to the best in people; stultifying
rules breed resentment in people which defeats the purpose.

A
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REVIEW BOARD OR COUNCIL

The membership should be representative of all important
groups having an interest in financial reporting, except government.
That is because government representatives would tend to overshadow

the private members.

Moreover, government agencies normally have

their own channels for reviewing financial reports of publicly

owned companies.
The review function is visualized initially as a self-

regulatory arm of the AICPA, financed by it.

Inclusion in its

membership of non-AICPA members should assure objectivity.

Added

assurance could come from a provision that the chairman be a person
of outstanding ability and prestige from outside the profession.
Adequate representation would require membership of at

least twelve and perhaps twice that number.

Conceivably the

chairmanship would be a full-time paid job, with some form of

remuneration for other outside members.

Term of office should be

sufficiently long to enable a member to become familiar with the

job and make a contribution to the work of the group—probably a

minimum of three years.

Adequate technical staff assistance

should be provided by AICPA.
For maximum effectiveness, the review group should have

the power to publicize its decisions, but the legal implications
of such power would require careful consideration.

B
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APPENDIX

TECHNICAL GROUP

If standards were adopted and a strong review body
created, it seems likely that much of the pressure now borne

by the APB would be removed.

Unless a "fresh start" is deemed

essential, perhaps the basic structure of APB could be salvaged.
A change of name would be needed, however, since the term

"principles" is to be dropped.
The technical group’s function would be to supply

technical guidance as required to support accounting standards,

particularly the standard relating to accounting practices and
methods.

It is strongly recommended that future pronouncements

be confined to important questions, be technically sound, be as

short and concise as possible, and be phrased as broad guidelines
instead of as detailed mandatory rules.
The most important qualifications for membership in
this group should be demonstrated technical expertise and a
disposition to work cooperatively with others.

The majority

should be members of the practicing profession, with minority
representation of other interested parties except government.

In view of its changed role, the number of members could
probably be reduced to say twelve.

None need be full-time or

salaried, but they should be prepared to devote substantial
time.

AICPA should provide adequate staff assistance as well

as the entire financing.

of three years.

Term of office should be a minimum
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APPENDIX

EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS OF A. CARL TIETJEN
In practice with Price Waterhouse & Co. continuously since 1935,
Thirteen of these years were in St. Louis, five in Cleveland

and the remainder in New York.

Also had major special assign

ment experience in Western Europe.
Admitted to partnership in New York in 1956

Started firm's formal research department in 1958 and continued

in charge until 1966, concentrating on client financial
reporting problems.

Chairman of firm's Accounting Committee 1960 to 1966
CPA in several states; member AICPA and other professional

societies

AICPA experience includes membership on Practice Review Committee
and advisory board for ARS No. 7

Lectured on advanced accounting, Washington University (St. Louis)
1945 to 1948

Contributor to professional journals for the past twenty-five years.
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Financial
Reporting
Responsibilities
The author believes
that what is needed is
an up-to-date concept
based on quality standards
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ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

Study Committee

Public Hearing

New York, November 3, 1971

Comments by

GEORGE GIBBS, CPA, Ph.D.
Professor of Economics and Accounting
Claremont Men’s College
Claremont Graduate School
California

Formerly
Director, California Society of Certified Public Accountants
President, California State Board of Accountancy
Member, Board of Examiners AICPA
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1.

ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES - SCOPE OF THE TASK

One answer to the question "What is meant by the term accounting principles?"

is that there have been really two categories included under this term (a) basic

ideas or fundamentals , which I have called principles,1 and (b) procedures, some
with several acceptable alternatives.

It may be that the word "standard" should

be employed in this system, as suggested by Professor Solomons.

2

It is important to remember the distinction between fundamentals and

The fundamentals are really a body of doctrine, which must be re

procedures.

ferred to by thinking men and women as a basis for making decisions as to which
procedure should be adopted as the standard to be followed by the members of

the profession.

In an intelligent system there will often be room for several

acceptable alternatives, assuming that the particular procedure is fully disclosed

and also that the significance of the choice is disclosed.
The fundamentals will change very slowly, if at all, while the procedures,
including alternatives, will change and specific rules as to how to follow the

procedures will need to be promulgated by the Board.

Attached hereto is an "Accounting Theory for the Preparation of Financial
Statements"

3

which presents an outline for all types of organizations:
A.

Underlying Conditions in the Economic World

B.

Principles (which now may be called Fundamentals):

- Disclosure
- Materiality
- Consistency

- Comparability
- Conservatism
- Income Determination

-1-

C.

Assumptions (necessary in the preparation of financial
statements for a particular legal entity)

D.

Procedures (with some examples of alternatives)

The lack of definition of "principles” (or "fundamentals”) by accountants

was clearly stated by Mr. McMonnies of the Institute of Chartered Accountants

of Scotland in a review of three publications of the Accountants
*
Study Group.

International.

He found confusion both as to terminology and content.

For

example, consistency, which I have called a principle, and would be one of the
fundamentals, was called both a "standard” and a "convention" and he found that

other writers referred to consistency as a "principle," "requirement,” "criterion,”
"tenet,” and "attribute."4

It is no wonder the public is confused when we continue, as we have done
since the 1920's, to say in accordance with generally accepted accounting

principles.

Also we have never cleared up the idea of "generally accepted."

By what groups in the financial community are these items generally accepted?

They cannot be made so by edict!
Obviously, if the practice of accounting is to be changed, then the wording

of the "Auditors Report Letter" must be changed.
several versions, not just one as at present.

Probably there should be

It should really tell the reader

more than it does now as to the opinion of the auditor, how and why he arrived
at it.
A recent booklet, The Auditors Report .... Its Meaning and Significance,
prepared by both bankers and Certified Public Accountants, stated that "No bank
officer anywhere is qualified to make loan judgments on the strength of auditreports unless he is fully conversant with the concepts and viewpoints that are

set out in the paper that follows."5
This would seem to be conclusive except

that in the booklet it states that "generally accepted accounting principles"

-2-

are "that group of concepts and related practices for dealing with accounting
matters."6

It refers to the Accounting Research Study No. 7 by Paul Grady

which lists 121 items, called principles, but which are in reality largely
7
descriptive of procedures.
No distinction is made between fundamentals and de
tailed procedures. There cannot be 121 fundamentals.

2.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ESTABLISHING BOARD

The primary responsibility for establishing accounting standards should

reside in a non-governmental body especially since we are members of a pro
fession.

It should set standards such that there would be no need for duplica

tion by government agencies or other private organizations.

Thus, the Securities

Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service and other Federal and state

agencies would be relieved of some of their present duties.

Individual standards

could be referred to by other organizations and by government agencies when re

quired.

Government agencies would need to supplement the standards with specific

rules in certain cases.

An interesting study, pointing out the need for more

cooperation both between government agencies and between government and the

profession, was published by Arthur Andersen & Co. in 1965.

Their solution in

cluded a proposal for "United States Court of Accounting Appeals” which would
have solved some of the conflicts between Federal government agencies but would
still leave ample work for the Board.8

3.

COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD

The Board should be composed of not more than nine men, chosen for life
tenure and serving full time at an adequate salary.

They should be Certified

Public Accountants but so chosen that the majority represents the medium and
small practitioners rather than being dominated by the larger firms.

The Board

activities should be directed from a city 'other than New York to avoid undue
influence of the financial world, perhaps San Francisco or Denver.

-3-

The cost
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of the Board activities should be borne by the members of the profession.

4.

METHODS OF OPERATION

The methods of operation could be improved by permitting alternative

procedures provided that the significance of the choice of a particular
alternative was adequately disclosed. If the basics are straightened out and
we stop being illogical such as is exhibited by the following statement used

internationally, nationally and found i

the Rules of the State Board of

Accountancy of California, the most populous state in the Union.
"The term ’accounting principles' is construed to include not only accounting

principles and practices but also the methods of applying them."9 How can
intelligent men pass rules like this?

How can A include A, B, and C?

It is

logically impossible.

Having recently commented on drafts of 6 proposed pronouncements of the
present Board, I am convinced that the operation could be improved.

In one case

I recommended the deletion of 46 repetitions of the phrase "generally accepted

accounting principles."

5.

ACCOUNTING RESEARCH

There are several types of activities included under the term Research, or

should it be Search if it is the first time a subject is really being studied?
A.

Interpretations.

Any written procedures

promulgated by the Board will call for in
terpretations.

However, it is improper to

suddenly state that interpretations written

by 2 staff men bring about a situation wherein
it can be stated that "members (of the AICPA)

should be aware that they may be called upon
to justify departures from the interpretations."10

Staff should be advisory only, not "judicial."
interpretations should remain "unofficial."

-4-
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B.

Investigation.

Before any action is taken

toward adoption of a procedure the staff of

the Board should investigate the problem
and report to the Board.

This report should

include references from many sources including

the results of more systematic searchers, both
in the United States and other countries,11
but should be succinctly summarized in order
to permit the Board to make decisions intelligently.
C.

Systematic Searches

Many persons should be encouraged to make
searches for the answers to the problems and
if enough is done and the new Board acts

promptly, then it is hoped that the confidence

of bankers, government officials, business
men, investors, analysts and the general public

will be restored, in the reports made by
Certified Public Accountants.

-5-
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Dr. George Gibbs

Claremont Men’s College
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2.

ACCOUNTING THEORY FOR THE PREPARATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

UNDERLYING CONDITIONS IN THE ECONOMIC WORLD:

a.

Money used as a measure of value and as a medium of exchange.

b.

Legal entity must be designated, as the data must have boundaries.
(Such as individual, corporation, non-profit corporation, trust,
partnership, government).

c.

Relevancy:

d.

Objectivity of data to be used (facts only, not impressions or
wishful thinking).

e.

Periodicity - time periods needed are usually only a portion of the
entire life of the entity.
(Month, quarter or year).

f.

Valuation basis to be declared such as historical, adjusted for price
level, appraisal or present value.

Financial statements must be baaed on relevant data.

PRINCIPLES:
a.

Disclosure - "raison d’ etre” of the statements.

b.

Materiality - all substantial items to be disclosed in statements.
Matter of judgment as to amount and nature of item.

c.

Consistency - necessary in order to permit comparison of data ox the
entity from period to period.

d.

Capital vs. income:

The basic principle

(Proper determination of income).

-matching expenses with income

-matching current expenses with current income

3.

e.

Comparability - between like entitles (there is a trend toward move
disclosure of differences rather than an emphasis on comparability
per se).

f.

Conservatism - If value of assets in doubt, understate and continue
search for liabilities.
(Lawsuits usually cost more than anticipated

ASSUMPTIONS:

(Vary as to different entities being considered).

-If the statements being prepared, arc for a commercial corporation in the
United States, for the current year, then the following assumptions are
necessary:

Page 1 of 2

4.

a.

That it is a legal entity - a corporation organized under the laws
of one of the 50 states, with stock issued publicly, listed on the
NYSE and thus under the jurisdiction of the Securities Exchange
Commission. Also Federal and State income taxes are involved.

b.

That it has yearly audited statements with quarterly interim reports.
Date of year-end to be determined. It can be last day of any month.

c.

That it is a going concern - assume that the management plans to
continue and not liquidate nor be forced to liquidate.
(In the case
of liquidation different values are given to many assets and the
claims of creditors are arranged in order of priority).

d.

That it has a traditional costing system including historical cost
less depreciation for long-life assets and valuation accounts for
accounts and notes receivable. No attempt to reflect effects of
change in the value of money due to inflation or deflation. If re
quired, a separate set of statements, reflecting change in the value
of money could be prepared. Also a separate set of statements re
flecting “current
values” prepared by an independent appraiser
could be prepared or present value of future flow of income.
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PARTIAL LIST OF PROCEDURES (with certain alternatives):

Assets:

Accounts receivable valuation - a. Estimated bad debt loss.
b. Direct charge off as bad debts occur.
Inventory - a. method: Last in first out system, first in-first out
or average value.
b. possible write down of slow moving
or obsolete stock.
Costing system in manufacture
-Choice of various methods of handling underapplied fixed
overhead when operations are at less than capacity.
Direct cost or absorption cost.

Long-life assets-

-Depreciation decisions necessary:
a.

b.
c.
d.

Cost calculation if owner built machinery or building.
Problem of inclusion of overhead,
Life of asset to.be estimated.
Method of depreciation to be chocen.
Salvage value to be estimated.

Liabilities at recorded values
Contingent (pending) liabilities - establish money value if possible.

Tax basis - choice of practices resulting in different net income for
“statement" or “income tax” basis. Includes choice of depreciation methods
or treatment of installment sales collections.
(Note: Differences give rise
to “deferred income taxes” and in some cases a modified definition of current
assets).

10/28/69

Revisad

11/1/71

Page 2
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Claremont Men’s College

Pitzer Hall, Claremont, California 91711

October 22, 1971

Professor David Solomons FCA
Wharton School of Commerce
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Dear David:

At your suggestion I called Frank Wheat and had lunch with him. He asked
if I could come to the meeting November 3 and 4 in New York and I now believe
that I can. I plan to come to New York, Tuesday the Second, and stay at the
Tudor Hotel on East 42nd Street as I have work to do nearby at the headquarters
of the Episcoal Church.
(I have been Treasurer of the Diocese of Los Angeles
since 1948). I will plan to be at the meeting Wednesday and Thursday.
At your suggestion I have sent copies of my article to Mr. Pinto. As to
terminology I have no real objection to the use of the word standard and perhaps
it would be better to use it and also use it for Auditing. Thus, we would have
Accounting Standards and Auditing Standards.

Frank outlined the charge of the Committee to be mostly interested in who
was to be on the Board, how they were to be chosen and how it should operate?
These are very important matters and I will be interested to sec what solutions
are proposed. However, it seems true that the scope of the activities of the
Board is just as important as the procedure of selection of members and the
manner of operation!
Thus, it appears that the delineation of what I called "principles” and you
might call "basic standards” are most important as the Board needs these as guide
lines in making its decisions. Thus, there is reason to distinguish between the
basics which include what I suggested might be called the “essential elements” and
the procedural details. The essential elements were: appropriateness, conservatism,
etc. Perhaps comparability should be added.
(We could agree to use practice as
the term to denote all that the accountant does). In other words, it does seem to
me that we need some agreed upon doctrine (if you wish) as a back drop to support
the decisions made with the detailed determinations. When we discuss, as an example,
pooling, vs. purchase, we use words disclosures of a material fact and also com
parability so we do use the basics in determining which procedure to recomment.

One problem that I think the new board will have to tackle is book base vs.
tax base and the concommittant item — deferred income taxes. If the Board is to
remain independent of government then it must answer criticism from government
agencies. The IRS has suggested that financial statement presentation be the same
as tax form presentation and if this were followed completely then there would be
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no need for the Board at all. This would be a calamity as government seems to go
”by the book: and is not imaginative or flexible! Therefore, the Board must tackle
the real issues and must have guidelines for solving these real issues. However,
sometimes I think that in some cases tax base and book base should be the same i.e.
installment sales. It seems to me that the tax base procedure of recording income
when the cash is received is a more intelligent solution for the stockholder and
also the corollary of showing only the next 12 months installment receivables as
current assets is advisable. A recent case involving millions of dollars was re
lated to the installment problem.
As I told Frank I am preparing a paper for the October 20-22 meeting of the
Western Association of the Collegiate Schools of Business in Tucson, Arizona.
The conference topic is "Managing the Management School -- New Ideas for Old Deans"
and I am on the panel for Academic Planning.
I hope to contribute to the thinking of the meeting November 3 and 4 and will
endeavor to put some more ideas in writing.

Sincerely yours

George Gibbs, C.P.A., Ph.D.
Professor of Economics and Accounting

GG/vc

Enclosure

CC:

(1)

Francis Wheat, Esq.
Michael A. Pinto
List of "Essential Elements"

Appropriateness
Conservatism
Consistency
Continuity
Determination of income

Disclosure
Materiality
Objectivity
Quantifiability
Uniformity

The Accounting Policies Committee
of
The Independent Natural Gas Association of America

The Accounting Policies Committee of the Independent Natural Gas
Association of America (Committee) wishes to respond to the invitation to the

The

public hearing on the Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles.

Independent Natural Gas Association of America is a non-profit trade associa

tion whose membership includes most of the long-distance natural gas trans

mission companies in the United States.
The Committee agrees with the statement of the American Institute of

Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in its Bulletin No. 4 issued in October,
1970 that the responsibility for the reliability of an enterprise’s financial

statements rests with its management.
With this recognized ethical and legal responsibility and with their per

sonal interest and concern as well as their expertise, business financial

managements must have an active part in the establishment and development
of accounting principles and of financial reporting policies and practices,
which will assure that financial reporting conveys meaningful information on

a consistent and comparable basis to the investing public and others.

The

responsibilities of financial management to report meaningful financial infor

mation cannot be delegated, and the financial accounting and reporting by
which those, responsibilities are discharged should not be controlled by require

ments established by the presently constituted membership of the Accounting

Principles Board (APB).

- 2 -

Since its establishment, the APB membership has been selected by the
AICPA and the majority of its members are Certified Public Accountants in
public practice.

The Committee believes that the APB membership should

contain equal representation from the accounting profession and from business
financial management, and some lesser number of members selected from
other groups such as financial analysts and academicians.
In addition to changing the make-up of APB membership, the Committee

also believes that:
(a)

Serious consideration should be given to making the APB function
a full-time activity.

(b)

The total membership of the APB, in order to be effective, should
be established at not more than twenty and not less than twelve.

(c)

Pronouncements or opinions of the APB should require the affirma

tive vote of at least two-thirds of its members.

(d)

The term of APB membership should be so established that the

APB will maintain a continuity of purpose and direction, with

new replacement members coming in at suitable intervals on a
staggered basis.
(e)

Financing for the APB program should be undertaken, on some
equitable basis, by the independent accounting firms.

This manner

of funding will assure uniformity in spreading the costs of this

activity over the entire business community through the accounting
fees paid by business concerns.

- 3 -

(f)

The research facilities of the AICPA and similar research resources

*

of business financial management and other groups should be made

available for use by the APB.

(g)

The newly constituted APB, from the time research studies are

commenced, should seek advice and participation of all interested
parties

on such studies.

It also should conduct information con

ferences and public hearings on the subject matter, issue exposure

drafts when appropriate, disseminate information concerning
pertinent views expressed by respondents, and provide for rebuttal
type responses to such views.

In summary, the Committee believes that business financial management
is in a unique position of accountability to its stockholders, to the general in

vestment public, to the financial community, to governmental agencies and to
others for the accounting principles relied upon in keeping its accounts and
records, and for the caliber of its financial reporting, and that, accordingly,
its responsibility in these areas carries with it a right and an obligation to play

a major role in the establishment of such principles and reporting practices.
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PARK AVENUE

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

October 12, 1971

Mr. Francis M. Wheat, Chairman
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Wheat:

The review, which your Study Group has undertaken, of the
process of determining accounting principles can be of value to the
entire business community, in particular to organizations that
issue financial statements, to persons and groups that use them,
and to members of the accounting profession, who report on them.
Some of the existing dissatisfaction with the way the process has
worked is justified, and we believe it was essential that a study
be undertaken. We are writing to ask the Study Group to consider
our views on a number of matters we think are pertinent to its work.

Under whose auspices?
The central question for the Study Group is: Under whose
auspices are accounting principles to be determined? Various an
swers have been suggested. Among these are the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, representing independent public
accountants; the American Accounting Association, representing
accounting educators; an organization such as the Financial
Executives Institute, representing industry; the Securities and
Exchange Commission, representing the Federal government; and the
New York Stock Exchange, representing users of financial statements.

The AICPA should continue to perform the principle
setting function. We have reached this conclusion primarily be
cause we believe that public accounting firms, acting through the
Institute, are able both to provide a foundation of authority for
accounting principle statements and to supply the accounting com
petence that must be brought to bear in setting the principles.
Providing the authority foundation and supplying the competence
are not separate functions but are dual aspects of a single func
tion; we know of no other body that can perform it as well.
We do not urge the perpetuation of the status quo as an
objective for the Study Group, nor do we believe that performance
cannot be improved. We do urge the Group not to recommend changes
unless the new ways promise to bring clearly superior results with
out creating equal, offsetting disadvantages.
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Without significant exception, the Opinions issued by the
Accounting Principles Board have been accepted by U.S. corporations
as a basis for their financial statements. We believe that this
condition has resulted from the combined impact of the influence of
the accounting firms and the regulatory power of the SEC. The
firms have exerted this influence despite their outright disagree
ment in some instances with the conclusions expressed in the Opin
ions and despite the existence in other instances of practices that
are as easily defended as practices approved in the Opinions. We
believe they have been willing to do so only because the APB is
composed primarily of representatives of accounting firms and func
tions under the auspices of the professional organization of CPAs.
To be sure, the SEC has the regulatory authority to deal
with these matters without any help from the accounting profession.
However, absent the influence of the accounting profession the
Commission would, we believe, have been swamped in adversary pro
ceedings, including court actions, that would have so altered its
method of operation as to disrupt the money markets and impede the
prompt flow of disclosures to stockholders.
Instead, the mechanisms
of the accounting profession have made it possible for the Commis
sion to deal expeditiously, and at an appropriately high level,
with a curtailed number of problems.
As is true of the authority foundation, the competence
brought to the APB by members of accounting firms is, we believe,
unobtainable from any other source. These practicing CPAs are men
of incomparably broad experience; moreover, they are in close touch,
both directly and through their partners, with the problems with
which the APB must deal.
Against this background, none of the alternatives prom
ises significant improvement. None of the other organizations
that might be considered could bring to bear the breadth of exper
ience and the depth of understanding available in accounting firms
(although each has points of view and expertise that ought to be
brought to bear in determining accounting principles). More im
portant, none of them, except an agency of government, could expect
to be effective in enforcing compliance with the statements that
would be issued.
And, even if placing the primary enforcement
responsibility in regulatory hands were conceptually desirable
(we think it is not), this course would entail significant prac
tical disadvantages, including a requirement for a very large
staff.

On the question of whether the principles body should be
an agency of government, we think it significant, and consistent
with our conclusion, that the SEC has in general foreborne to
exercise its statutory prerogative to determine the principles to
be followed in financial statements required to be filed with the
Commission. The Commission, in its nearly forty years of existence,
has exercised a restraint in issuing regulations, at least in the
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accounting area, which may be unprecedent in the history of our
Federal bureaucracy.
It is reasonable to believe that the health
and vigor of the securities industry and of the accounting profes
sion are due in large part to this restraint and that these factors
have not been at the expense of the public welfare but rather have
been to its advantage.
It has been suggested that the principles body ought not
to be under the auspices of the AICPA because of the possibility
that a CPA member may be unduly influenced by the views of a client
of his firm. We disagree.
It is a strength, rather than a weakness,
of the APB that its public accountant members have access to the
experience and views of their clients. Further, in many instances
different clients of a member’s firm will have contrasting points
of view. This concern over undue influence undervalues the funda
mental concern of CPAs for their tradition of independence.
Further,
those who raise this issue may overlook the fact that members of the
principles body, whoever they were, would be subject to pressures
from varying sources, including employers, colleagues, assorted
individuals and groups and their own prior published positions.
CPA members are at least as likely to appreciate and protect the
public interest as members Chosen from other groups would be.
It
might be possible to select persons who would appear to be free of
possible influence, but we question whether, if such persons could
be found, they would be sufficiently in touch with the business
world to deal with the problems of establishing accounting princi
ples .

Who should serve?
We turn now to the question: Who should serve on the
principles body? For reasons already stated, we believe a prepon
derance of the members should be CPAs in public practice. At the
same time, we recognize that persons in other business disciplines
have viewpoints, experience and expertise which are relevant to
the task of determining accounting principles. Hence, the principles
body should make maximum use of assistance available from persons
not among its members. Such influence, of coarse, can be (and has
been) availed of by receiving briefs and by conducting hearings,
and we think these procedures should be continued. We believe,
however, that more direct participation by representatives of
other disciplines can improve the quality of the statements of the
principles body.
Further, we think that providing for such par
ticipation can help to make the body’s statements more palatable
to other groups who have an interest in them.

One way to make it possible for persons in other disci
plines to participate directly would be to set aside seats on the
body for persons who are not practicing CPAs, for example, account
ing educators, corporation executives, economists, securities
analysts, lawyers.
It would be difficult, however, to find persons
in some of these categories who would be able to devote the
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substantial amounts of time (fifty percent or more) that would be
required and whose understanding of financial and accounting matters
would be deep enough so that they could contribute to the solution
of the wide range of problems coming before the body.
Another and perhaps more useful way would be to include
persons in other disciplines as members of subcommittees assigned
to study specified subjects and draft Opinions.
In some instances
the project advisory committee that assists in the preparation of
a research study might appropriately continue to serve until the
principles body had issued a formal statement.

A related question is the length of members’ terms. We
believe that the present arrangement, whereby members usually serve
two three-year terms, is satisfactory in that it adequately accom
modates the benefits of accumulated, detailed familiarity with the
work of the body and the benefits of reasonable rotation.
In searching for ways to accelerate output, it is natural
to wonder whether a smaller group could do better.
In this vein it
has been suggested that the principles body ought to be a smaller
group, composed of perhaps five or six members who would serve full
time.
Although such a group might reach answers faster, we do not
believe the answers would be correspondingly better.
Further, we
think it would be most difficult to find qualified people who
would be willing to serve as members of such a body. Moreover,
however well qualified, the people selected would quickly lose
touch with the business world, so that their pronouncements would
be decreasingly realistic and hence decreasingly accepted. Further,
as suggested earlier we think it unlikely that the accounting firms
would uniformly and effectively support statements of a body on
which they were not represented.
It may be relevant that in the
political arena the bodies to which legislative functions are en
trusted are almost always larger than those to which other major
functions are entrusted.
Appeals

In the eyes of some, the structure of the Accounting
Principles Board is defective because there is no formal procedure
for appealing its decisions. We think this objection evidences a
misunderstanding of the function of the principle-setting body.
To see this it may be useful to use again the analogy between
the function of that body and the function of the most nearly cor
responding type of government body. The appropriate analogy is
with the legislative function, rather than with the judicial. For
the most part, courts hear appeals from decisions of other courts,
not from the actions of legislatures. A legislative action is
subject to court review, but only on the basis that the legislators
have exceeded their authority, as by violating a constitution.
In
the case of an accounting principles body, there is no rationale
for a formal appeal procedure.
In any event, the SEC’s power to
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make accounting rules is an effective restraint, probably more ef
fective than the constitutionality restraint on legislation.
If
there were a procedure to appeal the setting of principles, the
body hearing the appeals might easily become the principle-setting
body, and in that event the group below would lose its signifi
cance .

Operating procedures
A complaint frequently heard is that the Opinions of the
APB have been too detailed. Many believe that the principles body
should limit its statements to broad expressions of philosophy and
intent. We do not believe a general answer can be laid down for
this issue. Rather, we think it should be left to the principles
body to decide how it can best meet the dual objective of (a) mak
ing its statements understandable and enforceable and (b) avoiding
the inclusion of unnecessarily detailed rules.

A serious problem the APB has faced is how to increase
the volume of its output. Ways should be sought to shorten the
time span between the initial consideration of a subject and the
issuance of an Opinion. Ways must also be found to enable the
principles body to better anticipate problems and to deal with
them in an orderly way before they become fires that must be ex
tinguished.
In the long run, the work of the Accounting Objectives
Study Group should be useful in this latter regard.
In the short
run, changes in the APB's operating procedures can be effective by
making more time available.

We believe that a significant advance can be made by in
creasing the extent of quality staff assistance. This has been
obvious to all concerned for some time.
If, before discussing an
issue, the members of the principles body were able to study wellprepared staff papers analyzing the alternatives and the varying
consequences of adopting them, the body ought to be able to reach
conclusions more rapidly than the APB has done in the past. And
surely the members of the body should not be called upon, as APB
members are at present, to perform research and to draft statements.
If the task of expressing the body’s conclusions could be assigned
to able, responsible staff people, the members would be free to
move more quickly in applying their experience and expertise to
the solution of additional issues.
The present requirement for a two-thirds vote of the mem
bership of the Board in order to adopt an Opinion should be con
tinued. This is a suitable safeguard against the issuance of state
ments to which too great a segment of informed opinion is opposed.
For the most part, the Opinions of the APB have become
effective shortly after they were issued.
It would be reasonable,
in many instances, to postpone the effectiveness of statements for
a relatively long period of time, such as one or two years. This
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would give companies an opportunity to adjust to the new principles
but would not seriously undermine the advantage of the change.

Interpretations

The practice of issuing interpretations is useful and
should be continued and expanded. We are not, however, in accord
with all the uses to which the process has been applied or with
the language of the recently adopted preamble to interpretations.
There has been a growing tendency to use the interpreta
tion process as a vehicle for the APB to make pronouncements which
for one reason or another it chooses not to put into the form of an
Opinion. The APB should not substantively alter an Opinion except
by means of another Opinion. On July 30, 1971 the APB approved a
change in the standard language accompanying interpretations which
give interpretations an authority they did not previously have.
We do not believe that the Board should issue two classes of au
thoritative pronouncements, one called Opinions and one called
interpretations and attributed to other authorship.

We believe it would be useful in connection with some
Opinions to issue discussions (whether called interpretations or
something else) which would develop various applications of the
Opinion and sometimes include illustrative applications. We do
not believe, however, that any such documents should carry the
July 30 language:
"However, members should be aware that they may
be called upon to justify departures from the interpretations.”
We also deplore the language "unless otherwise stated
the interpretations are not intended to be retroactive." If they
are only interpretations, they should simply explain what the
Opinion has always meant and the question of retroactivity should
not arise.

Financing
The cost of the process of determining accounting prin
ciples, including the cost of the related research effort, has
been substantial and will continue to be so. We believe that this
cost should be underwritten by different groups in different ways.
CPAs in public practice should continue to bear the preponderance
of the cost, partly by making available the time of APB members
and others and partly by means of direct contributions. We be
lieve that the APB should look increasingly to other interested
organizations for assistance, both in developing and presenting
reasoned position papers and in doing research. We do not believe,
however, that the accounting profession should look to other orga
nizations for direct financial support of the principles body or
of the research effort.
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We believe that the effectiveness of the AICPA’s research
efforts can be improved in a number of ways.
For one matter, we
would like the research studies to be more balanced in their pre
sentation of the arguments for and against the various conclusions
that might be reached. One way to achieve this would be to omit
recommendations of the authors, so that the studies would be neutral
in character. To make this workable, the studies would need to pre
sent alternative conclusions, worked out in relatively complete and
coordinated form, so that the significance of the choices would be
fully understandable.
We believe that studies should go more deeply into the
likely effects of proposed accounting principle changes on finan
cial statements, and hence on business operations.
Such procedures
would expose problems of implementation that the principles body
might otherwise overlook.
We also believe that behavioral research, directed to
finding out how readers use financial statements and how they are
influenced by them, would be helpful.
In order to attain the highest possible volume of output
consistent with maintaining the highest level of quality, the In
stitute should make use of all available sources of research capa
bility. Principal among these are the accounting firms, the uni
versities and the Institute's own research staff. A researcher
must approach his project with enthusiasm, must be able to commit
the time necessary in the aggregate to accomplish it and must be
able to give it sustained attention, with a minimum of interruption,
for relatively long periods. University faculty members may be
able to commit relatively large blocks of time, and consideration
should be given to making better use of their abilities.

Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles

Submitted by:
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Herbert K. Bell Jr.

1.

I believe the board should establish fundamentals, whether we call them "accounting
principles" or "financial accounting and reporting standards." Since Opinion No. 15,
the Board has been issuing detailed, illogical, arbitrary, regulatory instructions,
in most cases, it appears, to patch up or plug up some shady or undesirable accounting
practice or method of financial statement presentation being practiced by some segment
of the business world. They are trying to legislate honesty, integrity and high morals;
and if we have to do that, then, in my opinion, we had better turn in our badges and
let the SEC or some other governmental agency do the job.

2.

I would hate to see the responsibility for establishing accounting standards or
accounting principles reside in a governmental body. However, I sincerely believe
that if we do not improve on the present method of operation - the APB — then the
SEC will some day in the not too distant future step in and take over, which they
now have the power to do.

3.

I believe the present Board is ill-constituted, and will never be able to do an
acceptable job. The reasons:
a.

It is too large and unwieldy.
more effective.

I believe a Board of five or seven would be much

b.There are too many selfish interests being protected by the 18 members (or at
least a large part of them). The independence in mental attitude that we talk
about so much is certainly lacking here.
c.

4.

Closely akin to b, above, is the pressure from the business executives. The
corporate president does not want to be held to an accounting principle or
statement presentation requirement that will make him look bad, regardless of
how bad the situation really is. Look at a few articles in the Wall Street
Journal over the past couple of years and see how many companies have "really
cleaned house” during the business downturn. Why weren't these unfavorable items
handled in 1966 or 1967? Did everything suddenly go sour all at once? Of
course not, and all of you know it.

I would suggest a Board constituted somewhat as follows:

a.

Five or seven masters on a full-time, paid basis.

b.

They should all be CPAs, preferably with experience in public accounting,
industry, and teaching. This sort of varied background should gire knowledge
and understanding of the problems of the practicing CPA and the business executive,
as well as the needed academic touch.

c.

Hare any Opinions (or whatever you might call their pronouncements) coordinated
with and approved fay the SEC. Then, request the SEC to put the necessary "teeth"
into the Opinions,
the APB cannot new do.

d.

I would suggest an appeal procedure.

CPA ASSOCIATES
EMPIRE STATE BUILDING • SUITE 5415
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10001
(212) 736-3617
SAMUEL P. GUNTHER
Executive Director

October 15, 1971

Accounting Principles Study Group
American institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10019

Attention:

Michael A. Pinto

Gentlemen:
I am writing to you as a member of the Committee on Account
ing and Auditing Procedure of the New York State Society of
Certified Public Accountants.
Because of the limitations of
time, this letter has not been reviewed by our entire com
mittee at this point.
It will be circularized among the
committee as a whole, and any conclusions which differ with
the opinions expressed in this letter will be sent to you.
The comments presented below are divided into four major
categories: (I) Public Hearings,(II) Legislative Histories
(III) Accounting Interpretations, and (IV) Technical Infor
mation Service Interpretations.

I.

PUBLIC HEARINGS

Accounting Principles Board Opinions constitute "Account
ing Law."
As such, they are developed in a manner quite simi
lar to legislation.
In fact, the business corporation laws
of certain states contain language which permits reliance,
for certain purposes, by officers and directors of corpora
tions upon reports of certified public accountants.
This is
viewed by some as incorporating generally accepted account
ing principles into those statutes.
Because this is so, and
because of the vast impact upon the public of promulgated
principles of accounting, public hearings should be held prior
to the issuance of every Accounting Principles Board Opinion,
similar to those held for marketable securities.
This will
provide any interested person or organization with an oppor
tunity to indicate his or its comments on any matter under
consideration by the Board.
It will also assist the Board
in deriving reasonable positions and will be useful in main
taining publicconfidence in the manner in which the Board
draws conclusions.
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II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES

Based upon the results of public hearings and delibera
tions of the Board, Accounting Principles Board Opinions are
issued.
It would be invaluable to practitioners to have
available textual summaries of Board meetings containing
descriptions and examples of the problems considered, alterna
tive proposed solutions, the reasons for adopting or reject
ing those solutions and the specific meanings of specific
terms and phrases used in the Opinions,
Such legislative
histories would also indicate how new Opinions change prior
practice or merely codify that which always had been deemed
to be generally accepted.

Of equal if not greater importance, committee reports should
focus on the substance of transactions dealt with and will
indicate the spirit of the pronouncements.
This will further
guarantee that the “substance over form" language which fol
lows each Opinion will have the effect intended.

At present, Accounting Principles Board Opinions con
tain very brief introductory commentaries but the individual
operative paragraphs of the Opinions provide little insight
into the reasoning behind them.
Moreover, frequently no
definitions are set forth.
For example, Paragraph 46a of
Opinion 16 says “Each of the combining companies is autonomous
and has not been a subsidiary or division of another corpora
tion within two years before the plan is Initiated..."
(Emphasis added).
Does the word “and“ suggest that "autonomous"
has a meaning independent of "not a subsidiary or division"
or should the paragraph have simply read, “Neither of the
combining companies has been a subsidiary or a division..."
without using the word "autonomous" at all? The answer to
this question is not apparent in the paragraph in point.

The suggested legislative histories could be made avail
able in the AICPA library or for purchase at the AICPA.
Such
histories would be useful not only to practitioners but also
to the AICPA staff and to subsequent appointees to the APB.
III. ACCOUNTING

INTERPRETATIONS

The general interpretations of Board Opinions by the
AICPA staff which administers the APB have been published
in the Journal of Accountancy and in one instance, in book
let form, (i.e. (concerning Opinion 15),Leonard Savoie,
Executive Vice President of the AICPA, writing in the Septem
ber, 1971 CPA, stated that in the future the word "unofficial"
will be dropped in describing future interpretations of Board
Opinions.
Because of the mechanism through which the inter
pretations are developed and released, and because of their
source, we recommend that such interpretations specifically
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be designated as constituting "substantial authoritative
support" for those paragraphs of Accounting Principles
Board Opinions which are interpreted.
In view of the fact
that practitioners must justify departures from these in
terpretations, conversely, they should be able to rely upon
them without equivocation.
The present warning that de
partures from these interpretations requires justification
implies such a conclusion.
We feel that although the in
terpretations may not be labeled "official" they are clearly
"authoritative."
Why not say so in the standard caveat
that accompanies all of these interpretations?
IV.

TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE INTERPRETATIONS

The Technical Information Service of the Institute has
the responsibility of answering specific inquiries includ
ing those relating to Board Opinions.
The Institute should
consider publishing for members those opinions of the Tech
nical Information Service which deal with Board Opinions
(without the use of actual names, of course).
These inter
pretations might be compiled annually in booklet or loose
leaf form.
They could also be incorporated into the loose
leaf CCH service which presently contains material concern
ing Accounting Principles Board Opinions.
The force and effect of Technical Information Service
interpretations could be differentiated from the general
interpretations set forth by the AICPA staff which admini
sters the APB.
The possibility of any conflict between the
two interpretative sources would be small if the administra
tive staff reviewed Technical Information Service opinions
prior to their release to those making specific inquiries.
Very truly yours,

SPG:se
cc:
Peter Lasusa, Chmn

Samuel

P. Gunther

Louis Sternbach & Company
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Offices

10 EAST 40TH STREET

NEW YORK, N. Y.

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016

WILTON, CONN.

(212) 889-4900

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

1 - SCOPE OF THE TASK

We believe that the public interest will best be served if the body
concerned with the "Establishment Of Accounting Principles" will concentrate
its work on formulating financial accounting and reporting standards. Concern
with "principles" is likely to go far afield into theoretical considerations
as to accounting postulates, principles, procedures and methods and the respec
tive areas encompassed by each, with the possible result of academic exercises
diverting attention from the establishment of sound and fair standards to oper
ate within the existing economic and social environment. Financial accounting
and reporting standards should be based on sound theory; but within the param
eters indicated it would appear that the main objective should be the develop
ment of a coherent body of workable standards pointing to the most desirable
practices in implementation.

The formulation of financial accounting and reporting standards
should not be limited to fundamentals which can be made so broad in scope that
"anything goes". On the other hand, we do not view the responsibility of
formulating standards as an authority to promulgate detailed standards and
regulations which are likely to become the limiting norms for compliance and
cause a lowering of the status of the accounting profession to the position of
artisans applying "cookbook" rules. We see the task at hand as that of develop
ing guidelines in an orderly manner, pointing up recommended treatments when
ever possible, and calling for explicit justification of departures from
recommended treatments, to arrive at a unified stand for the accounting profes
sion so as to make it a truly effective leader in its area of competence.

2 - PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERFORMING THE BASIC TASK

The formulation of financial accounting and reporting standards
should remain the responsibility of a skilled body of professionals capable of
seeing the work in its broadest social and economic context, preferably the
Accounting Principles Board. A government agency or government-sponsored body
is likely to have its deliberations affected by the political tendencies of the
day, consciously or subconsciously - whereas the basic task, as we see it, is

that of providing a framework of guidelines for the future, with a view toward
making the accounting and reporting standards truly responsive to the require
ments of all users of financial statements.

The non-governmental body of skilled professionals, preferably the
Accounting Principles Board, should work in close contact with the AICPA.
It
would be preferable for a majority of the members to be drawn from the AICPA.
The contemplated body should work in close contact with the SEC but not be
subservient to it. We would favor a body that, by coming to grips with the
"issues" of financial accounting and reporting standards, would demonstrate
that the leadership in the field rests upon skill and understanding and would
resist any attempt at arbitrary ad hoc rule - making.
Enforcement of the
guidelines promulgated by this body should continue as heretofore, by placing
on the reporting entity the onus of justifying, in clear and understandable
terms, any departures from the guidelines.

3 - COMPOSITION OF THE NON-COVERNMENTAL STANDARDS BOARD

Service on the board should be broadened somewhat beyond the present
composition in that one or two financial executives who are not CPA's should
be invited to serve on the basis of demonstrated leadership on their part in
working towards more adequate reporting. The board should be composed of CPA's,
in practice, with a good combination of public practice, industrial and com
mercial practice and non-profit organization practice; the majority of the board
should be members of the AICPA. As to representatives from public practice,
it would be important to include competent members of local and regional firms;
to some extent, there is such representation now, but it should probably be
increased so that the public interest is served. Recommendations from the various
State Societies of CPA's should be solicited and evaluated.
The size of the
board could be increased to 25 members or so; but in order to expedite its func
tioning there should be increased delegation of work to project subcommittees
for review, discussion and acceptance or rejection by the full board.
We would like to see the present volunteer board system continue, in
the interest of having all members keep in continuing touch with the practical
problems to which they are expected to address themselves. The spirit of public
service to the profession and the community is just as lively in small and
medium firms as it is in large firms. The distinctive honor of serving in a
leadership capacity on the board should of itself be sufficient compensation.

Staff support, to the extent that existing support from the AICPA
requires rounding out, might be supplemented by the seconding to the Board, for
a year at a time, of capable CPA's just below full Board stature, to serve the
Board, possibly by an arrangement under which the seconding firm pays half of
the salary and the AICPA the other half.
In this manner, there would be created
one possible avenue for bringing in replacement members to the Board as terms
of office expire.

Louis Sternbach & Company

Financing should, ideally, be by the entire profession; but as it is
probably difficult to reach CPA’s who are not members of the AICPA or their
applicable state societies, the preferred practical solution would be financing
by a dues increase on the part of the AICPA, with the increase being clearly
labeled as to its nature.
It is not that we would want to discourage grants or
gifts to the AICPA in support of the Board; we would, however, take a dim view
of even the possibility of some substantial ’’angels” desiring to call the tune
on the basis of contributions.

4 - METHODS OF OPERATION OF A NON-GOVERNMENTAL STANDARDS BOARD

The newly applied procedure of public hearings appears adequate;
provided, however, that continuing control is kept over the time allotted to
oral presentations, and that time continues to be made available, in moderation,
to participants at hearings wishing to speak.
Since full consensus is impossible to attain, except in the most noncontroversi al situations, the present rule requiring at least two-thirds of the
members to assent before action should be retained.
It may be possible to set
up a post-review of opinions that are passed by a two-thirds vote, but did not
command at least three-quarters of the vote, after the first two years of ex
perience with such opinions, to determine the extent to which the objections or
reservations of dissenting members have been borne out by experience.

We suggest that swift action on ’’developing
by resorting to unofficial interpretation of existing
not yet covered by formal opinions, by the increasing
mittees of the Board with adequate staff assistance.
cedures are currently used, they appear to be working

problems ” can be obtained
opinions, and, in areas
use of working subcom
To the extent both pro
satisfactorily.

We do not think it desirable to develop an appeal procedure designed
to handle appeals from determinations of the Board. An accounting court, by
whatever name called, would, in our opinion, make for rigidity and for going
in the direction of rule-making rather than in that of developing parameters
for action. Reconsideration of matters previously dealt with by the Board
should come from two-way communication, to and from the Board and its individ
ual members.

5 - ACCOUNTING RESEARCH SUPPORT FOR A NON-GOVERNMENTAL STANDARDS BOARD

There should be a continuation of the present accounting research
studies, under the auspices of the Board, with the help not only of those present
ly engaged in them but also of suitable personnel to be secured to help the
Board by cooperating firms. The studies should concentrate on the objective of
usefulness and public interest and should be financed by increased AICPA dues.

Louis Sternbach & Company
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
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Sound theoretical justification must be adduced, but the concern with theory
must be tempered with an understanding of what is feasible and wise.
It should
be remembered that accounting has a dual character, that of a science resting
on working hypotheses considered valid until disproved, and that of an art,
holding upa mirror to reality and thus, hopefully, getting nearer to the essence
of reality.

Louis Sternbach & Company
CERTIFIED PUBLIC

ACCOUNTANTS
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by Edward P. Brunner
My statement has been prepared in line with the pertinent questions submitted with
the notice of the establishment of the Committee on Accounting Principles and I
will address myself to these questions in the order that they were presented.

1.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

I feel the term ’’Accounting Principles” should be defined as the
comprehensive and fundamental laws, rules and code of conduct for
the fulfillment of the art of accounting. The body primarily re
sponsible for formulating these laws should limit itself to fun
damental concepts and should not develop specific detailed standards
of operation. If an expert heart surgeon were bound by a detailed
list of specific instructions of how and when to use his scapel,
he would be much less effective in his profession — so it is with
the accountant. I think Mr. Paton covered this point very well in
a recent article in the Journal of Accountancy when he stated:

"All of us expect the doctor to base his decisions in the
particular case on his own judgment, in the light of his
training and experience. The same should be expected of
the accountant, viewed as at least an aspirant to pro
fessional competence and reputation. The business world
in which he operates is almost infinitely complex and
varying, and it is impossible as well as undesirable for
any Board to hold him by the hand by means of an exhaus
tive set of detailed directives."1
I am in complete sympathy with Mr. Paton’s point of view and I
think his example of Opinion #15 is a valid one. The obscurity
and unnecessary detail covered in this Opinion and the resulting
publication of a 189 page unofficial interpretation of the Opinion
is evidence, I feel, that the tendency appears to be toward a more
detailed regulation which, I feel, will be detrimental to the pro
fession.
2.

ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD
I feel that the Accounting Principles Board should be a non
governmental body and should be a legislative arm of the AICPA.
It should work closely with all segments of the financial com
munity and should be represented accordingly (see #3 below).
The nature of its authority, I feel, is self-evident in matters
of accounting, and enforcement of its proclamations can be sup
ported and enhanced by cooperation of regulatory authorities,
security analysts and public practitioners through various means.
The regulatory authorities would require compliance for areas
under their jurisdiction; the security analysts would require
compliance through their organizational representatives; and
the public practitioners would require compliance through the
code of ethics.

1 ’’Earmarks of a Profession — and the APB”, Journal of Accountancy, January 1971,
p. 43.
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COMPOSITION OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD

I feel that the breadth of view of the Board should be expanded
and should proportionately represent the various segments of the
financial community.
In the report of the special committee on Opinions of the
Accounting Principles Board published in the spring of 1965, it
was indicated that over 25% of the members of the Institute are
from industry, education and government and I would assume at
this time that this percentage is much higher. It may well be
when you are referring to auditing standards that the prepon
derance of public practitioners is mandate. However, when you
are referring to accounting principles, I feel that all seg
ments of the profession have men equally competent with the
integrity and trustworthiness to participate in the establish
ment of these principles. To say that an individual in industry
would be serving special interests is no more justified than
saying that a member of one of the "big eight" would be serving
a special interest because of the relationship with a large
national client. I feel that the criterion for serving on the
Board should be an individual’s capability and expertise rather
than his location in the business community.
In order to give the Board the broader scope recommended here,
I feel that there should be equal representation of public
practitioners and other areas of the business community.
I
feel that members of the Board should be members of the AICPA.
I feel there should be representation of certain essential
segments of the financial community such as: the SEC, the se
curity analysts field and the academic community. These
representatives along with additional representatives from
industry, would broaden the input of the Board and hopefully
would enhance the enforcement of the Board’s pronouncements.
I feel that the term of office should be flexible and possibly
varying for certain members. Some members may hold office for
three years in order to establish continuity, whereas other
members may serve shorter terms, possibly one year, to enable
that member to devote the necessary time required while serving
on the Board.
It may be that some members would not want to
commit themselves for a three year period, if the meetings were
to be held frequently. The chairman preferably, should be a
paid full time member.
Since the Board would be all inclusive in its membership and
the members would be members of the AICPA, I feel that out
side financing would be justified.

4.

METHODS OF OPERATION OF THE BOARD
I feel that the introduction of public hearings on subjects for
proposed opinions has been very successful and should be con
tinued and expanded.
I feel that the two-thirds vote for adop
tion of an opinion is satisfactory and should remain in effect.
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I feel that the Board should meet regularly, at least monthly,
in order to cut down the required time for taking action on an
issue. The use of subcommittees, meeting more frequently on
given issues, may also speed up the process.
Although an appeal procedure would probably be extremely bene
ficial in certain cases, the problems, expenses and maintenance
of such a system makes it impractical.

The publication of unofficial interpretations of APB Opinions
should be continued, however, the word unofficial should be
eliminated and the interpretations should be promulgated after
the Opinion has been in force for a given period of time, in
order to clarify the questions that arise immediately after
the issuance of an Opinion.

5.

ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
There should be a research committee established within the AICPA
with representation similar to the Principles Board.
It would be
this committee’s responsibility to research various accounting
standards and report their findings to the Accounting Principles
Board.

The committee would not be a part of the Principles Board, but
an independent entity established within the Institute. It
would be a sounding Board for the financial community for pressing
accounting problems.
Again, I feel that outside financing would be justified in the
form of membership fees.

Very truly yours,

Edward P. Brunner, CPA
Member, AICPA

EPB: dmb
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INTRODUCTION
Substantial progress has been made in recent years in the development of
accounting principles. But there has been increasing criticism, from both within and
without the accounting profession, of the process by which accounting principles are
established. This criticism has resulted in the formation of a special committee of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to study the process for
establishing accounting principles. To aid the Committee in its study, we at Haskins &
Sells submit in summary form our views on today’s and tomorrow’s needs of
accounting and our proposal for a new structure to determine accounting principles
and their applications—one fully capable of responding to these demanding needs.

General Acceptance
Accounting principles and their applications have meaning only in relation to the
objectives of financial statements. Objectives, in turn, derive from needs for financial
information. The needs are diverse because the interests of those concerned with
financial statements are varied. The needs, therefore, must be evaluated and given the
emphasis justified by their relative importance. This evaluation process may cause some
whose needs are not emphasized to believe that their views and interests are unduly
subordinated. The process, therefore, must be fair and, of equal importance, both users
and issuers of financial statements must believe it to be fair. Otherwise, general
acceptance will not be attained.
To date, pronouncements of the Accounting Principles Board have gained general
acceptance, if not general approval, in that they are being followed. The objectivity of
the Board’s decisions is not seriously questioned. The growing concern over the
determination of accounting principles appears to be aimed more at the process by
which principles are established than at the particular conclusions reached by the
Board. We believe, therefore, that the process should be changed in order to enhance
confidence in it and thus ensure the general acceptance of its results.

The Blur Between Principles and Applications
The basic distinction between meaning and usage of principles on the one hand
and applications of principles on the other needs to be emphasized and observed in the
establishment of principles. The blur of meaning between these terms has slowed
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progress. Principles or fundamentals of accounting are broad concepts that cut across
industries and companies. Applications are concerned with making the fundamentals
operative, both where the circumstances are alike and where they are not.
Fundamentals or principles underlie; applications represent the method. Attention to
fundamentals has lagged with resulting inconsistencies and obscurities of reason.
The time and effort expended by members of the Accounting Principles Board
have been very significant. Even so, financial reporting problems requiring Board
attention have been occurring at an increasing rate. Time limitations have caused the
Board to concentrate on pressing problems, whose solutions generally include
enunciation of new applications rather than of principles. A way must be found to give
continuing parallel attention to principles and to their applications.
As needs for financial information change and evolve, accounting objectives
change and, therefore, so do accounting principles. Thus, consideration of accounting
principles must be a continuing process. At the present time the task is magnified by
the backlog of matters requiring attention.

HIGHLIGHTS OF OUR PROPOSAL
To ensure that consideration of accounting principles and their applications is
coordinated, that pronouncements are responsive and timely, and that they receive
general acceptance, we recommend a structure comprising the following elements.

A Foundation for Advancement of Accounting and
Its Board of Trustees
A non-profit foundation should be formed for the specific purpose of developing
accounting principles. The Foundation would be governed by a Board of Trustees,
whose members would be distinguished representatives of all the interests concerned
with and affected by developments in financial statements, including issuers, users,
and auditors.
An Accounting Principles Commission
A full-time, paid commission would be appointed by the Board of Trustees of the
Foundation to issue pronouncements on accounting principles after extensive research,
hearings, interviews, exposure, and deliberations. Each Commissioner would be a
recognized expert in the field, who would possess a broad understanding of the
purposes, uses, and limitations of financial statements.
The success of the structure recommended by this proposal depends upon the
qualifications of the Commissioners. We are confident that persons with the required
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capability can be found and will accept appointments to the Commission.

Research-A Vital Function of the Commission
Extensive research, both analytical and empirical, will not only continue to be
required but, at least initially, will need to exceed the research efforts presently
devoted to the development of accounting principles. This research capability should
be in the Foundation in order that the Commission may direct the research needed to
perform its function. Some of it may be contracted; some of it would be performed by
a full-time staff; but all of it should be supervised by a director of research responsible
to the Commission.
A Committee on Applications of Accounting Principles
A part-time, non-paid committee should be established within the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants to issue pronouncements on applications and
interpretations of accounting principles. Its membership would be quite similar to that
of the present Accounting Principles Board. Issuance of a pronouncement by the
Committee would be subject to approval by the Accounting Principles Commission.
A Task Force on Accounting Objectives
From time to time, perhaps as frequently as every five years, the Trustees of the
Foundation should appoint a task force to study the then existing needs for financial
information and their effects on the objectives of financial statements.

Petitions for Interpretation or Reconsideration
A procedure should be created to provide interested parties with the opportunity
to petition the Accounting Principles Commission for interpretation or reconsideration
of pronouncements on accounting principles or applications thereof.

*****
We at Haskins & Sells believe that the organizational structure outlined above
would represent a substantially more effective process for the determination of
accounting principles and their applications and that it would be responsive to the
needs of accounting both for today and for the future.
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OUR PROPOSAL IN FURTHER DETAIL
Background
Financial reporting has been advanced significantly by the Accounting Principles
Board. The Board has dealt with some difficult problems and has gained general
adherence to its pronouncements. Of course there has been controversy. Unanimity in
any field is rare when complex and sensitive issues are being resolved.
In 1958 when the AICPA Special Committee on Research Program recommended
formation of the Accounting Principles Board, it also recommended that the
“immediate projects of the accounting research staff should be a study of the basic
postulates of accounting underlying accounting principles generally, and a study of the
broad principles of accounting.” It was envisaged that these postulates and principles
would form the basis for the Board’s pronouncements. Although the Special
Committee recognized that postulates and principles could become outmoded, there
appeared to be an underlying assumption that, once the postulates and principles had
been identified, promulgation of guides for applying principles could move ahead
quickly. Concerted efforts were made to identify these postulates and underlying
principles; however, the results did not receive general acceptance and were laid aside.
Perhaps they were ahead of their time; perhaps the transition was too difficult.
Whatever the reasons, they seem to have had little impact on accounting developments.
Since then the Board has approached the development of accounting principles in an
evolutionary way. We agree that the process should be one of evolution, rather than
abrupt transformation; however, the process can and should be speeded up and made
more effective.

Today’s and Tomorrow’s Needs
Assurance of General Acceptance. General acceptance is essential—both of the
decisions made in establishing specific accounting principles and their applications and
of the process by which these decisions are made. General acceptance of the process
requires recognition by both issuer and user of financial statements that the process is
fair and effective. Objectivity and independence are the keys to acknowledged fairness.
General belief that the process itself safeguards objectivity and independence and
responds quickly to changing needs will minimize controversy. A minimum of
controversy is necessary to assure a maximum of reason and reflection in establishing
accounting principles.
The relatively placid accounting world of earlier times is gone. For years
accounting was not subject to extensive public scrutiny, and the process of developing
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accounting principles was slower-paced and comparatively non-controversial. Today
there is broader awareness of accounting and greater interest in its results. This
awareness has lead to increased criticism from (1) those desiring more rapid progress,
(2) those concerned about the process by which accounting principles are determined,
and (3) those disagreeing with specific decisions of the Accounting Principles Board
(including some who believe their reported financial results will be adversely affected
by changes in accounting principles). As for the last group, new promulgations of
principles must stand on their own merits, and some disagreement must be expected.
The recent practice of conducting public hearings and seminars before
determining positions on principles should be followed in establishing accounting
principles and their related applications. Accounting principles cannot be derived by
attempting to achieve a consensus of the parties concerned (often because their
individual interests are in conflict); nonetheless, once accounting principles are
determined, general acceptance by all concerned parties should be sought. It will be
substantially obtained if the process is objective, reasoned, and responsive to the needs
for financial information.
The criticism from those desiring more rapid progress reflects today’s need for a
substantial increase in the total capability for establishing accounting principles and
related applications. This need results from changing accounting objectives, a backlog
of fundamental matters requiring attention, and the accelerating rate of change in
today’s world. Accounting “crises” will inevitably arise in a rapidly changing business
environment unless the time and resources to anticipate change and accommodate to it
are provided in the structure for advancing accounting principles.

Distinguishing Between Principles and Applications. There is a pressing need to
distinguish between (a) broad accounting principles and (b) applications of those
principles. Accounting practice has tended to blur, at times virtually to erase, this
distinction. The results sometimes have been (1) to elevate applications to the status of
principles or (2) to ignore the need for considering (sometimes establishing) principles
when establishing applications. Accounting principles represent the conceptual logic of
accounting in relation to the objectives of financial statements. They prevent
accounting from becoming a patchwork of unstructured rules. Why have principles and
rules become confused? Muddled terminology, the necessity of reacting to crises, and
the inherent difficulties in establishing principles-all of these have contributed to this
confusion.
Principles, concepts, objectives, standards, conventions, methods, procedures,
practices, and rules have been a part of accounting’s muddled terminology. The phrase
“generally accepted accounting principles” in reports of auditors is generally
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recognized as including not only accounting principles and practices but also the
methods of applying them. Although this single phrase has been useful in referring to
the criteria upon which financial statements are prepared, its usage should not be
permitted to obscure the fact that principles or fundamentals are of a different order
from applications or methods.
In the structure we recommend, accounting pronouncements would deal
separately with:

Accounting Principles—Fundamental, pervasive concepts that are established in
relation to the objectives of financial statements.
Applications of Accounting Principles—Procedures, methods, and rules that are
observed in applying accounting principles.
Accounting principles and applications of accounting principles can be defined so
as to appear mutually exclusive; but in fact the elements of “generally accepted
accounting principles” span a continuum ranging from those representing the most
fundamental principles to those representing applications based solely on consensus, or
even in some instances a majority view. Although some elements have the attributes of
both principles and applications, the two can be determined separately. The operations
of the United States Government provide a precedent for this approach; Congress
enacts laws, while the agencies of the Executive Branch adopt enabling regulations. As
a result of the proposed separate determination of principles and applications, there
should evolve an appreciation for the functional differences between the two that
should facilitate the resolution of future accounting problems.
The emphasis placed on accounting methods and guidelines, without
corresponding attention to unifying fundamental concepts, has resulted largely from a
continually growing need to deal with “short-range crises.” Specific problems tend to
beget specific, application-oriented solutions. Time limitations often necessitate
adoption of stop-gap measures rather than solutions related to unifying fundamental
concepts, particularly where the pertinent concepts lack clarity of definition.
Accounting principles are more pervasive than applications of accounting
principles—and more difficult to develop. One principle may seem more applicable to
the needs of one financial statement user; an opposing principle may appear more
applicable to another’s needs. The adopted principle must be equitable to both. Often
there are difficult trade-offs.
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A Responsive Organizational Structure
The Foundation and Its Board of Trustees. We recommend formation of a
foundation for advancement of accounting. The interests of those concerned with the
development of accounting principles are widespread and diverse and are by no means
limited to accounting practitioners. We believe a foundation would be an effective
means for also involving the issuers and users of financial information in the
development of accounting.
Members of the Board of Trustees should be leaders in their fields. Collectively,
they would be representative of those in the financial community who are concerned
with and affected by developments in financial statements. These would include,
among others, accounting practitioners, accounting educators, corporate executives,
investors, investment advisors, lawyers, lenders and other creditors, and government
officials.
Once established, the Board of Trustees should appoint succeeding Trustees. We
believe that organizations representing broad groups concerned with financial reporting
should be asked to recommend candidates for Trustees.
The most important function of the Trustees would be to appoint Commissioners.
Through their power of appointment and because of their individual prestige, the
Trustees would be a significant influence on the process of establishing accounting
principles and would enhance the general acceptability of the results. The Board of
Trustees would also be a logical forum for considering public criticism. They would
have the power to act. They also could become an important buffer for the Accounting
Principles Commission in responding to public criticism. In addition, the Trustees
would hire other key employees for the Foundation and would administer the
Foundation’s overall finances.
The Accounting Principles Commission. The Commission would issue statements
on accounting principles. Its conclusions would be based on intensive research, public
hearings, interviews with interested parties, comments on exposure drafts, and its own
deliberations. The Commission’s statements ordinarily should be released sufficiently
ahead of their effective date to allow for the concurrent development of any necessary
related pronouncements by the Committee on Applications of Accounting Principles
(whose functions are described subsequently). The Commission would review exposure
drafts and pronouncements of the Committee on Applications of Accounting Principles
to make sure that they are not in conflict with established accounting principles.
Statements on accounting principles, approved by a majority of the Commissioners,
would have the same authority as that presently applying to Opinions of the
Accounting Principles Board.
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Individuals named as Commissioners should be those recognized for their broad
perspective and judgment. A majority should be accounting practitioners at the time of
their appointment. This would provide a broad base of experience in accounting
practice and training in accounting theory. The remainder should be chosen for their
backgrounds in accounting education or in the preparation or use of financial
statements. All Commissioners should have a thorough understanding of financial
statements—their uses, purposes, and limitations. Each Commissioner would be
required to sever his prior employment affiliation, and compensation would be
sufficient to obtain persons with the highest qualifications. A Commission of seven
members with staggered seven-year terms of appointment seems appropriate.

Research—A Vital Function of the Commission. While outstanding qualifications
of Commissioners can be thought of as the keystone to success, the underlying
cornerstone must necessarily be extensive research, both empirical and analytical.
Considering the circumstances of the times and the nature of the fundamentals
requiring resolution, the initial research efforts directed toward the development of
accounting principles should be greater than past undertakings. One portion of the
program should be concerned with developing fundamentals that fulfill the objectives
of financial statements in the current environment. Another portion should be
concerned with analysis of problems, including extensive testing of proposed principles
and applications. This analysis would thus ensure anticipation and understanding of the
effects of proposed principles on the financial statements of diverse entities.
The Commission would need research capability within the Foundation to
support its activities. Diversity of research skill and experience would be required.
Whether the research is contracted or performed by a full-time staff, it should be
supervised by a director of research in the Foundation who would report to the
Commission. Much of the drafting of the Commission’s pronouncements should be
performed by writers on the staff.
The Committee on Applications of Accounting Principles. The Committee’s
function is to issue pronouncements on applications and interpretations of accounting
principles. Because accounting applications are so closely related to wide-ranging
current accounting matters, we believe a majority of its members should be accounting
practitioners. A large committee (of perhaps 18 to 21 members) is desirable, in order
to bring a diversity of experience to bear on specific issues. The Committee should be
formed within the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and should
consist of part-time, non-paid members.
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The operating procedures of the Committee should be similar to those of the
Commission; accordingly, its conclusions would be based on research by the staff and
others, public hearings, interviews, committee deliberations, and comments on
exposure drafts. Its pronouncements, approved by a majority of the Committee,
should have the same basis of authority as statements of the Commission.

The Task Force on Accounting Objectives. From time to time (possibly as
frequently as every five years) the Board of Trustees of the Foundation should appoint
a task force on accounting objectives. This Task Force would prepare or update a
statement on the objectives of accounting and financial statements in the light of
changing needs for financial information.
Since accounting deals with the circumstances of the times, objectives are subject
to gradual change. Objectives, therefore, must be periodically re-examined.
The Task Force on Accounting Objectives should include representatives of public
accounting, industry, accounting education, and users of financial statements.
Accounting practitioners should probably be in the minority, since the wide-ranging
insight of users and issuers of financial statements is necessary to identify and rank the
needs for financial information. The Task Force’s conclusions would serve to guide the
Accounting Principles Commission in its deliberations.
Petitions for Interpretation or Reconsideration. There should be an opportunity
for representatives of industry, accounting practitioners, and others to petition the
Accounting Principles Commission on matters relating to accounting principles and
their applications. A procedure to petition for interpretation or reconsideration is
essential. Circumstances vary among entities, and therefore pronouncements cannot
be sufficiently comprehensive to cover all possible situations. Moreover, changes in
business practices and the accounting environment necessitate continuing
re-examination of accounting principles and their application.

Transition and Financing
Carrying Out the Proposal. We think the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, representing the accounting profession, is the organization that should
act on this proposal. If adopted, it should establish the Foundation and seek
recommendations for and then name the initial Board of Trustees. The Trustees would
then name the members of the Accounting Principles Commission.
It would be intolerable if a protracted period of inactivity resulted from a
changeover to a new or different structure for establishing accounting principles.
Therefore, the Accounting Principles Board should continue its operations
uninterrupted and undiminished until the Accounting Principles Commission is
prepared to issue statements on accounting principles. Our proposal preserves the
characteristics of the present Accounting Principles Board in the proposed Committee
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on Applications of Accounting Principles. In fact, the Board could very well become
the Committee with little or no modification.
If for any reason the Accounting Principles Commission proved to be ineffective,
there would still be a continuing body in the form of the Committee on Applications
of Accounting Principles to prevent a disruptive break in the development of
accounting principles.
Financing. Our proposal calls for a substantially expanded -effort to advance
accounting principles. We estimate the additional expenditures required-over and
above current expenditures for the Accounting Principles Board and its research
program—at $2,000,000 to $3,000,000 annually. In order to attract highly qualified
personnel as Commissioners and staff, the ability of the Foundation to operate with
assured financing must not be left in doubt. Accordingly, we recommend that the
financial requirements of the Foundation be guaranteed by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, which in all probability would be the major source of
financing. Since an objective of the Foundation would be to broaden participation in
the advancement of accounting, financial contributions from other sources should be
encouraged.

Conclusion
The Accounting Principles Board has achieved much in its twelve years of
operation. The needs of accounting today, however, show every likelihood of
intensifying in the years ahead. For this reason, it could only be a matter of time
before the organization and operation of the Board would require revision. The
constructive approach is to move ahead now to create a plan capable of meeting the
challenge of changing times. We believe the steps we propose will do just that.

EXHIBIT

11

A SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF
THE PROPOSAL

FOUNDATION FOR

AMERICAN INSTITUTE

ADVANCEMENT OF

OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC

ACCOUNTING

ACCOUNTANTS

BOARD

TASK FORCE

OF

ON ACCOUNTING

TRUSTEES

OBJECTIVES

ACCOUNTING

COMMITTEE ON

PRINCIPLES

APPLICATIONS OF

COMMISSION

ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

601

The Central National Insurance Group of Omaha
STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

1.

Establishing accounting principles - scope of task.

The question was asked, "What is meant by the term 'accounting principles'?”.
If the question and the suggested answer, which referred to "financial account
ing and reporting standards" refers to an all encompassing approach, then we
feel that this is impossible. However, if the term "financial accounting and
reporting standards" refers to an industry-by-industry approach, then we feel
it is feasible and would surely be more accurate and useful.

Relating to the same subject, it is our opinion that an industry principles
board should be responsible for not only fundamentals but for detailed standards
as well. We are adding "detailed standards" because in the past opinions have
been interpreted differently within the A. I. C. P. A. membership.
2.

Should the primary responsibility for establishing accounting standards
reside in a governmental body or a non-governmental body?

It is our opinion that the governmental body of the A.I. C. P. A. should remain
independent from the S. E. C. or any other governmental body. We believe that
the A.I. C. P. A. should act independently and should not be governed by requests
from government organizations which it appears to have done in the past. In
our opinion, an industry non-governmental body's relationship to the A. I. C. P. A.
should be their reports and/or recommendations for the industry they are repre
senting made to the governing board. This relationship is further explained
below. As to the S. E. C. , we reemphasize that the only relationship should be
of a cooperative nature and the non-governmental bodies should not be governed
by S. E. C. standards. In our opinion, any pronouncements having a majority
approval of the A. I. C. P. A. membership should be enforced as they are today
by disallowing further membership in the A. I. C. P. A. if a member does not
follow the wishes of the majority. It could possibly be further enforced by
getting state-by-state backing to loss of that individual's certificate.
3.

Composition of a non-governmental standards board.

We would recommend the formation of several non-governmental standards
boards. Each board would be made up of nine members of the A. I. C. P. A.
whose backgrounds are substantial for the industry board they will represent.
In other words, we are suggesting that each industry have its' own standards
board which would be responsible for fundamentals, as well as developing de
tailed standards for that particular industry reporting to the governing board
of the A. I. C. P. A. The governing board should then poll the membership for
their approval or disapproval with majority rule. The possibility has existed
in the past wherein many members of the A.I. C. P.A. have disagreed with
opinions of the principles board as it is now constituted, while being compelled
to act in accordance with its' findings.

-1-

4.

Method of operation of non-governmental standards boards.

In our opinion, the present procedures where the board holds public hearings
on subjects for proposed opinions are satisfactory. There should be a twothirds vote requirement for each non-governmental standards board with de
scenting opinions contained within their reports. If the boards' procedures
and public hearings are broad enough, no developing problems should exist
that have not already been considered in that you are dealing with specialists
within each industry. We believe that there should be an appeal procedure
by segments of the industry for which the opinion is being rendered. This
appeal should be set up so that it is an ar bitration-agreement type procedure,
wherein the governmental body of the A. I. C. P. A. would appoint one arbitrator
and the industry appealing appointing a second arbitrator, with the third ar
bitrator being a disinterested party, such as a United States District Court
Judge.

5.

Accounting research support for a non-governmental standards board.

We have touched on the subject in the foregoing answers, however, we believe
that a permanent salaried employee who is a member of the A. I. C. P. A. is
necessary, who would have a staff adequate enough to formulate and clear all
documents from the various industry boards reporting to the governing board
and who would instigate their requests for opinions for the particular industry
to the proper non-governmental standards board. This office and its' employees,
in our opinion, should be financed by the A.I.C. P. A. through dues of the mem
bers. We believe it is also possible to obtain membership fees from the various
companies representing a particular industry if it is known that industry boards
will be established.

Earl G. Watters
Vice President and Comptroller
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October 22, 1971

Mr Michael A Pinto
American Institute of C P A’s
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Dear Sir:
Re The Wheat Committee
It occurs to the writer that if the Wheat Committee were to decide
that the APB should not concern itself with the "fundamentals," it should ask
itself what body is to do that job. By appointing the Trueolood Committee, the
AICPA is on record as having concluded that important matters have been left
undone and presumably many will be in that state even after the Trueblood Com
mittee reports. The Wheat Committee is at somewhat of a disadvantage in this
regard because it probably will have been discharged before the Trueolood Com
mittee issues its final report.

The writer believes that the APB, however constituted, should continue
to work in the same stratum as heretofore, viz, promulgating rules or standards
rather than fundamentals . The reason is that some group, made up primarily of
active practitioners, must develop and. monitor the loophole closing function.
In the absence of such a body, the "clever" businessmen and professionals soon
would conjure up and attribute so many different meanings to the broad funda
mentals, from whatever source derived, that they would be reduced to impotency.
Accordingly, if the Wheat Committee decides that fundamentals are not
the province of the APB, it should retain the matter on its agenda and ultimately
satisfy itself that some group has as its preoccupation the abstract and the
conceptual while the APB or its successor focuses on the rule making or standard
setting process.

Although this letter is confined to but one part of one of the Perti
nent Questions, it is directed at a basic factor which merits full deference from
the Committee.

I hope my brevity excuses my tardiness.
Very truly yours,

M F Blake

MFB:t

604

Before the Study Group
on Establishment
Accounting Princi
ples
Of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

Brief of

Arthur Andersen & Co.

For Presentation at

Public Hearing on November 3 and 4, 1971

605

October 15, 1971

TO: Mr. Francis M. Wheat, Chairman
Mr. John C. Biegler
Mr. Arnold I. Levine
Mr. Wallace E. Olson
Mr. Thomas C. Pryor
Mr. Roger B. Smith
Professor David Solomons
The Study Group on Establishment
Of Accounting Principles

We welcome this opportunity to present our views on
the matters under consideration by your Study Group.

Investors and other users of financial statements in the
United States have a right to expect more progress than
they have been getting in the establishment of sound
accounting principles, and they are entitled to a work
able procedure whereby changes can be made on a more
timely and effective basis. The legitimate public interest
in financial statements in this country is enormous, and
little consolation should be taken in the claim, even if true,
that American investors are “the best informed in the
world."
We believe that the accounting profession, through
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), is best qualified to provide the leadership in
establishing accounting principles. However, the experience
in recent years indicates an urgent need to improve the
process by which accounting principles are determined by

i

the AICPA and to reevaluate the approaches that have
been taken in the light of current developments.
Neither managements nor independent auditors can
function effectively in the area of financial reporting unless
they have sound accounting principles based on defined
objectives to use in discharging their responsibilities. The
importance to our free-enterprise system of an appropriate
solution to this problem cannot be overemphasized.

The solution must be sought in terms of what is best for
investors and all segments of the public and must not be
prejudiced by the special interests of managements, ac
countants or commissioners trying to maintain their rela
tive prerogatives as they exist today.

A letter dated November 16, 1970, from the Chairman
and Chief Executive of our firm to the President of the
AICPA commenting on the need for a thorough review of
the manner in which accounting principles are established
is included herein as Appendix A.
Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO.

ii
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THE GENERAL PROBLEM

OF ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

Need for Reevaluation

The need to improve financial reporting to investors
and others through the establishment of sound accounting
principles has become increasingly evident. One of the
important problems facing the accounting profession and
the business community in carrying out their responsi
bilities to the public is that of determining the best means
of accomplishing such improvement.
The problem is this: Where and how in our society can
decisions best be made to establish accounting principles
that will communicate in the most useful manner infor
mation as to the economic circumstances and performance
of business enterprises. The approach selected must com
mand the respect and support of all segments of our society
if it is to be effective.
The most important consideration in establishing account
ing principles is that of fairness—fairness to all segments
of our society, including stockholders, management, labor,
creditors, customers and government. Fairness should be
determined in the light of the economic and legal environ
ment and the modes of thought of all such segments in
relation to each other. Accounting principles that are
based upon this criterion of fairness should produce finan
cial information that reflects in an impartial manner the
lawfully established, but often conflicting, economic rights
and interests of everyone in society.

Common law evolves through a court structure and de
cisions by judges who, upon becoming judges, have dis
continued the practice of law and previous business and
financial connections with their clients and their associates
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in practice. Also, they disqualify themselves from hearing
cases involving their former clients and associates. A
structure with the same type of independence is needed for
the establishment of accounting principles. To depend, as
some accountants have suggested, on long-range evolution
with no formal independent structure in an environment of
undefined goals is unrealistic.

Accounting is a means of communication, and thus es
sentially utilitarian in nature. Any utilitarian discipline
is ultimately dependent upon a broad consensus for its
effectiveness, but no authority, even a statutory one, can
for long sustain a utilitarian function that is not sufficiently
useful to the public. However, the complex and competitive
nature of business and the conflicting interests of the
various segments of our society would require an orderly,
fair and efficient system for achieving consensus and for
enforcing that consensus. No such comprehensive system
currently exists, and in the absence of such a system no
consistency or coordination would be likely between
business enterprises in a particular industry or among
business enterprises generally.

In making our suggestions for restructuring the proce
dures to establish accounting principles, we are cognizant
of the improvements achieved from actions taken by such
organizations as the AICPA, the SEC and the New York
Stock Exchange. However, the establishment of accounting
principles in the United States has most often occurred only
after a crisis and after the public has become disillusioned
because of misleading representations about business
activity. When the public has lost confidence in certain
aspects of accounting, changes have been demanded of
someone in authority. Both the accounting profession and
governmental agencies have tended to react after problems
have become acute and the public has been damaged rather
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than dealing with problems promptly as they emerge. This
tendency to react to crisis rather than to act from a posture
of leadership has resulted from two factors. First, and
most important, the lack of definition of objectives of
financial statements has made it virtually impossible to
lead and act on problems before they arise and become
critical. Second, the structure whereby the accounting
profession has attempted to deal with accounting principles
has been inadequate.
Where Are the Responsibilities
and Authorities for Establishing
Accounting Principles?

An analysis of the present situation reveals a state of
confusion as to where the responsibility and authority for
establishing objective standards and sound accounting
principles lie. In our view, such confusion is most unde
sirable for investors and other users of financial state
ments, for the accounting profession, for the business com
munity and for the public in general. The problem can be
illustrated by considering the responsibility and authority
of some of the groups and organizations involved.
Managements of business entities. The management of a
business entity has a significant legal responsibility under
the Federal Securities Acts and other statutes for the
financial statements of that entity. Some agreement seems
to exist that management has the primary responsibility
for the financial statements, but who establishes the
principles? Does management have effective authority to
select accounting principles? The AICPA, independent
auditors, governmental agencies and stock exchanges are
all simultaneously prescribing or enforcing accounting
principles and a wide variety of related rules and regula
tions that management may not always believe result in the
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best presentation of financial information concerning that
particular enterprise. While each management may have
its own concepts of what it is trying to reflect and communi
cate and therefore not agree with the prescribed proce
dures, does it have a viable choice?

Independent auditors. The primary responsibility of the
independent auditors is to the users of financial statements
other than management. The professional responsibility to
stockholders and external parties who rely on the financial
statements upon which the auditor has expressed an opinion
is very significant. Independent auditors have a personal
responsibility—both legally and professionally. Their
individual reports are their specific responsibility and not
that of the AICPA or a governmental agency.
An opinion written in 1947 by Mr. Scott W. Lucas, who
subsequently was Majority Leader of the United States
Senate from the State of Illinois, stated in part as follows
with respect to registration statements filed under the
Securities Act of 1933:
“While the form and content of the financial state
ments are subject to the rules and regulations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission the opinions
expressed in the certificate by the accountant are his
alone and he is the person who will be held responsible
therefor. The accountant is also responsible for the
examination and review of those financial statements,
used in the registration statement, as to which he
undertakes to express his expert opinion, and his
responsibility relates not only to the propriety of what
is set forth in the financial statements, but also to the
inclusion of such additional information as is neces
sary to make such statements not misleading. ...”

Although the AICPA may encourage the observance of
APB Opinions by AICPA members who are in public prac
tice, compliance to date has been on a voluntary basis.
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Can the Opinions be effectively enforced when in the
judgment of an individual auditor compliance with an
Opinion is not proper in a particular case? Who represents
the public in resolving such a dispute? Compliance may be
indirectly imposed by the intervention of governmental
agencies with statutory powers, but the views of those
agencies may reflect a bias without any effective public
judicial review.
What position are the auditors in when they follow
accounting principles prescribed by a professional associa
tion or a governmental agency that in their view do not
properly present the facts or attain the proper public
accountability in a particular case?
Governmental agencies. The SEC has wide statutory
powers to see that investors are adequately informed. As a
result, the rules, regulations and policies of the SEC prob
ably have a wider influence on accounting principles fol
lowed by business entities than those of any other govern
mental agency. However, many other Federal and state
regulatory agencies have extensive powers to regulate the
accounting and financial reporting of large industries, such
as public utilities, transportation and communication com
panies, banks, savings and loan associations, and insurance
companies. “Protection” of the public by these agencies
may sometimes be based on political and economic theory
biases that do not result in the most meaningful informa
tion for all users of financial statements.

These agencies may sometimes prescribe accounting with
which the management or the independent auditors, or both,
do not agree. Under these circumstances, where is the ulti
mate responsibility? The power to enforce can easily be
abused if the agencies are not required to document and
support their conclusions as being the fairest to all seg
ments of society.
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While the SEC has generally supported and enforced the
Opinions of the APB, it has made no formal commitment of
any kind to do so. And in the case of Opinion No. 2, the
SEC did not enforce that Opinion. The SEC has not dele
gated, directly or indirectly, any of its statutory power to
the APB. Neither has it gone through formal procedures to
adopt any APB Opinions as its own rules and regulations.
Various Federal and state agencies support or ignore
the viewpoints of the accounting profession, including APB
Opinions, as they see fit. In some areas, they select from
alternative practices; in other areas, they accept alter
native practices. They have both published and unpublished
accounting policies and rules. They are sovereign in their
own fields with very little effective appeal from their deci
sions in accounting matters available to enterprises under
their jurisdiction. Of critical significance is the fact that no
overall harmonizing or coordinating authority exists re
garding the accounting principles prescribed by these agen
cies. (See Appendix B for a further discussion of certain
Federal governmental agencies.)
Stock exchanges. The stock exchanges have certain
requirements for listing purposes and can exercise con
siderable control over listed companies. The exchanges have
occasionally prescribed accounting or reporting rules, but
in general they have followed the lead of the accounting
profession and the SEC in these matters and thus have
contributed very little independent thought to the establish
ment of accounting principles.
Accounting profession. A professional association, such
as the AICPA, cannot require anyone other than its mem
bers to follow the pronouncements of its boards and com
mittees.
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The Council of the AICPA in its 1964 resolution stated
that its members should follow APB Opinions, as repre
senting “generally accepted accounting principles,’’ and no
departure from such Opinions is permissible unless “sub
stantial authoritative support’’ can be found for another
approach. Departures from positions established in APB
Opinions must then be disclosed in the auditor’s report or
in the footnotes to the financial statements. The burden of
proof is placed upon the auditor who departs from an APB
Opinion to support the alternative used. A recent attempt
to incorporate this requirement in the Code of Professional
Ethics failed to obtain the necessary affirmative vote. (How
ever, this matter is presently being reconsidered.) In the
absence of governmental agency enforcement, the support
of the APB Opinions has been dependent upon the volun
tary cooperation of the accounting firms and the members
of the Institute. This support has, in general, existed during
recent years, but there is no assurance that such support
will continue indefinitely.

In few, if any, cases has a member of the AICPA relied
upon “substantial authoritative support” to defend a
direct and significant departure from an APB Opinion.
Auditors have been qualifying their reports for such depar
tures. However, the alternative of relying on “substantial
authoritative support” is available and is a potential weak
ness in establishing effective standards. This alternative
was established by the Council as a compromise during the
controversy in 1964 as to whether AICPA members should
be required to follow APB Opinions as representing the
only acceptable accounting principles. (See Appendix C
for further discussion of the past efforts of the AICPA to
establish accounting principles.)
Relationship of responsibilities. The interrelationship of
the various parties involved with the issuance of financial
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statements can be summarized briefly. A committee in a
professional association can bind only the action of its
members, and this may be done by threat of expulsion from
membership. Voluntary cooperation is effective only so long
as the cooperation continues. Such cooperation, however, is
tenuous and subject to breakdown at any time. In fact, if
a group of AICPA members refused to follow an APB
Opinion, the whole structure might fall apart unless the
SEC enforced the Opinion.

Managements cannot be required by auditors to follow
the pronouncements of professional committees, except
indirectly if the auditors threaten to qualify their reports.
A governmental agency, such as the SEC, can refuse to
accept a qualified auditor’s report and can require com
panies subject to its jurisdiction to follow the professional
pronouncements. Managements are claiming that the SEC
is using the APB as an unofficial regulatory arm, and is
enforcing APB Opinions as though they were SEC regula
tions, but without going through the rule-making proce
dures as required by law. Some of this enforcement
might be considered to be undesirable coercion because
many of the rules are arbitrary and not supported by
objectives that can be understood.
Managements and independent auditors have serious
responsibilities to the users of financial statements, but
other organizations and agencies are telling them what
methods of accounting should be followed without taking
responsibility for what the objectives are, or should be, and
whether they are, or are not, being achieved. Those organi
zations and agencies at present do not assume any direct
responsibility to the public for the published financial
statements.

617

9
Underlying Considerations

Determination of sound accounting principles must be
free of bias toward the particular interests of any groups
within our society. Yet, each group is entitled to a forum
(1) where a hearing may be had on its views, and (2) where
the full record and the basis for the decision are public
information. No adequate forum of this kind, which is so
necessary because of the vast public interest, exists today
with respect to accounting principles in any business, pro
fessional or governmental organization.
Questions are sometimes raised as to whether any private
organization, such as a professional association, can suc
cessfully establish and enforce standards which have such a
huge impact upon the business community and the public
generally. Is the public interest involved so great that direct
statutory authority is necessary to avoid difficult legal
problems? Some authorities have suggested that the AICPA
cannot successfully accomplish its self-appointed mission in
this area, and that it is naive to try to do so.
Regardless of who makes authoritative decisions involv
ing accounting principles, consideration must be given to
effective appeal procedures. In a democracy, the citizens
should have a right to appeal to some appropriate and
effective appeal point the decisions imposed by a body with
enforcement powers (either assumed or statutory). This
problem needs attention in the field of accounting prin
ciples, where prescribed requirements may have significant
effects on many business and investment decisions, on busi
ness transactions of all kinds, including mergers, and even
on the success or failure of a business enterprise.
We believe that the solution proposed in this brief rep
resents the best balance between the responsibilities and
authorities of the various groups and organizations on the
one hand and the public interest on the other hand.
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ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS
OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD

Many aspects of the operations of the APB could be
analyzed and commented upon in this brief. However, some
of those matters relate merely to the management of the
APB and will not be covered herein. The following com
ments are limited to an analysis of the basic organizational
structure, the overall basis of operations, and significant
deficiencies in accomplishing its mission.

General Effectiveness

The time and cost of the APB members and their asso
ciates, probably one of the hardest working groups who
ever participated in a volunteer program of this type in
any field, and the administrative and research staff at the
AICPA are tremendous. However, the results have not
been commensurate with the effort.
Increasing concern has been expressed that the APB as
presently constituted is no longer capable of meeting the
need for timely development of accounting principles that
are fair to all interests.
One question relates to the slowness of the APB to act.
Many examples can be cited of extensive delays in dealing
with problems. Five major questions were left open in
Opinion No. 11 in 1967, and they are still open. Corrections
of deficiencies in Opinions No. 5 and No. 7 have been pend
ing for several years. Accounting for research and develop
ment costs, which is one of the most urgent problems in
today’s technologically oriented society, has been under
study for about eight years and the study is not yet com
pleted. Shortly after the APB was formed in 1959 certain
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critical problem areas, including accounting for business
combinations, were identified for immediate research and
eventual conclusions in the form of Opinions. Eleven years
later, in 1970, Opinions were issued on accounting for busi
ness combinations and intangible assets. In the intervening
eleven years accounting practice in these areas deteriorated
steadily to the detriment of many investors and the increas
ing embarrassment of the accounting profession. Two other
problem areas were selected for research about ten years
ago—accounting for intercompany investments and for
foreign operations—and are still in the research stage. This
situation requires some corrective action.
A related concern is that the APB has not anticipated
problems well enough and that it has spent most of its time
putting out fires to prevent emerging problems from becom
ing of crisis proportions. A review of the Board’s accom
plishments indicates that nearly all of its Opinions have
dealt with problems that the profession has faced for many
years. While some argue that the AICPA is able to act
quickly and point to accounting for franchise fees as an
example, the facts are that the action taken was informal
and outside the Board structure. Further, the timeliness of
the action could certainly be questioned. Pressing problems
have been identified more recently in the areas of computer
leasing and land development. Some of the basic issues in
these areas remain unresolved, however, even though many
months have passed since the Board agreed that these
problems needed prompt resolution.
The need to act quickly has been accentuated by the
accelerating rate of change in our society—changes in
methods, products, consumer tastes, laws, etc. These rapid
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changes challenge concepts of stability and permanence
that permeate accounting, and demand a continuous change
in accounting to reflect changes in the goals of business
enterprises and in social and economic conditions.
The APB has not been efficient in its operating proce
dures, and the degree of inefficiency has been accelerating.
The vast number of problems on the Board’s agenda often
prevents the Board from focusing on a given problem for a
sufficient time to reach definitive positions. As a result,
problems remain on the agenda for many months (even for
many years, e.g., the reconciliation of lease accounting for
lessees and lessors). Each time a problem reappears on the
agenda for discussion much of the allotted time is devoted
to a review or rediscussion of points covered in preceding
meetings. Too often little new light is shed on the issue. The
allotted time is used, and the problem reappears on
numerous subsequent agendas. The inefficiency of these pro
cedures is obvious.
The AICPA has been publishing interpretations of APB
Opinions either in booklet form or in The Journal of
Accountancy. This is a desirable practice that should be
continued and expanded. However, interpretations should
not be used to attempt to amend Opinions. Also, inter
pretations should not be used to overcome delays, to meet
crises that have arisen during the delays, and to deal with
important problems that should be handled by Opinions.
If the exposure process and many of the procedures that
have proved to be desirable in the development or amend
ment of Opinions are improperly bypassed, affected parties
would have a legitimate cause for complaint. For example,
questions have been raised as to whether the interpretation
of Opinion No. 7 recently approved by the APB does not
have the effect of amending that Opinion. This inter
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pretation includes a definition of financing leases and
guidelines for profit recognition by manufacturers who sell
leases on their products to third-party financial institu
tions. The APB has had this important subject under con
sideration for several years and could have had a new
Opinion prepared on this subject well before the final crisis
arose. This interpretation, which has a very significant
effect on many companies, was never exposed for comment
and was distributed by passing out typed copies on an
informal basis. The SEC presumably is enforcing this
interpretation, but it probably will not be furnished to
AICPA members or printed in The Journal of Accountancy
for two or three months after its approval by the APB.

A major cause of inefficiency in Board operations is the
other interests and responsibilities of Board members.
Each Board member carries heavy responsibility within
his own firm or organization, a responsibility that assumes
primacy between Board meetings and even competes with
Board matters for attention during Board meetings. Too
often these competing demands appear to result in less
than adequate preparation between Board meetings for
those matters scheduled for discussion at the next meeting.
Thus, Board members often are unable to prepare for
APB meetings in a manner that would enable the Board
to function reasonably effectively. The matter is not one
of lack of interest or dedication, but simply one of lack of
time in the face of the heavy responsibilities that each
Board member bears. As a result, even after a given
problem has been on the agenda for several meetings there
is wide variance among Board members and Board com
mittees in the depth of their understanding of the issues
involved. This difficulty is compounded when the decision
making process lacks objective standards to serve as a
guide.
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The activities and deliberations of the APB have been
well publicized. The impact of the Opinions on the business
community has become increasingly evident to everyone
concerned. The APB is in fact a quasi-public body, whose
actions have great significance to investors and many other
persons and organizations. The desire of some for the
APB to have a “low profile’’ reflected a failure to under
stand the essential public nature of the APB’s responsi
bilities. Those APB members who wanted the APB to
operate more as a public body, with public hearings and a
public record, were clearly in the minority, and their sug
gestions in this regard received little consideration. Grad
ually, the APB has been moving in that direction, and its
first public hearing was held in May 1971.

Objectives

The major problem encountered by the APB has been
the absence of an authoritative statement of the objectives
of financial statements that would provide a standard
against which to judge and measure the propriety of solu
tions to accounting problems. As a result, individual APB
Opinions reflect no overall philosophy or theoretical frame
work. The Opinions consist of elaborate and arbitrary
detailed procedural rules, and the conclusions are a diverse
collection of ad hoc regulations to deal with alleged abuses.
Extensive disclosure requirements are established to shore
up the rules, and such disclosures place an undue burden
on the readers who try to interpret them. The Opinions
seldom contain adequate reasons or demonstrations why the
conclusions produce useful results for investors and other
readers of financial statements. Several Opinions are dia
metrically opposed to the conclusions of extensive research
studies, with little explanation in support of the departures.
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As originally conceived, the Accounting Principles Board
was to develop a statement of basic objectives and con
cepts of financial statements. This statement would then
provide the premises or base points of support for later
Opinions on individual problems. While some research
was undertaken along these lines in its early years, the
APB was unable at that time to agree on any particular
objectives and concepts. Statement No. 4 issued by the
APB in 1970 provides no real guidelines for progress, and
eleven years during a most critical time were lost.

No organization, whether it be a professional association
or a governmental agency or any other one, can establish
sound principles that will serve the public and command
genuine support, unless objectives and criteria are estab
lished to serve as standards against which conclusions can
be evaluated and judged. The fact that the APB has not
accomplished this phase of its mission, is the greatest
single deficiency in the operations of the APB. In our view,
this omission could be fatal.
Regulatory Attitude

As a result of the failure to agree upon objectives, the
APB has gradually deteriorated over the years into an
organization that issues more and more arbitrary and in
consistent rules rather than broadly based and logical stand
ards or principles that are consistent with a set of guiding
objectives. Each Opinion has been approached in an ad hoc
manner, seeking to accommodate conflicting views with no
clear expression of the goals to be achieved. Compromise
has replaced principle, and rules have replaced reason.

Flowing from this effort has been a proliferation of
detailed methods, procedures, and disclosures and an at
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tempt to fit these into an ever-expanding web of regulations.
As a result, the accounting profession and its service to the
public are being damaged by rules; and, in the case of some
Opinions, hundreds of pages of explanations will be re
quired to make the Opinions operational in our firm.

Methods and procedures get confused with objectives and
then are sanctified, as evidenced by our long forbearance
with historical cost and the matching process. The result of
all this has been that accountants have turned their backs
on common sense.
Some accountants frequently argue that while a certain
concept or principle is theoretically proper it is vulnerable
to abuse. In order to foreclose the potential abuse, various
arbitrary rules are prescribed. This approach is undesir
able because (1) from a theoretical standpoint it assures
the wrong answers, and (2) from a practical standpoint it
invites abuse and circumvention. Accounting and financial
reporting should communicate economic facts and circum
stances in the most meaningful manner and in accordance
with the objectives. Accounting rules should not be used as
a club to police the judgments or performance of manage
ment.

The APB has become obsessed with its self-appointed role
of plugging up loopholes and stopping alleged abuses. But
as arbitrary rules are written, additional loopholes are
created, since the more precise a rule, the more questions
as to its scope and applicability. The constant increase of
detailed, arbitrary requirements has also had the effect of
encouraging craftiness in financial reporting. An atmos
phere of “gamesmanship” is created to try to “beat the
rules” since the rules do not command the respect and
support that would flow from principles based on logical
reasons and oriented to defined objectives.
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Unless objectives are agreed upon and serve as a basis
for decision making, each segment of the public affected
has no way of knowing the reasons why a particular deci
sion is made and why it is necessary and warranted.
Independence

Concern has been expressed about the degree of inde
pendence under the present APB structure. The accounting
profession faces serious challenges to its independence, and
questions as to the independence of the APB are one facet
of this broader issue. Insofar as the APB is concerned,
doubts as to independence have increased as its Opinions
have involved wider public interest. A body such as the
APB, which deals with such significant matters involving
the public interest, cannot afford to have any doubts persist
as to its independence. Fairness and equity are critical for
public acceptance of conclusions reached by the APB, and
extensive doubts that Opinions issued are free from preju
dice can eventually lead to public rejection of the APB as
an authority on accounting matters.

In our view, the independence of the APB (both in fact
and in appearance) is of overriding importance, and failure
to deal adequately with this phase of the problem now
could have serious repercussions later. This matter cannot
successfully be deferred until some indefinite future date.
Research

The various Directors of Accounting Research and their
staffs have performed some effective work since the incep
tion of the APB in 1959. However, the research program
has not been sufficiently responsive to the needs of the APB,
either in the nature of the research performed or in the
timeliness of its performance. Therefore, the entire ap
proach to the research program needs to be reconsidered.
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Very few formal
in recent years. Of
only two have been
has not made very
been published.

research studies have been completed
the eleven research studies published,
in the last five years. Also, the APB
effective use of the studies that have

The research program has also suffered from a lack of a
common set of objectives and criteria with the result that
the conclusions of the researchers were controlled and lim
ited by each individual’s experiences and background. Thus,
not only did each APB member have his own premises and
base points, but each researcher did likewise. No common
objectives existed.

While the deficiencies in the operations of the APB can
not be traced particularly to the inadequacies of the re
search program, the fact remains that the proper type of
research performed on a timely basis could greatly facili
tate the work of the APB.
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PROPOSED SOLUTION

We believe that the proposed solution set forth below
represents the best overall plan at the present time.

While the name “Accounting Principles Board” could be
changed, it is used herein for the proposed new organi
zation.

Summary of Recommendations

Our basic recommendations, which are discussed more
fully in this section, are summarized as follows:

1. The objectives of financial statements and the
necessary criteria for establishing accounting prin
ciples must be determined so that the research, the
views of interested parties, and the decision-making
process of the APB all can be related to one set of
sound premises and thus properly serve the public
interest. This is the most crucial need facing the pro
fession and no restructuring of the APB will be effec
tive unless this need is met. (Since the AICPA pres
ently has another study group working on this project,
no further comments in this regard are included in
this brief.)
2. An APB of five to seven full-time, paid members
should be established within the AICPA.
3. The legal basis for the operations of the APB
should be considered so that its authority and limita
tions are known.
4. Operating procedures of the APB should be
designed to make the maximum use of the experience
and viewpoints of AICPA members and all other
interested parties.

5.

The research program should be revised to make
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it more effective and to coordinate it more closely with
the needs of the APB.
6. The present procedures relating to interpretation
of APB Opinions should be improved.
7.

Appeal procedures should be carefully studied.

A question frequently arises as to whether the APB is, or
should be, legislative or judicial in nature. We believe that
this function has both legislative and judicial elements, but
it is most important that the function be conducted in a
judicial manner. Therefore, it is our view that the judicial
characteristics should be predominant.

In an earlier section of this brief, the authority and
responsibility of managements of business entities, inde
pendent auditors, governmental agencies, stock exchanges
and the accounting profession were discussed. In balancing
these as well as the authority and responsibility of others,
the primary test should be—what is in the public interest?
If the performance of the APB is of sufficiently high
quality and conducted in a truly professional manner, if all
interested parties are given a comprehensive hearing, and
if the APB earns the respect of the public, the chance that
the APB will be successful in carrying out its mission is
relatively high.
Background Considerations

Suggestions have been made to change the present APB
merely by increasing or decreasing the number of its mem
bers or by having a full-time, permanent chairman. We
believe that such changes would be superficial and would
not solve the basic problem.
Suggestions have also been made for an APB outside the
AICPA made up of representatives from various business
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organizations and other segments of our society, such as
corporate executives, lawyers, bankers, economists, finan
cial analysts and accountants. However, a group so con
stituted would not be responsible to any organization or
entity, and we believe that an approach of that type would
not be effective.
During the past forty years the accounting profession
has borne a significant responsibility in the development
of accounting principles. We believe that the basic respon
sibility for developing accounting principles should con
tinue to rest within the accounting profession as repre
sented by the AICPA. The AICPA has no inherent institu
tional defects that would prevent attainment of a much
higher level of accomplishment. The AICPA, more than
any other nongovernmental organization or group, pos
sesses the personnel, the resources and the freedom from
inherent biases favoring any segment of society to achieve
the necessary progress in this area. Between a restructur
ing of the APB to eliminate the defects in its operations
that have emerged over the past twelve years and a
resignation from the basic responsibility and consequent
reassignment of such responsibility to a governmental
agency or organization outside the jurisdiction of the
accounting profession, we strongly favor a restructuring
of an independent APB within the purview of the account
ing profession.

The structure, organization and operating procedures of
an APB within the AICPA must (1) assure the establish
ment of sound accounting principles, consistent with the
defined objectives of financial statements documented to
meet the needs of users, representing fairness to all seg
ments of society; (2) reduce the present inefficiencies in
operations; (3) provide a shorter reaction period in deal-
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ing with emerging problems; and (4) operate in an environ
ment free from conflicting and self-serving interests and
questions as to independence.
In addition, all parties who may be affected by the devel
opment of accounting principles should have ample oppor
tunity to present their views. Whenever a small group in
the private sector of our society assumes the responsibility
for reaching decisions that may have a broad public impact,
it is essential that those who are affected have an oppor
tunity to contribute to the decision-making process. This is
particularly important in the area of accounting principles,
since public trust in financial reports is fundamental to the
functioning of the free-enterprise system.

The APB should deal primarily with matters of prin
ciple that achieve the defined objectives. Detailed pro
cedures can and should vary and should be left largely to
judgment. Managements and the independent auditors
should bear the responsibility of carrying out the prin
ciples and satisfying the objectives in the fairest manner.

Proposed APB Structure and Organization

Small permanent board. We believe that the APB should
consist of full-time members, with a relatively small num
ber of members, such as five or seven. Each member of
the APB should separate himself from his prior firm or
company affiliation and should be expected to devote his
full time to the activities of the APB. He should meet
tests of independence (insofar as investments and other
matters are concerned) as would be expected of a Commis
sioner of the SEC. APB members should be compensated
by the AICPA at a level commensurate with their responsi
bilities, including appropriate retirement benefits. The
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term of appointment should be relatively long—for example,
a period of five years with a possible renewal term of five
years. Each member should be selected on the basis that
he will represent the entire public and no particular
constituency.
The members of the APB should be nominated by a
continuing committee (of perhaps 15 members of which
at least a majority should be AICPA members). That
committee should be carefully selected by the President
and approved by the Board of Directors of the AICPA.
Those persons nominated for the APB should be elected
by the Council of the AICPA. Such a selection process
should help assure that the pronouncements of the APB
will have maximum acceptance within the accounting pro
fession.

Individuals selected for the APB should be knowledge
able in the areas covered by APB Opinions, but they do
not necessarily need to be members of the AICPA and
need not be practicing certified public accountants. How
ever, a majority of the APB at any time should have had
extensive experience in financial and accounting matters.
The objective should be to obtain the best qualified persons
rather than representatives of any particular group.

A frequent assertion is that the AICPA will find it
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the type of individuals
for a restructured APB that would be necessary for it to
be successful. The presumption is that individuals with
the experience, maturity and ability to fill such a respon
sible position will be unlikely to leave their existing firm
or affiliation for a position that might involve lower com
pensation and an uncertain future. However, individuals
of top quality in other professions have been successfully
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attracted to positions of professional and public service and
so have members of the accounting profession. Attorneys
and businessmen regularly accept judicial appointments
and high governmental positions, roles that frequently re
sult in significantly reduced compensation. Surely the ac
counting profession has the kind of people who would
welcome this opportunity for important service with a
major public interest. However, the compensation must be
comparable to other positions of such responsibility.

Another point sometimes made is that a full-time APB
would not be as professional as a part-time APB; and,
also, that since a full-time APB has more of an appearance
of a governmental agency, greater difficulty would ensue
in trying to keep this function in the private sector. We
do not accept this viewpoint. A full-time APB operating in
an effective manner could be more professional and more
successful in bringing the talents and resources of the entire
profession to bear in accomplishing its mission. In the
end, success or failure will depend on the quality and time
liness of the pronouncements, and the principal question is
how to obtain the highest quality.

Efficiency in operation. The overall costs associated with
the operation of the present APB are significant in relation
to the number and quality of the Opinions produced. In
addition to the annual cost of several hundred thousand
dollars to the AICPA for research and administration,
the AICPA bears considerable additional costs directly
and indirectly associated with APB activities. Individual
firms and companies absorb annually a large amount,
perhaps in excess of two million dollars, in terms of the
time and expenses of APB members, their advisers and
others involved in APB projects. A full-time APB should
be able to operate, with research and staff support, on a
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budget of this general magnitude, and possibly less. The
AICPA should be able to find the necessary financing,
whatever the cost would be.

Of more importance, however, is the increase in pro
ductive efficiency which a smaller, full-time APB could
achieve. The ability to concentrate on a problem until it
is resolved and the opportunity to direct research activities
in the most productive channels would be definite ad
vantages of such an APB. Whether in terms of cost or
productivity, a full-time APB is likely to improve signi
ficantly on the value received from the efforts expended
than is presently the case.
Dealing with new problems. A full-time APB would have
a significant advantage in dealing effectively with newly
emerging problems. Rather than meeting only eight or nine
times a year, the restructured APB could be virtually in
continuous session. Procedures could be established for
timely consideration of new problems and for expression
of tentative conclusions for guidance of the profession until
a definitive position could be developed.

An early warning system combined with issuance of
tentative positions to guide practice away from foreseeable
pitfalls is necessary. The complexity of business and gov
ernment is increasing and new problems are constantly
arising. The accounting profession needs a framework that
can be responsive quickly to new developments, so that the
business community and the users of financial statements
can have a clear understanding of any accounting conse
quences of such developments.

The frustrating delays experienced by the APB because
of its periodic meetings, and other organizational con
straints, could be eliminated. The result would be a more
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timely response to the needs of the profession and the
public than has been possible.

Independence. A full-time APB whose members are dis
sociated from conflicting entanglements and undesirable
types of pressures would tend to remove the questions or
cloud relating to independence. The enhancement in public
confidence that could result would be of great benefit to the
profession. Continuing loss in public confidence because
of doubts as to independence under the existing structure,
whether warranted or unwarranted, could be disastrous to
the profession.
An important part of the function of the APB would be
the establishment of appropriate procedures for the filing
and presentation of views. In this regard, the APB and its
staff should not have private meetings with affected persons
or groups without having these meetings reflected in the
public record.

Acceptability of pronouncements. There are those who
argue that pronouncements by a full-time APB would not
gain sufficient acceptance by the profession and that some
AICPA members might not follow the Opinions. Apparent
ly those who so argue believe the present level of acceptance
of APB Opinions is related to the membership on the APB
of partners from each of several accounting firms. We
believe that acceptance results more from the quality of
the pronouncements than from who are the members of
the APB. No accounting firms should have permanent
representation on the APB.
The key to acceptance of the pronouncements rests on
the quality of the research and the documentation and
reasoning supporting the conclusions and on their relation
ship to the basic objectives of financial statements.
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Proximity to current problems. Some contend that a full
time APB would be inappropriate because the members
would be too far removed from day-to-day experiences, and
that the current organization benefits greatly from the fact
that most current APB members are on the “firing line.’’
The wide range of problems they would face in their work
on the APB would hardly result in a loss of touch with
reality. The situation can be likened to that of a judge.
Appointment to the bench doos not mean that a former
attorney becomes impractical. Quite the contrary, the range
of practical matters coming to his attention on the bench is
likely to become greater than in practice. Similarly, the
members of the proposed APB would likely expand rather
than contract their range of exposure to practical issues of
the day.

The information presented to the APB by means of hear
ings, briefs and committee reports would bring to the APB
the views of many parties who have had wide experience.
Likewise, an opportunity to question those who make pres
entations would enable APB members to keep in touch
with the practical aspects of issues under consideration.

Other considerations. While views may differ regarding
the merits of public criticisms of the APB, no one can deny
that such criticisms tend to impair public confidence in and
respect for the Opinions issued. Many in the accounting
profession as well as in the business and financial com
munity expect the profession to change the present struc
ture of the APB to eliminate, to the extent possible, the
bases for the recent criticisms. Any change made must be
substantive, without creating undue discontinuity, and
achieve the maximum improvement.
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The restructure that we have recommended represents a
significant change from the current mechanism, yet it pro
vides continuity with the past. The new APB could embrace
the current agenda of the APB as well as initiate new proj
ects as problems are identified. The new, full-time APB
would be a logical step in achieving a formalized process
for articulating accounting principles. The new APB would
remain an integral part of the accounting profession, yet
its increased independence and ability to react quickly to
emerging problems would make it more responsive to public
needs. It would permit more effective reaction to the de
mands that increasing complexities have created in the
development of accounting principles.
The future of the accounting profession depends impor
tantly on its ability to meet the demands that the public,
government and business community place upon it. A fulltime APB would improve the ability of the profession to
meet more promptly and effectively the rapid changes
occurring in business and society at large and would help
restore public confidence in financial presentations of
American business.

Operating Procedures

Organizational relationship in AICPA. The Chairman of
the APB could be responsible to the President of the
AICPA only for general administrative purposes, such as
the use of office space and other facilities and services of
the AICPA. However, the governing and administrative
structure of the AICPA should have no influence or control
over the work or conclusions of the APB.
The heads of the research and supporting staffs of the
APB should report to the Chairman of the APB. The APB
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should have a separate budget. It would be the responsi
bility of the Board of Directors of the AICPA to obtain
the necessary funds.
Task forces. In order to bring the maximum abilities
and experience to bear on each particular problem, a task
force of specially qualified individuals should be appointed
to study the problem. These persons would be selected for
their knowledge and background and would include those
from various fields of experience, depending upon the sub
ject matter. The task force would represent a significant
source of information for the APB and would act in an
advisory capacity to the APB. In this way, not only the
vast experience of the accounting profession but also the
experience from many other fields would be made available.

Briefs and position papers. The APB should give wide
public exposure to matters it has under consideration. Upon
announcement of an intention to issue a pronouncement in
a given area, all interested parties should be invited to file
their views with the APB. These views, or briefs, should be
reasoned presentations and should provide the APB with
material for its deliberations in addition to any research
commissioned by the APB under its own research organi
zation or special task force. All contacts with the APB with
respect to subjects under consideration should be a part of
the public record, and the conclusions should relate to the
public record.

Public hearings. The APB should establish procedures
for public hearings on all significant matters under con
sideration and state the controlling criteria to be met in
making the decisions. Interested parties, including govern
mental agencies, should be notified of the hearings and
invited to appear to make oral presentations in addition to
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any brief or position paper filed. The hearings should be
conducted in a judicial manner, and a transcript of the
proceedings should be published and sold on a subscription
basis. Through the public hearing process the APB would
have an opportunity to question in depth those who express
differing views on matters under consideration. The APB
would thereby be better able to consider the impact of
proposed pronouncements on the various interested parties.

Exposure period. A question could exist whether, the
draft of an Opinion or other pronouncement of the APB
should be publicly exposed for reaction and comment. If
the research, public hearing and other steps taken by the
APB to review and consider a subject have been properly
undertaken, it may be unlikely that much new information
would result from the exposure process. Also, exposure
could perhaps be construed as an indication of some degree
of indecisiveness. However, it is difficult to record the rea
soning and conclusions on complicated and controversial
subjects in a clear and comprehensive manner. Also, the
complexity, the diversity and the wide scope of business
activities make it difficult to anticipate all of the problems
of application. Therefore, public exposure of drafts of pro
nouncements would be a desirable step in some cases in
assuring the best possible results. However, this exposure
would not be necessary in all instances.
Conclusions in Opinions supported by reasoning. The
conclusions in Opinions should be supported in a more com
prehensive and effective manner. These explanations would
involve not only the establishment of a proper relationship
to the defined objectives, but also the reasoning why the
conclusions best serve investors and other users of financial
statements.
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Approval and dissents. Approval by a majority of the
APB would be required for its conclusions to become effec
tive. A two-thirds vote requirement not only has the danger
of an impasse but also results in excessive compromising.
Each dissenting APB member would have an opportunity
to express his disagreement with the majority position and
his reasons therefor. The increasingly widespread interest
in APB Opinions requires full disclosure and makes it very
important that dissenting views not be submerged and that
they be published together with the majority position
reached.

Effective dates for Opinions. If the work of the APB
could be done on a more timely basis, a greater opportunity
would be available to lengthen the period of time from the
publication of an Opinion to the effective date. This
would give business enterprises more time to adjust to
the new principles and methods and would undoubtedly
reduce some of the opposition to changes. The APB in
the past has tended to operate on a “crash basis” with
only relatively short periods for those affected to adapt to
the new bases.
Legal Basis

We do not propose in this brief to discuss the legal
aspects of the operations of the APB, including its authori
ties and limitations. These should be reviewed with lawyers
who are knowledgeable in this area. Since various legal
questions do arise periodically in this regard, and since
the threat of possible legal action against the APB has
been made occasionally, it is essential that full considera
tion be given to this subject in connection with the present
study. This consideration would include the legal aspects of
enforcement.
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Research

The entire research program and the role and respon
sibilities of the Director of Accounting Research and his
staff need to be thoroughly reviewed and our comments
in this regard are brief. The research program of the past
12 years has been successful in some respects. The research
studies published have generally been of good quality. The
research staff has also provided significant assistance on
APB projects not involving or resulting in publication of
a research study. However, an overall assessment of the
research program indicates the results have not been com
mensurate with the time and cost that have gone into it.
The research program should be coordinated much more
closely with the needs of the APB. The permanent re
search staff should not be expected to interrupt a signifi
cant research assignment to deal with short-term projects
or housekeeping chores. The capabilities of research per
sonnel need careful evaluation so that research projects
are assigned in a manner that will maximize the probabil
ities of productive efforts.

Substantial portions of supportive research for the APB
could be undertaken by various organizations and academic
groups. The result of “outside” research could be pre
sented to the APB in briefs or position papers, or it could
be independently published.
The research as well as the conclusion of the APB
should be related to predetermined and defined objectives
if any common purpose is to be achieved.

The experience in our firm has indicated that successful
and effective accounting research is generally not achieved
by groups, teams or committees. Research involving con-
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ceptual matters, while it may require the accumulation of
relevant data, is based primarily upon the thought and
analysis of individuals. The best accounting literature has
been written by individuals. Therefore, emphasis should
be placed on research by individuals.
Interpretations

The preparation and publication of interpretations of
Opinions should be expanded and improved. If this pro
cedure were carried out properly and effectively, it would
eliminate the alleged need for so many detailed rules in
Opinions. Thus, Opinions could be limited more to prin
ciples, and the implementation and application of the
principles could be handled by interpretation and the use
of judgment.
Enforcement

One of the long-range problems with respect to the APB
is enforcement of its Opinions. This subject is closely re
lated to acceptability of APB pronouncements as discussed
in an earlier section of this brief.
Members of the AICPA. Members of the AICPA have
generally complied with APB Opinions since the fiasco over
the conclusion stated in Opinion No. 2 with respect to the
investment credit. However, that episode involving certain
AICPA members and the SEC illustrates what could hap
pen again. The entire question of enforcement of APB
Opinions other than with the assistance of the SEC (and
certain other governmental agencies) has not yet been faced
squarely and dealt with in a realistic manner.
The real question is whether AICPA members as a con
dition of their membership should be required to follow
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APB Opinions. So long as mere disclosure of departures
from APB Opinions and reliance on “substantial authori
tative support’’ is a permissible alternative, enforcement
is purely voluntary and cannot be effective for a very long
period. The AICPA should reach a definite decision to
place a requirement upon its members to follow and sup
port APB Opinions regardless of “substantial authorita
tive support’’ for other alternatives. However, the AICPA
should not attempt to force a member to take any action
that would be unlawful.
While a certain degree of acceptance among AICPA
members is necessary for any enforcement procedures to
be effective, such procedures are a necessary part of the
overall plan for the APB. Such procedures place an even
greater burden upon the APB to perform its function in a
proper manner.

We recommend that:
1. The new plan for the APB be adopted by a vote
of the entire AICPA membership.
2. Procedures be established for requiring AICPA
members to follow APB Opinions if an appropriate
legal basis to do so exists.
Governmental agencies. The SEC has supported APB
Opinions other than No. 2. However, it has no obligation
of any kind to do so. Other governmental agencies also
have considerable authority and power and their own
enforcement objectives. What will be the ultimate effect
when a Federal governmental agency with strong statu
tory power orders a company under its jurisdiction to
follow accounting contrary to an APB Opinion? The SEC
will ordinarily not countermand such an order from another
regulatory agency. The independent auditor can qualify
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his report, but no one can predict the ultimate outcome of
such a conflict. Without some vehicle to resolve conflicts
that might arise in this connection, how is the public to
be served?

The Opinions published by any group within the AICPA
must be based on their authority as a pronouncement of a
professional organization operating for the benefit of the
public. If the Federal Power Commission, for example,
decides not to follow an APB Opinion in its rules and regu
lations under existing conditions, no organization other
than a Federal court could require it to do so and then only
under a proceeding initiated by a party having the neces
sary standing before the FPC. Past experience indicates
that success in such a court action is only a remote pos
sibility.
The SEC could adopt APB Opinions, as its own regula
tions, or the Federal Securities Acts might be amended
to give some sort of statutory authority to APB Opinions.
However, neither action would necessarily be feasible, nor
would such action necessarily influence the many other
Federal and state regulatory agencies.

Congress could pass a law giving some legal authority to
APB Opinions for purposes of all Federal regulatory
agencies. However, it is not likely that Congress would
give this authority to a private organization.
In view of the vast authority of the Federal and state
regulatory agencies, it could be contended that the account
ing profession might as well abdicate in its efforts to estab
lish accounting principles and let this responsibility fall to
the governmental agencies. However, we do not agree with
that viewpoint.
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If the APB is a strong and effective professional or
ganization and does an outstanding job in carrying out
its mission in behalf of the public, and if it receives the
support of the business community and the accounting
profession, it has an excellent chance of having its views
prevail. Even though governmental agencies would have
the power to depart from APB Opinions, they would have
the responsibility to justify such departures.

Therefore, we believe that a strong and effective APB
within the framework of the AICPA is the best means for
the accounting profession to carry out its responsibility.
The final decision as to who should carry the responsibility
for the establishment of accounting principles may be made
some day by the Congress, but the best way to keep this
responsibility in the private sector is to have an APB that
will do a truly outstanding job and place upon others (in
cluding governmental agencies) the responsibility of justi
fying departures.
We believe that a strong accounting profession, which
retains on a merit basis the right to develop accounting
principles in a professional manner, is desirable for the
welfare of our free-enterprise system. There is a reason
able chance for the accounting profession to retain this
right, in behalf of the public, and the accounting profession
should do everything in its power to earn this right by
performance.
Appeal Procedures

APB Opinions have significant effects upon numerous
decisions and actions in the business community and by the
public. Such Opinions, in a free-enterprise system such as
exists in the United States, cannot be imposed upon the
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business community over a long period of time without any
effective right of appeal. Fair appeal procedures are critical
because they provide a safety valve that could help resolve
potentially explosive situations. Until the first public hear
ing was held by the AICPA in May 1971, company manage
ments or other interested parties were not given an oppor
tunity to be heard by the APB in person and on the record
(committees of the APB had met previously with certain
groups). Neither has the SEC served in a very effective
appeal capacity for APB Opinions.

Certain appeal procedures are presently available to
company managements and anyone else who can show that
they are so affected as to have an appealable action. These
procedures would involve appeals to appropriate govern
mental agencies and to the courts. Everyone has certain
constitutional rights that cannot be taken away.
Business managements resort to what may be considered
to be aggressive persuasion when they consider their exer
cise of this right to be the only appeal really available to
them without undertaking court actions that may be lengthy
and costly and with possible questionable results.

More effective appeal procedures beyond the AICPA may
eventually be necessary to protect the legitimate rights of
investors and other parties involved. Such rights may need
to be further protected and, if they are not, the APB and the
AICPA could be casualties in the process. In addition, the
existence of reasonable appeal procedures may lead to a
better job being done in the first place.

Our firm in 1965 published a booklet entitled, “Establish
ing Accounting Principles—A Crisis in Decision Making.”
This booklet discussed in some detail the possibility of a
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United States Court of Accounting Appeals that could be
established in the Executive Branch of the Federal Govern
ment.
We recognize the problems involved in trying to estab
lish appeal procedures beyond the AICPA that are any
more prescribed or legal than those that may exist at the
present time. However, consideration of the general subject
under review by the study group would be incomplete with
out consideration being given to appeal procedures and
the rights of affected parties.
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APPENDIX A

Arthur Andersen & Co.
69 West Washington Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602

November 16,1970

Mr. Marshall Armstrong, President
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Armstrong:
The Accounting Principles Board, in our view, has not
successfully carried out its mission nor does it currently
give promise of doing so. While the APB has made prog
ress in some areas, the total result has not been sufficiently
responsive to past or present needs. Many of the problems
covered by pronouncements have been considered within a
framework of concepts and principles which is out of date
and which led to the problems in the first place. Most of
the pronouncements represent little more than detailed,
arbitrary rules, which set forth almost no reasoning as to
how and why they meet the needs of investors and other
users of financial statements. Also, too much emphasis has
been placed on what is deemed to be best for the auditors.
The inability of the APB to succeed in its mission is evi
denced today by the dissatisfaction and criticism, both
inside and outside the profession, which are far greater
than in 1959 when the APB was established. Many events
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and developments in recent years have focused increased
attention on the work of the APB. The public interest in
business has been greatly expanded, and the number of
shareholders in publicly held companies has increased
dramatically. Also, business transactions have become more
complex, and many new and difficult accounting problems
have arisen, which underscore the urgency of achieving
substantial improvements in financial accounting and re
porting.

The Committee on Accounting Procedure was replaced
because it was not properly organized to accomplish what
was needed and because it had not established the neces
sary objectives on which to base its conclusions. The effec
tiveness of the APB has been seriously handicapped for
similar reasons. The APB has been organized in much the
same manner as the CAP, even as to size. Both groups
have been involved primarily in what has been referred to
as “putting out fires,” rather than taking a coordinated
and planned approach to the problems in total. The total
direct cost of the APB to the profession has probably been
about twenty times as much as for the CAP. Yet, the im
provement in results has not been at all commensurate with
this increased cost.

With the APB or the CAP-type of organization, the
necessary results cannot be achieved merely by increasing
the expenditures of money and effort, by holding longer
and more frequent meetings, and by having more people on
the AICPA payroll. The time spent in debate and dis
cussion expands to fill the time available, and the amount
of expenses increases to use up the funds budgeted. There
is little evidence that the research has had any significant
effect on the views of individual APB members.
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While many reasons exist for delays in resolving
problems, the fact is that numerous and undesirable delays
have occurred. This fact could be documented in detail
by a long list, but only two cases are mentioned here as
illustrations. In order to avoid three dissents to Opinion
No. 7 in 1966, the Board as a whole assured three Board
members that a prompt review of Opinion No. 5 in relation
to Opinion No. 7 would be made and appropriate action
taken by the Board; but such review is still in process and
no action has been taken. When Opinion No. 11 was issued
in 1967, it was agreed that prompt attention would be
given to each of the five special areas excluded from the
Opinion; but any significant consideration or discussion of
these items has been postponed several times, and no
action appears to be imminent on any of them.
In our view, there are two primary reasons for the dif
ficulties which the APB has had in carrying out its mission.
The first reason is a lack of a definition of the objectives
of financial statements. Under the original plan for the
APB, these objectives were to be established as the first
order of business. This omission has resulted in inef
ficiencies in the APB’s operation and disastrous results
in its resolution of problems. The tremendous amount of
time which has been spent by APB members, the AICPA
research staff and others on Statement No. 4 has delayed
action in the establishment of meaningful objectives and
concepts for five years and has produced nothing more
than an elaborate defense for the status quo. Thus, after
eleven years of effort, and with only Statement No. 4 as
a product indicated to fill the need for basic objectives,
this continued void (which is of increasing seriousness)
will become more difficult to eliminate. Subjects such as
business combinations, goodwill, changes in methods, equity
basis, and marketable securities are examples of problems
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where objectives of financial statements must be established
before it is possible for effective solutions to be determined.
Unfortunately, the appearance of indecision and pro
crastination on the part of the APB, resulting from a lack
of objectives, creates an impression of a lack of independ
ence and a doubt as to its leadership role and capabilities.
The second major reason for the difficulties of the APB
involves its general organization and the manner in which
it approaches problems. The APB has operated essentially
as a compromising, rule-making body trying to achieve on
each issue, by means of arbitrary rules, an ad hoc accom
modation of the various views of eighteen members. While
the APB is carrying out a quasi-public, legislative function,
it has not operated in a manner which adequately recog
nizes the public interest. There have been no public hear
ings, no public record, and no appeal procedures, even
though many millions of people are affected by its deci
sions. Regardless of the personal integrity of individual
APB members, questions involving conflicts of interest
have arisen. An appraisal of the record indicates that a
new approach is needed in formulating sound accounting
principles.

We much prefer to have accounting principles estab
lished by the accounting profession. Although we have
questioned various decisions of the APB, we have up to the
present time followed all of the Opinions issued. However,
as we have noted, the situation is rapidly deteriorating,
and it may no longer be desirable for the AICPA as a
whole to continue to rely upon the APB as it is presently
constituted. Likewise, it may no longer be reasonable to
expect AICPA members to do so.

Compliance with APB Opinions by AICPA members is
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essentially a voluntary matter. Considerable responsibility
is placed upon the SEC for enforcement. Yet, there are
questions whether the SEC has the legal right to enforce
such rules without going through the prescribed rule
making procedures. Also, CPAs may not have an effec
tive, legal defense under the Securities Acts for relying in
good faith upon mere SEC enforcement of APB Opinions.
The AICPA can no longer take the position that the APB
is only a committee of a private association establishing
standards for its members. The pronouncements of the
APB have a major impact on all segments of our society—
not only investors, creditors and other users of financial
statements, but also employees and their families. The APB
is carrying a tremendously important public responsi
bility.
The AICPA will not be able to retain this function unless
it demonstrates that it deserves the confidence of the public.
When an activity with such a significant public interest
involved is undertaken by a private organization, such
organization must satisfactorily meet the tests required by
the public. Otherwise, it is inevitable that the activity will
eventually be performed by some other organization, which
would probably be a governmental agency.

We respectfully petition that prompt action be taken by
the AICPA to make the necessary changes in the organi
zation and operations of the AICPA as they relate to the
establishment of accounting principles. We also suggest
that the need for these changes is so urgent that a new
plan should be submitted to Council for approval in May
1971 and put into effect as soon as possible.

In our view, the following matters should be considered
if the accounting profession is to retain significant respon-
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sibilities for the determination of accounting principles:

1. A major organizational change is necessary in
order to achieve better results on a prompt and timely
basis.
2. The objectives of financial statements should be
defined.
3. Each pronouncement should explain why the con
clusions are in the best interests of investors and
other users of financial statements.

4. All aspects of the legal basis for the pronounce
ments should be reviewed further and consideration
given to ways and means of clarifying this situation.
5. Features which are characteristic of a body
responsible to the public should be adopted, such as
the following:

a. Maximum independence and freedom from con
flicts of interest.
b. Primary attention to the needs of investors and
to public interest generally.
c. Public hearings with a complete record of the
proceedings to be published.

d. Clear reasoning in support of conclusions, with
comprehensive concurring and dissenting opinions.

e.

A procedure for appeal of decisions.

6. Research should be more timely and better
oriented to meet the necessary requirements. Also, more
research could be done by those outside groups repre
senting different viewpoints.
7. Improved methods should be established for de
termining and isolating current problems, obtaining
the facts, and responding to the problems on a timely
basis.
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8. The relationship of the AICPA to the SEC and
other Federal and State regulatory agencies, as well
as the responsibilities of CPAs in giving reports under
the Securities Acts, should be clarified. The AICPA
should not be an unofficial or informal arm of any regu
latory agency. A better understanding of the responsi
bilities of the various parties is necessary.
9. Procedures for interpreting pronouncements and
answering questions should be improved.
While we are not committed to any particular solution
to this problem at the present time, we do favor a plan
whereby the new body would consist of five to seven fulltime members and would incorporate such matters as those
set forth in the listing above. Many of the details could be
worked out satisfactorily, and we are prepared to give more
specific suggestions which would be intended to make the
entire organization more effective than it is at the present
time. The staff of the AICPA which supports the present
APB should be strengthened and its activities reorga
nized and streamlined. More of the research now under
taken by the AICPA could be performed by those com
panies, firms and organizations which have a significant
interest in the proceedings.
A new program probably would involve increased costs.
We believe that sufficient funds could be obtained for the
right kind of a new program. We also believe that it will
become increasingly difficult to obtain funds for the present
program.
Our firm will continue to devote its manpower and re
sources to the establishment of sound accounting principles,
and these must be channeled in a manner which will assure
their most effective utilization.
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We are available at your convenience to discuss this sub
ject with you further, if you would like to do so.

Sincerely yours,
/s/ Harvey E. Kapnick, Jr.

Harvey E. Kapnick, Jr.
Chairman
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APPENDIX B

FIVE OF THE

FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES WITH

INFLUENCE ON ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING OF

PUBLICLY HELD COMPANIES

General

Various Federal and state agencies have the authority,
individually and separately, to prescribe accounting to be
followed by companies under their jurisdiction. They have
not been coordinated or consistent with one another in their
approach to accounting practices. They may or may not
follow the Opinions of the APB. This situation represents a
serious obstacle to improvement in financial accounting and
reporting.
Each of these agencies was created by law for specific
purposes; as a result, each has a special viewpoint, which
may and frequently does constitute bias in its approach to
accounting decisions. They have not been required to har
monize their decisions with “generally accepted accounting
principles” or even with one another. Within its own
sphere, each of these agencies is sovereign, subject only to
very broad limitations.1
1. This same general problem was discussed in 1938 by A. A. Berle, Jr.
(a lawyer and then Undersecretary of State) in an article “Accounting
and the Law” (The Accounting Review, March, 1938, pages 13-14) as
follows:
“Where a government body has power to make an effective rule in
any particular case, we have come to expect at least two, and possibly
three, safeguards which are also development mechanisms. These are,
in order: (1) The opportunity for full argument afforded both sides;
(2) The requirement for a publicly announced, reasoned decision;
(3) Review upon appeal to a higher tribunal. It may be granted at
once that a conscious attempt has been made, in recent years, by certain
influences in the law to eliminate some, if not all, of these safeguards,
and to deify the administrative process in and of Itself. But this school
of thought, is so obviously an extreme as applied to American conditions
that it cannot be taken as a permanent guide in building the intellectual
framework of the newest branch of law, which accounting really is. .. .”
*****
“It should be within the realm of possibility to create a Board of
Accounting Appeals to which accounting questions could be referred,
and which, by training, personnel, and equipment was capable of
rendering swift decision on such problems. . . .”
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Five of the most significant of these agencies—the ones
whose practices perhaps have the greatest influence on the
accounting and reporting of publicly held companies—are:

Securities and Exchange Commission

Federal Power Commission

Interstate Commerce Commission
Civil Aeronautics Board
Federal Communications Commission

Rule-Making and Appeal Procedures

The extent of jurisdiction that these five agencies exer
cise over the accounting of companies varies greatly. Fur
ther, the agencies vary significantly in how they administer
the accounting authority they do exercise.
In the case of one of these agencies, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), little use has been made of
formal rule-making procedures for accounting matters.
There is no requirement to issue written rules on account
ing principles and practices. Those formal pronouncements
that have been made in this area either (1) have dealt
with matters of form and disclosure, as in Regulation S-X,
or (2) have been directed toward occasional specific mat
ters as in some of the Accounting Series Releases. In fact,
only a small fraction of the policies of the SEC relating to
accounting principles and practices are in writing and
available to the public.
Informal, but nonetheless binding, determination of im
portant policies and rules as a result of decisions reached
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in cases involving individual companies generally has been
substituted by the SEC for formal rule making in account
ing. As a result, far-reaching decisions are made and prece
dents are created without a record and without an oppor
tunity for participation by other parties who may have an
interest, including public investors whom the SEC was
established to serve.
In the case of the other four agencies, rule-making pro
cedures for accounting matters are followed to some extent.
However, public hearings generally are not held.

Appeal to the judicial courts from rule making by an
agency is generally limited to those parties that are
directly and adversely affected. However, an agency is
presumed by the judicial courts to have expertise in areas
of its jurisdiction, and its latitude in exercising powers
granted by Congress is quite broad. Even where a party is
directly and adversely affected and has adequate standing
to appeal, judicial courts have usually refused to disturb
accounting rules adopted by an agency unless they are so
arbitrary and so flagrantly wrong as to amount to pure
whimsy2 or violate “due process” standards. Yet, the courts
hold public accountants to a high level of accountability and2
2. In refusing to interfere with a uniform system of accounts prescribed
by the Federal Communications Commission, Justice Cardoza of the United
States Supreme Court in American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299
U. S. 232, stated at pages 236-37 of the opinion of the Court:
. . it is not enough that the prescribed system of accounts shall
appear to be unwise or burdensome or inferior to another. Error or
unwisdom is not equivalent to abuse. What has been ordered must
appear to be ‘so entirely at odds with fundamental principles of
correct accounting’ (Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 231 U. S. 423,
444) as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of
judgment. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 287 U. S. 134, 141; Kansas
City So. Ry. Co. v. U. S., supra, p. 456. . . .”
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do not grant an immunity to them of a type that is available
to the regulatory agencies.3
Inconsistent Rules Among Agencies

No means are available today to ensure consistency in
accounting practices prescribed by the various agencies.
Each is sovereign in its own jurisdiction with almost un
limited powers to prescribe accounting as it, and it alone,
sees fit. Also, the agencies have not established overall
objectives and criteria to serve as guidelines, and their
policies are frequently established without criteria or with
out the underlying reasoning as to what is best for investors
and other interested parties.

While the SEC has generally supported the Opinions of
the APB, there have been increasing indications that other
Federal regulatory agencies are giving more recognition to
the Opinions of the APB. For example, after the issuance
of Opinion No. 9, the FPC, FCC and ICC each instituted
rule-making proceedings and subsequently issued orders
changing the prescribed uniform system of accounts to re
flect in general the revised form of the statement of income
set forth in Opinion No. 9. However, these three commis
sions adopted somewhat different rules with respect to the
definition of extraordinary items and prior-period adjust
ments.
3. The legal counsel of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac
countants as a result of the Continental Vending case, stated:
“The defendants had asked . . . for instructions that would have
required the jury to acquit if it found that the balance sheet was in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. The trial
court instead gave instructions which said that the ‘critical test’ was
whether the balance sheet fairly presented the financial position with
out reference to generally accepted accounting principles.
“The trial court also said in its instructions that evidence of com
pliance with generally accepted accounting principles would be very
persuasive, but not conclusive. It also gave other instructions which
the jury might have taken as an invitation to test the fairness of
presentation, not against generally accepted accounting principles, but
against their idea of what an investor or other layman might want to
know.” (The Journal of Accountancy, August 1970.)
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Some companies come under the jurisdiction of more than
one of the agencies. Interagency conflicts and inconsisten
cies could possibly be resolved by cooperation and consid
eration for one another’s requirements, but there is now no
effective method of achieving consistency in objectives or
approach among all these agencies.

The principal problem results from the confusion to
investors and others when they are furnished with financial
statements of various companies that may not be—and
frequently are not—prepared on a uniform basis or in
accordance with consistent accounting principles and prac
tices. With the overriding authority of these agencies over
the accounting followed by companies representing such a
significant portion of our economy, and with the autono
mous power of each to make rules, efforts by the accounting
profession to establish objectives and narrow alternative
practices will not necessarily be successful.
While all of these regulatory agencies have a statutory
responsibility to the public, there are indications that cer
tain of them, by the very nature of their regulatory activi
ties and statutory responsibilities, may from time to time
tend to favor certain segments of society in establishing
accounting rules. This potential for bias, accentuated by the
lack of overall criteria concerning what constitutes the
fairest presentation for all segments of the public that are
affected, may not produce results that are in the best
interests of all segments of the public. The one agency
specifically concerned with the interests of investors, the
SEC, seldom can or does challenge the accounting rules of
the other agencies.

The general approach each of these five agencies has
taken with respect to accounting requirements for com-
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panies subject to its jurisdiction and the expansion of the
use of such authority are discussed below.

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

The agency with the broadest impact on publicly held
companies is the SEC. It administers several statutes and
has duties under certain others.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the
Investment Company Act of 1940 give the SEC extensive
control over the accounting followed by certain companies,
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes accounting
requirements on brokers and dealers. By far the greatest
number of companies, however, are affected by the registra
tion, reporting and proxy-solicitation provisions of the Se
curities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. These provisions apply to several thousand com
panies with securities issued to or traded by the public.
Under these Acts, the SEC has certain authority over
financial statements issued by most of the nation’s larger
companies. As a result of the Securities Acts Amendments
of 1964, most companies with 500 or more stockholders and
over $1,000,000 of total assets now come under its account
ing requirements. These requirements relate not only to
financial statements filed with the SEC but also affect
published reports to stockholders. Proxy Rule 14a-3, as
revised in 1964, includes the following provision:

“. . . Any differences, reflected in the financial state
ments included in the report to security holders, from
the principles of consolidation or other accounting
principles or practices, or methods of applying ac
counting principles or practices, applicable to the finan-
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cial statements of the issuer filed or proposed to be
filed with the Commission, which have a material effect
on the financial position or results of operations of the
issuer, shall be noted and the effect thereof reconciled
or explained in such report. ...”

The SEC’s powers to prescribe accounting rules are
specific and sweeping. These powers are expressed in the
Securities Act as follows:
“The Commission shall have authority from time
to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the pro
visions of this title, including rules and regulations
governing registration statements and prospectuses
for various classes of securities and issuers, and de
fining accounting, technical and trade terms used in
this title. Among other things, the Commission shall
have authority, for the purposes of this title, to pre
scribe the form or forms in which required informa
tion shall be set forth, the items or details to be shown
in the balance sheet and earnings statement, and the
methods to be followed in the preparation of accounts,
in the appraisal or valuation of assets and liabilities,
in the determination of depreciation and depletion, in
the differentiation of recurring and nonrecurring in
come, in the differentiation of investment and operating
income, and in the preparation, where the Commission
deems it necessary or desirable, of consolidated balance
sheets or income accounts of any person directly or in
directly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any
person under direct or indirect common control with
the issuer; but in so far as they relate to any common
carrier subject to the provisions of section 20 of the
Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, the rules and
regulations of the Commission with respect to accounts
shall not be inconsistent with the requirements imposed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission under author
ity of such section 20. . . .” (Section 19a)
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Similar authority is contained in the Securities Exchange
Act, except that the SEC shall not require reports that
are inconsistent with accounting methods prescribed by
any other agency under Federal law. Both Acts, in giving
discretionary authority to the SEC, relate such authority
to what is necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors. These Acts do not in
clude any meaningful criteria to serve as guidelines for
deciding when financial statements and the underlying
accounting are on a sound basis.

In testimony before a subcommittee of the House of
Representatives concerning the Securities Acts Amend
ments of 1964, then-chairman William L. Cary of the SEC
emphasized the importance of the SEC’s accounting
authority as follows:
“Most importantly, investors in over-the-counter
securities are entitled to be assured that corporate
reporting meets all the tests of timeliness, sound ac
counting, reliability, responsibility, and consistency.
This can be achieved only by the imposition of legal
obligations which would shape the development of
appropriate accounting and other disclosure prac
tices.”4

Mr. Cary also stated:
“The purpose of disclosure is to place the investor
in a position to make an informed judgment on the
merits of a security, and to provide a basis for com
paring that security with others issued by companies
in the same or different industries. Essentially this
purpose is achieved through the furnishing of financial
information which provides a uniform pattern of
reporting based on understood and generally accepted
accounting practices.”5
4. Hearing held before Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, Com
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, on
November 19, 1963.
5. Ibid.

663
55

With due respect to Mr. Cary, his viewpoint as expressed
in the last sentence above has not always been followed
by the Commissioners or the staff.

During the three decades since passage of the Securities
Act and the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC has pub
lished relatively few rules on matters involving accounting
principles and practices. However, the SEC is in no better
position than the accounting profession to determine ob
jective standards until it establishes criteria to serve as a
basis for decision making.
Regulation S-X governs the form and content of financial
statements filed with the SEC; but this regulation is con
cerned primarily with method of presentation and extent
of disclosure, not with accounting principles and practices.
The SEC has also issued Accounting Series Releases but
only a relatively few of those issued to date have dealt
with important accounting problems, and those few have
dealt with rules rather than basic criteria, concepts and
principles. In general, such releases as do relate to ac
counting principles and practices have been directed toward
specific problems (not necessarily the most important ones
nor ones with the widest applicability) or have dealt with
questions arising out of a few cases in which action was
taken because financial statements filed were considered
deficient.

Even when formal statements of policy are issued, there
is no assurance that interested parties will be afforded an
opportunity to present their views or that the SEC will
consider the record, if any, in reaching its decision. In con
nection with the issuance of some statements, the SEC does
“expose” an advance draft to the public, requesting that
any views or comments be submitted by a specified date.
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This practice is followed with respect to revisions of Regu
lation S-X. In some cases, however, policy statements are
issued without prior notice. For example, on January 10,
1963, one month after the APB issued its Opinion No. 2
with respect to the investment tax credit, the SEC issued
its Accounting Series Release No. 96 on the same subject.
This release, dealing with a matter of intense interest to
business, the accounting profession and the public, was
issued without advance notice or a hearing; it did not sup
port the APB’s Opinion; and it gave no acceptable reason
other than “the substantial diversity of opinion which
exists among responsible persons” for its requirements,
which differed in essential respects from the Opinion of
the APB. No explanation has ever been given as to the
identification of the “responsible persons” or as to why the
action of the SEC was in the public interest.

Instead of exercising official authority directly and auton
omously, the SEC generally has chosen to accomplish its
objectives in two ways: (1) through working “behind the
scenes” with the AICPA and (2) through its day-to-day
processing of registration statements and reports filed by
the many companies subject to its jurisdiction.
The SEC has generally preferred to go along with the
customary practices of business and the alternatives con
sidered acceptable by the accounting profession, although
there have been occasions where the SEC has been placed
in an untenable position and has decided to act on its own
initiative. The SEC has usually followed the lead of the
AICPA in this area. The preference of the SEC for work
ing with the accounting profession rather than assuming
direct responsibility for prescribing accounting principles
and practices represents a deliberate position expressed
time and again by the SEC and its individual members. It
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was reiterated in Accounting Series Release No. 96, as
follows:
“In Accounting Series Release No. 1, published
April 1, 1937, the Commission announced a program
for the purpose of contributing to the development of
uniform standards and practice in major accounting
questions. Accounting Series Release No. 4 recognizes
that there may be sincere differences of opinion be
tween the Commission and the registrant as to the
proper principles of accounting to be followed in a
given situation and indicates that, as a matter of
policy, disclosure in the accountant’s certificate and
footnotes will be accepted in lieu of conformance to the
Commission’s views only if such disclosure is adequate
and the points involved are such that there is substan
tial authoritative support for the practice followed by
the registrant, and then only if the position of the
Commission has not been expressed previously in rules,
regulations, or other official releases of the Commis
sion, including the published opinions of its Chief
Accountant. This policy is intended to support the
development of accounting principles and methods of
presentation by the profession but to leave the Com
mission free to obtain the information and disclosure
contemplated by the securities laws and conformance
with accounting principles which have gained general
acceptance. ’ ’
The SEC has been criticized, and perhaps properly so,
for not pressing the AICPA more for prompt and effective
action. Instances have occurred where the APB has acted
rapidly at the insistence of the SEC.

In Congressional testimony, which followed that quoted
earlier, Mr. Cary answered Questions by Congressman
Harley 0. Staggers as follows:

“Mr. Staggers. . . . Who has the primary responsi
bility for the determination of appropriate accounting
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principles to be followed in the preparation of finan
cial statements?

“Mr. Cary. I would say Mr. Barr is our long-time
senior chief accountant, and I think I can say quite
truly that we have cooperated with the accounting pro
fession very carefully on this subject over a period of
years. I would take it as a joint responsibility.
“Mr. Barr has been working with them, I know, on
an almost day-to-day basis over a period of years, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
“One of my colleagues says the ultimate responsi
bility is ours, but I think in many areas we have
encouraged them to move ahead and we have stood
behind them. Sometimes we have differed but in gen
eral we have been going along with them in many areas
and we have pushed them. ’’6

The chairman of the SEC in 1964, Manuel F. Cohen,
expressed it this way:
“No one can dispute the assertion that the Commis
sion has the power to decree ‘acceptable’ accounting
principles and practices. I think it is common knowl
edge that we have, at various times, been urged to do
just that. However, from its inception, the Commission
has preferred cooperation with the profession to gov
ernmental action, and has actively encouraged account
ants to take the initiative in regulating their practices
and in setting standards of conduct. In response, the
profession, although not the recipient of delegated
power (as are the NASD and the stock exchanges),
has performed an important service as a self-regula
tory institution. ”7
6. Hearing held before Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, Com
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, on
February 19,1964.
7. From an address before the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American
Accounting Association, September 1,1964.
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The above comments do not imply that the SEC’s posi
tion with respect to accounting principles has been purely
passive, waiting for the profession to take action. Through
meetings, correspondence and speeches, individual com
missioners and members of the staff have encouraged im
provement in specific areas where it has felt particular
concern. The Chief Accountant of the SEC has frequently
submitted his personal views (which do not purport to be
those of the SEC) to appropriate AICPA committees. The
SEC has not indicated, at least publicly, any general dis
satisfaction with the overall performance of the accounting
profession in establishing accounting principles. However,
the SEC’s tolerance in this regard, particularly as it re
lates to objectives, may not have always been in the public
interest.
The SEC’s greatest influence over accounting practices—
and one that is sometimes overlooked—results from its
regular and continuous review of financial statements
included in registration statements and reports filed with
it pursuant to the Acts which it administers. In deciding in
each case whether to accept the financial statements as filed
(and, usually, as covered by an opinion of independent
public accountants) or to request that they be revised, the
SEC exercises a great influence over accounting practices.
The decisions reached in these individual cases, together
with matters covered in conferences and correspondence,
have cumulatively built up a vast body of informal, unpub
lished “file-cabinet case law” with respect to the SEC’s
position on accounting principles and practices.

The influence exercised in this way is discernible to the
general public (and even to many companies and their
accountants) only in those isolated instances where major
differences of opinion between the SEC and a registrant
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become public or in speeches by the SEC members and
staff, but it is nonetheless real and powerful. Through this
means the SEC, quietly and without public discussion,
molds and directs the development of accepted practices in
those areas in which it chooses to do so. However, this
procedure does not cover all areas, and many second-rate
alternative practices continue.

Whether the SEC has exercised too much or too little
influence over accounting practices or whether the influence
it has chosen to exercise has been sound are really not
as important as the considerations that (1) the SEC has
broad authority over accounting; (2) its influence is
mainly exercised through day-to-day decisions reached pri
vately between registrants and the staff with no public
record; (3) there are no effective means for compelling the
initiation of accounting rule making or for review on
appeal where differences of opinion among companies,
accountants and the SEC may exist; and (4) the statutes
that give authority and responsibility to the SEC do not
establish criteria or require that such criteria be estab
lished for the determination of accounting principles that
will result in “fairness” to all segments of our society
affected by the decisions of the SEC.
Federal Power Commission (FPC)

The Federal Power Act of 1935 gives the FPC regula
tory jurisdiction over sale of electric energy at wholesale
in interstate commerce. Similar authority over companies
engaged in the interstate transmission and sales-for-resale
of natural gas is conferred on the FPC by the Natural Gas
Act of 1938; this has been held by the United States
Supreme Court to include sales by independent producers
in interstate commerce.
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Under the authority of statutes that it administers, the
FPC has issued uniform systems of accounts for natural
gas companies (other than independent producers) and
electric companies. In addition, its chief accountant has
adopted the practice of issuing Accounting Releases setting
forth interpretations of the uniform systems of accounts.

In the Appalachian Power Company case,8 the United
States Supreme Court refused to review a decision of the
Appeals Court that, under the Federal Power Act, upheld
the FPC’s authority to require that a utility’s report to its
stockholders conform to its prescribed uniform systems of
accounts. Since the wording in the Natural Gas Act is
similar to that in the Federal Power Act, the FPC may have
the same authority over reports to stockholders of natural
gas companies.
Mr. Arthur Litke, Chief Accountant of the FPC, in an
address in 1965 made the following comment with respect
to the above court decision:

. The Appeals Court held that the Federal Power
Commission’s systems of accounts are to be regarded
as the basic accounts in cases where there may be
conflict with those prescribed by state commissions. In
addition, the Appeals Court affirmed the Commission’s
authority to insist that utility stockholder reports con
form to Federal Power Commission accounting pro
cedures. The decision is another in a series of cases in
which the Commission has been sustained on fundamen
tal questions concerning the force and effect of its
prescribed systems of accounts. By refusing to review
the case, the Supreme Court has left, in effect, the sug
gestion of the Appeals Court that the Federal Power
Commission take full advantage of the authority given
to it by the Federal Power Act. Obviously, the decision
and how the Commission will now proceed is vitally
8. Appalachian Power Co. v. F. P. C., 328 F. 2d 237 CA 4, Cert. denied
(1964 ) 85 S. Ct. 59; 379 U. S. 829.
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important. Looking beyond the statutory command,
there is an obvious challenge to the Commission to
impose accounting standards which are balanced with
the general needs and interests of government, man
agement and investors.

“The Appalachian decision affirms the Commission’s
responsibility to review the financial statements of
jurisdictional companies in their reports to stock
holders and to the public. As yet, however, the Com
mission has not formulated any definite procedures for
carrying out this responsibility. The accounting pro
fession is of great influence in improving financial
statements to the end that accounting nonconformities
are eliminated or reduced in number. In this respect
cooperation of the profession will assuredly be sought
by the Commission.”9

The FPC’s uniform systems of accounts for electric com
panies and for natural gas companies vary from the
alternatives available under generally accepted accounting
principles primarily in the area of accounting for plant
costs.

Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)

The ICC regulates the interstate transportation by com
mon carriers of passengers or property by railroads, motor
carriers (trucks and bus lines), inland water carriers, and
pipelines (except those transporting natural gas or water).
The Interstate Commerce Act authorizes the ICC to pre
scribe uniform systems of accounts for railroads and pipe
lines, motor carriers, carriers by water and freight for
warders. The uniform systems of accounts so prescribed
vary in several respects from the alternatives available
under generally accepted accounting principles. A partic9. From an address before the Federal Government Accountants Associa
tion Symposium, June 17, 1965.
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ularly significant difference is the failure to provide for
deferred taxes arising from the use of liberalized deprecia
tion and amortization under certificates of necessity.
Another difference relates to the accounting for certain
types of properties and the related depreciation. The usual
type of depreciation accounting is followed by railroads for
such assets as freight and passenger-train cars, locomotives,
bridges, buildings, communication systems, shop machinery,
etc. Replacement, sometimes called “betterment,” account
ing is followed for grading, ties, rails, other track material,
ballast, and track laying and surfacing costs. Under re
placement accounting, costs are charged to the property
accounts when such items are originally constructed. To
the extent that these items are replaced in kind, the cost
of the replacement is charged to expense and no entries
are made to the property accounts, which retain the amounts
capitalized at the time of original construction. To the
extent that these items are replaced with heavier or im
proved material, the cost of the heavier or improved ma
terial in excess of the cost of replacement in kind is also
capitalized. The so-called “betterment” capitalized is
limited to the “betterment” in material; labor is charged
to operating expense, both when materials are replaced in
kind and when replaced with improved or heavier material.

A committee of the AICPA in 1957 took the position that
this replacement accounting for railroads was not in accord
with practices generally followed by other industries but
that “no substantial useful purpose would be served by
a change to depreciation accounting techniques.” On Sep
tember 17, 1963, the AICPA was requested by our Firm
to reconsider this view (since it could not be supported on
any logical basis), and a committee was appointed to do so.
That committee submitted its report to the Accounting
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Principles Board on April 20, 1966, but the APB has taken
no action on the report.

In 1960, the ICC issued a proposed rule that would
prohibit carriers subject to its accounting regulation from
including financial statements in their annual reports to
stockholders (or otherwise released to the public) that are
inconsistent with the corporate books of accounts main
tained in conformity with the applicable uniform systems
of accounts. However, on January 25, 1962, the ICG
adopted Order No. 33581 which stated that:
“Carriers desiring to do so may prepare and pub
lish financial statements in reports to stockholders and
others, except in reports to this Commission, based on
generally accepted accounting principles for which
there is authoritative support, provided that any
variance from this Commission’s prescribed account
ing rules contained in such statement is clearly dis
closed in foot-notes to the statements;.. .”

A few railroads and a number of other carriers subject
to the ICC’s jurisdiction have adopted the practice per
mitted by this rule, primarily as related to deferred in
come taxes. Many railroads continue to report to their
stockholders in accordance with the accounting require
ments of the ICC; and, as a result, the independent public
accountants (in cases where audits are made and opinions
are issued) generally take exception in their opinions
to the lack of a provision for deferred taxes in cases where
such taxes should be provided, but they take no exception
to replacement accounting.

In our opinion, the deficiencies in the accounting of the
railroads as reflected in their published financial state
ments, which accounting does not respond fairly to the
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objectives of investors, have had a far-reaching effect on
the public and have influenced many business decisions
such as the declaration of dividends and the management
of cash.
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)

The CAB regulates the routes and rates of air carriers.
As authorized by law, it has prescribed a uniform system
of accounts for such companies. Generally the system of
accounts does not vary from the alternatives available
under generally accepted accounting principles.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that:
‘‘The Board is empowered to require annual, monthly,
periodical, and special reports from any air carrier;
to prescribe the manner and form in which such reports
shall be made; and to require from any air carrier
specific answers to all questions upon which the Board
may deem information to be necessary. ...” (Section
407a)
The CAB has not attempted to exercise authority over or
to prescribe the form and content of financial statements
furnished to stockholders and other parties. The pre
scribed annual report to the CAB includes a schedule for
reconciling such report to the statements on which the
independent public accountants have given their opinion.
This appears to be a recognition that differences could
exist between the requirements of the CAB and generally
accepted accounting principles.
Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

The FCC has authority over licensing and allocation of
wire and radio communication rights, and has jurisdiction
over interstate telephone and telegraph rates.
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In accordance with statutory authorization, the FCC has
prescribed uniform systems of accounts. These systems of
accounts vary from the alternatives available under gen
erally accepted accounting principles primarily in the area
of accounting for plant costs.

The FCC has not attempted to exercise authority over
or to prescribe the form and content of financial statements
furnished to stockholders or other parties. However, this
matter has not come to issue and the FCC’s powers in this
regard are not clear.
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APPENDIX C

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AICPA WITH RESPECT
TO ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

Of the numerous organizations and associations of
accountants, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) has assumed the greatest respon
sibility for the establishment of accounting principles. This
Appendix represents a brief discussion of the activities of
the AICPA in this area.
Prior to 1939

Prior to the early 1930’s, there was relatively little
interest in development of accounting principles on a
profession-wide basis. The accounting profession was small
and was loosely structured, and its activities were on a
“personalized” basis. Neither the interest in financial re
porting nor the resources of the AICPA were significant
enough to provide the impetus for a broad review of
accounting principles. Very little consideration was given
to the real objectives of financial statements.

In the early 1930’s, interest in accounting principles
became much more evident, because of the damage to the
public from inadequate financial reporting. The inad
equacies of financial reporting and accounting were high
lighted during this depression period. A special committee
of the AICPA on cooperation with stock exchanges made
specific recommendations in 1932 to a companion committee
of the New York Stock Exchange. One key suggestion
was that a small group, including accountants, lawyers
and corporate officials, should prepare an authorita-
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tive statement of the broad accounting principles or
standards to be adopted by listed corporations. This state
ment was intended to be brief and to provide only a broad
framework within which companies would be free to choose
individual detailed accounting methods and procedures
considered to be best suited to their own needs. This state
ment stressed consistency of application and disclosure
of the accounting methods employed, rather than what the
objectives and principles should be.
While all aspects of the recommendations were not im
plemented, the pattern was established for significant
freedom of choice by companies among alternative ac
counting methods with certain boundaries on those methods
to be circumscribed by agreement among a small group of
informed individuals commissioned for such a task. The
accounting profession was to take the lead in the articula
tion of the necessary broad principles. However, such broad
principles and the related objectives were never estab
lished.

During this same period Congressional hearings and
discussions were held which led to the passage of the
Securities Acts and to the creation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1934. While the Commission was
granted broad powers over matters of financial reporting
and accounting principles, in practice the Commission has
only rarely chosen to exercise its powers to prescribe
specific accounting rules. In effect, the Commission urged
the accounting profession to meet the challenges of the time
in regard to matters of accounting principles, but the test
was whether the results were “misleading”, rather than any
broad principles or objectives. The basic policy of the Com
mission has been to let the accounting profession take the
lead, with the Commission providing support and occasion-
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al prodding. However, neither the accounting profession
nor the SEC had established any criteria, objectives or
guidelines as to what constituted “fairness” in financial
reporting to all segments of our society.
Committee on Accounting Procedure (1939-1959)

By 1939 the AICPA had formalized its structure for
expressing statements of accounting principles by estab
lishing a “senior committee,” the Committee on Account
ing Procedure. This committee consisted principally of
practicing certified public accountants, and it issued 51
Accounting Research Bulletins during the period up to
1959. These bulletins considered specific topics and identi
fied one or more alternative procedures as being superior.
The conclusions expressed were advisory to auditors in
their resolution of day-to-day practical problems, and ad
herence to the bulletins was voluntary, although most
bulletins received fairly widespread acceptance. The main
thrust of the committee was to use persuasion rather than
compulsion to gain acceptance of positions taken. Thus,
companies exercising the strongest opposition generally
received the least compulsion. Auditors who did not agree
with a bulletin were not bound to follow the recommended
practice, provided they accepted and supported the desired
alternative as being generally accepted or as having sub
stantial authoritative support.
Dissatisfaction developed during the 20-year existence
of the Committee on Accounting Procedure both as to the
quality of the bulletins issued and as to the ability of the
committee to deal effectively with difficult problems. The
degree of usefulness of these bulletins has varied, but an
overall evaluation of them indicates that:

1. No criteria were ever established that could be
used as guides in determining which of the alternative

678
70
solutions to a problem represented the fairest result
for investors and other users of financial statements.

2. The bulletins were not supported by any signi
ficant amount of research by the AICPA. The AICPA
staff was unable to give the committee very much
assistance insofar as research was concerned, since
the limited personnel available were busy with the
administrative aspects of the operations of this and
other committees.

3. The bulletins represented a compromise of the
committee members’ personal points of view because
no basic objectives or concepts were ever agreed upon.
The bulletins usually included little reasoning or ex
planation of the bases from which the conclusions were
drawn.
4. The bulletins frequently sponsored alternative
practices or were equivocal in dealing with the subject
matter. Compromises on conclusions and wording to
receive the necessary two-thirds vote of the committee
members frequently resulted in “watering down” the
conclusions so that the bulletins were only partially
effective. Thus, the decision-making process was
really one of arbitration among the committee members
rather than a determination of what principles would
best achieve predetermined objectives.

5. The bulletins reflected a lack of real authority
by carrying the following statement,
. Except in
cases in which formal adoption by the Institute
membership has been asked and secured, the authority
of the bulletins rests upon the general acceptability
of opinions so reached. ... It is recognized also that
any general rules may be subject to exception; it is
felt, however, that the burden of justifying departure
from accepted procedures must be assumed by those
who adopt other treatment. ...”

6. Bulletins were never issued on many con
troversial subjects, which were avoided.
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Accounting Principles Board (1959-Present)

In an effort to assume more effective leadership in the
determination of accounting principles, the AICPA estab
lished a Special Committee on Research Program and its
report was submitted to the AICPA Council in September,
1958. The establishment of the Accounting Principles
Board (APB) along with a much expanded research pro
gram was recommended. The committee report stated:
“The general purpose of the Institute in the field of
financial accounting should be to advance the written
expression of what constitutes generally accepted ac
counting principles, for the guidance of its members
and of others. This means something more than a
survey of existing practice. It means continuing effort
to determine appropriate practice and to narrow the
areas of difference and inconsistency in practice. In
accomplishing this, reliance should be placed on per
suasion rather than on compulsion. The Institute, how
ever, can, and it should, take definite steps to lead in
the thinking on unsettled and controversial issues.”

The APB was established by the AICPA Council and
superseded the Committee on Accounting Procedure on
September 1, 1959. The APB, supported by a much ex
panded research program, was first to consider and reach
some conclusions on the basic concepts, postulates and
principles of accounting (including the objectives of
financial statements), and then to proceed to study, analyze
and consider the more important current problem areas
involving accounting practices and financial reporting. The
overall objective, as indicated above, was “to narrow the
areas of difference and inconsistency in practice” in as
expeditious a manner as practicable, but on the basis of
adequate research and consideration.
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Research. The responsibility for research studies was
assigned to the AICPA’s Director of Accounting Research
and those who are associated with him in research proj
ects. The conclusions and recommendations are not ap
proved, disapproved or otherwise acted upon by the APB,
the only agency of the AICPA having authority to make
or approve public pronouncements on accounting principles.
Opinions and Statements. The APB has issued twentyone Opinions and four Statements. Fifteen of these
Opinions and three Statements have been issued since
1965, and most of these have been on more significant sub
jects than those issued during the first six years of the
APB’s existence.

Despite the fact that the APB has dealt with some
difficult and controversial subjects in recent years—cost
of pension plans in 1966; the form of income statements in
1966; income taxes in 1967; earnings per share in 1969;
business combinations and intangible assets in 1970; the
equity method in 1971; and accounting changes in 1971—
many difficult problems still remain on the agenda.
The inability of the APB to hold its position on Opinion
No. 2 on accounting for the investment credit and the re
sulting damage to its standing as an independent and
authoritative body in the business community led to a
controversy within the AICPA and to the appointment of
the Special Committee on Opinions of the Accounting
Principles Board. Action taken by the AICPA Council on
one of the committee’s recommendations was reported to
the AICPA membership by its President as follows:
‘‘The Council of the Institute, at its meeting October
2, 1964, unanimously adopted recommendations that
members should see to it that departures from Opinions
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of the Accounting Principles Board (as well as effec
tive Accounting Research Bulletins issued by the
former Committee on Accounting Procedure) are dis
closed, either in footnotes to financial statements or
in the audit reports of members in their capacity as
independent auditors.” (Special Bulletin, October
1964)

The question of whether AICPA members should be
required (under the By-Laws and Code of Professional
Ethics) to follow the above Council action was deferred.
The same Special Committee also prepared a compre
hensive report dated April 1965 in which many recom
mendations were made for improvement in operations of
the APB. One recommendation was that Council in 1968
should approve, and propose to the AICPA membership,
an amendment to the Code of Professional Ethics to cover
infractions of the requirement to disclose departures from
APB Opinions. Such a proposal was made in 1969, but
was defeated by the membership.
Since various aspects of the operations of the APB are
covered in the principal part of this brief, no further dis
cussion is necessary in this Appendix C.

Generally Accepted

Accounting Principles

The standard used by the accounting profession for the
past thirty-five years in judging whether financial state
ments of a business entity fairly present its financial posi
tion and results of operations has been “generally accepted
accounting principles.” However, this term has no clear
meaning either to those who use it or to those who read or
rely on it.
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The Council of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) in 1964 adopted various recom
mendations of a Special Committee on Opinions of the Ac
counting Principles Board. These recommendations in
cluded the following:
“1. ‘Generally accepted accounting principles’ are
those principles which have substantial authoritative
support.
“2. Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board
constitute ‘substantial authoritative support.’
“3. ‘Substantial authoritative support’ can exist
for accounting principles that differ from Opinions of
the Accounting Principles Board.”
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1938
stated in Accounting Series Release No. 4, which is still in
effect, that when financial statements ‘‘are prepared in ac
cordance with accounting principles for which there is no
substantial authoritative support, such financial statements
will be presumed to be misleading or inaccurate . . . .”
In 1963 the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 96
relating to accounting for the ‘‘investment credit.” Despite
the publication of Opinion No. 2 of the Accounting Prin
ciples Board, which provided for deferment of the invest
ment credit, the SEC in that release stated: “In recogni
tion of the substantial diversity of opinion which exists
among responsible persons in the matter of accounting for
the investment credit, the Commission will accept” either
the deferment method or the flow-through method. Thus,
“diversity of opinion” was formally recognized as a basis
for alternatives in accounting.

The accounting principles set forth in Statement No. 4,
issued by the Accounting Principles Board in 1970, are
stated in terms of what is “generally accepted.” It states
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in paragraph 137: “Generally accepted accounting prin
ciples incorporate the consensus at a particular time . .
as to what the accounting should be. That 122-page docu
ment gives no indication of how this consensus can be de
termined or identified.
A research study published by the AICPA in 1965 states
that the sources for determining whether an accounting
practice has substantial authoritative support are:

“1. In the practices commonly found in business.
This does not follow from the mere fact that a practice
exists, but from the fact that experience of the business
has demonstrated that the practice produces depend
able results for the guidance of management and for
the information of investors and others.
‘‘2. The requirements and views of stock exchanges
as leaders in the financial community; similarly the
views and opinions of commercial and investment bank
ers would be entitled to weight.
“3. The regulatory commissions’ uniform systems
of accounts and accounting ruling exercise a dominant
influence on the accounting practices of the industries
subject to their jurisdiction. The commissions some
times depart from generally accepted accounting prin
ciples and, in such cases, it may be necessary for the
certified public accountant to make appropriate qualifi
cations in his report.
“4. The regulations and accounting opinions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission have the con
trolling authority over reports filed with the Commis
sion. The Commission and its chief accountants have
demonstrated a high degree of objectivity, restraint
and expertness in dealing with accounting matters. The
regulations and opinions issued to date are entitled to
acceptance by their merit as well as on the basis of the
statutory authority of the Commission.
“5. The affirmative opinions of practicing and aca
demic certified public accountants constitute authorita-

684
76
tive support for accounting principles or practices.
These may be found in oral or written opinions, expert
testimony, textbooks and articles.

‘‘6. Published opinions by committees of the Amer
ican Accounting Association and of the American In
stitute of CPAs.”1
Support for a wide variety of accounting practices, many
of them inconsistent with each other, can be found in the
sources listed above. The many alternative accounting
practices which are followed for similar transactions under
similar circumstances are therefore considered to be in ac
cordance with “generally accepted accounting principles.”
As a result, financial statements often are not prepared on
a comparable basis as between industries or even among
companies in the same industry. Variations in accounting
principles followed by two companies obscure financial com
parisons between them and may result in differences that
do not reflect differences in the facts and circumstances.

As a result, it is only natural that some are questioning
the whole concept of ‘‘general acceptance’’ as presently em
ployed in the term “generally accepted accounting prin
ciples.” Can this concept be continued as the basis for
accounting principles unless it rests more on what truly
serves the needs of users of financial statements than on
what accounting procedures are merely customary?
These deficiencies cannot be overcome by footnotes to the
financial statements disclosing the alternative practices
that are followed. Such disclosures generally do not re
veal the effect of a particular practice except perhaps to
the highly sophisticated user of financial statements.
1. Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Business
Enterprises by Paul Grady, AICPA Accounting Research Study No. 7,
March 1965, pp. 52-53.
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The Machinery and Allied Products Institute is a
national organization of capital goods and allied industrial
equipment manufacturers . Its member companies are deeply
interested in the work of the Accounting Principles Board
(APB) of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun
tants (AICPA) and in the Study on Establishment of Account
ing Principles which was formed to consider, in the words
of the President of AICPA, ”... how the AICPA’s standardssetting role can be made more responsive to the needs of
those who rely on financial statements.”
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In this preliminary statement of our views, we
have commented within the limits of our competence on the
"Memorandum of Pertinent Questions” now under consideration
by your distinguished Committee and have suggested certain
other questions which we think deserve the Committee’s at
tention. Our principal comments on the "Memorandum” relate
to "Composition of a Non-Governmental Standards Board” and
more specifically to our suggestion of October 12, 1970, to
the Executive Vice President of AICPA that there be estab
lished an Advisory Committee to APB, composed of chief
corporate executives. A copy of that letter is attached.
Our oral testimony, scheduled for 10:15 a.m. on Thursday,
November 4, will elaborate on this issue and will consist
in the main of testimony by two chief executives of lead
ing American corporations.
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Wear
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Some General Questions
We commend AICPA for the initiation of this study
and we appreciate the opportunity of offering our views on
those matters comprehended by it. The study is a most timely
one. The Accounting Principles Board has now been in exis
tence for some twelve years, a period of time sufficient to
justify a reexamination of its mission, its organization,
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its mode of operation, and, of course, its products. The study is made
not only timely but urgent by exogenous factors bearing on the develop
ment and refinement of accounting theory and practices. Such influences
—and they are reciprocal, interacting influences—include greatly expanded
stock ownership and a resulting enlargement of public interest in the prac
tice and the product of financial accounting; the growing importance of
security analysis—itself a product of enlarged shareholding; an increas
ingly activist administration of the Federal Securities Acts with con
tinually growing emphasis on disclosure and more disclosure of informa
tion hitherto regarded as confidential in nature; and a growing public
cynicism toward financial accounting and reporting that has found expres
sion not only in professional and press criticism but in lawsuits against
leading accounting firms . One item must be added to this too short list
ing—the Opinions of the APB itself which have produced in many cases
controversy and passionate debate.
With all this in mind, sketched in outline here because it
seems to us that our views can be fully appreciated only if considered
against the backdrop of the larger problem as we see it, let us turn
now to some questions which seem to us deserving of examination in the
course of this very important study. They reflect generally, we believe,
the views of capital goods manufacturers whom we represent. Those views
have tended to become even more firmly held as the pace of APB activity
has quickened in recent years.

What is the guiding philosophy of the Accounting Principles
Board? Does APB conceive its function as being a professional forum for
the study, development, statement, and restatement of accounting princi
ples as experience and changing circumstance may dictate? This seems to
us its proper function. Or does APB regard its primary obligation that
of asserting sole leadership in the pronouncement and enforcement of new
and revised principles of accounting? This would seem of less doubtful
propriety but it is in practical effect what has happened. In combining
its professional obligation of offering expert opinion on accounting mat
ters with the quasi-judicial function of enforcing—through the profes
sional apparatus of AICPA—opinions thus rendered and with no provision
for appellate review, APB mey have bitten off more than ary organization
can or should be expected to chew.

Are the Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board leading to
more rigidity and less flexibility in accounting practice? We are in
clined to think so. To be sure, pressures on the accounting profession
have unquestionably necessitated a reduction in optional accounting
practices but, if the present trend in APB Opinions were to continue,
we think there mey well be a further and most undesirable erosion of
management discretion. To cite an example, SEC has required the report
ing by diversified companies of sales and earnings by line of business.
APB seems headed in the same direction. Is this really wise? In an
unsuccessful attempt to persuade the then Chairman of SEC to desist
from such a requirement, MAPI said some years ago, "A real danger in
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product line reporting—both to shareholders and in a larger sense, the
economy itself—lies in the possibility of subjecting management to a new
volume of criticism based on limited knowledge and a constricted view of
management’s problems, plans and opportunities which can only tend to re
duce management’s freedom of action. And we must not forget that this
freedom of capable management to act in the corporation’s best overall
interests may well be the corporation’s principal asset and the thing
which gives to the investor’s share of ownership its greatest value.”

We continue to hold that view and we cite it here, in view of
APB’s apparent move toward ’’product-line reporting," as a reminder that
the continual reduction of management’s discretion by the introduction of
greater rigidities into accounting and reporting requirements can have the
most serious consequences for business and the economy as a whole. We
believe that the Accounting Principles Board—or any successor standardssetting body—must broaden its horizons and enlarge its sources of infor
mation if it is to avoid such unintended consequences. Let us consider
this latter point briefly.
Is the Accounting Principles Board receiving all of the infor
mation and counsel which it should have in preparing its Opinions? We
credit APB with a thoroughly conscientious effort to obtain the views of
interested parties in its standards-setting process. The solicitation
of views on "exposure drafts" of APB Opinions and, in some cases, on
matters under current study by the Board is both timely and extensive.
It is to be noted, however, that comments are solicited and received
almost wholly from professional accountants and financial executives.
No doubt the bulk of comments should be received from these sources be
cause of the technical character of matters under review. We think,
however, that the review process followed by APB—or initiated by any
successor body—should include an input from top business management.
Without intending to demean in any way the indispensable contribution
of the accountant and the financial executive, only the chief executive
of the corporation sees the enterprise whole and from a vantage point
which enables him to appraise fully the effects on it of major new de
partures in accounting and reporting.

Obviously these questions are merely representative of the
many larger questions that deserve ventilation in the course of this
study. They will suffice, however, to suggest a line of inquiry which
would seem to us to go beyond those very important matters referred to
in your "Memorandum of Pertinent Questions” and to which, in our Judg
ment, the Committee should give major attention.
Let us go now to some further comments on that Memorandum.
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"Pertinent Questions"

1. Established Accounting Principles —
Scope of the Task
We think it might be preferable to substitute the phrase "finan
cial accounting and reporting standards" for the more commonly used term
"accounting principles." The word "principle" at once raises some con
ceptual problems inasmuch as it means in common understanding, "a compre
hensive and fundamental law, doctrine or assumption" (Webster's Seventh
New Collegiate Dictionary). The reason for our tentative conclusion is
well put by Paton and Littleton (An Introduction to Corporate Accounting
Standards as quoted in the Fourth Edition of Accountant's Handbook): "The
term 'standards’ is used advisedly. 'Principies' would generally suggest a
universality and degree of permanence which cannot exist in a human-service
institution such as accounting." In short, the development of accounting
standards is an evolutionary process and accounting standards must change
as the nature of business may change; they are not, and must not be regarded
as, immutable laws that are fixed and unchanging.

The final question under this heading asks, "Should the body with
primary responsibility for formulating such standards limit itself to fun
damentals, should it develop detailed standards, or should it undertake to
do both?"

It seems to us that there is no one right answer to this ques
tion. There may well be circumstances in which the standards-setting
body will find it necessary to develop and announce both fundamental and
detailed standards. We believe, however, that such cases should be the
exception and that the general rule should be this: The standards-setting
body, by whatever name known, should be charged with developing fundamen
tal financial accounting and reporting standards. This is true for at
least two reasons. First, and as a purely pragmatic matter, the body
confronts an immense task with limited resources; it should deploy those
resources on the most critical part of its task—the statement and/or
restatement of fundamental standards. Secondly, we doubt if the
standards-setting body should undertake as a general practice to fix
detailed standards—at least insofar as that term implies detailed and
prescribed procedures—since, as pointed out above, the infinitely vary
ing circumstances to which accounting applies would seem to demand flex
ibility in accounting procedures designed to satisfy a particular ac
counting standard.
2. Should the Primary Responsibility
for Establishing Accounting Standards
Reside in a Governmental Body or a
Non-Governmental Body?
The responsibility for establishment of accounting standards
should be vested in a non-governmental body. We believe that such a
standards-setting group should be an agency of the American Institute
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of Certified Public Accountants and that its relationship with the Securi
ties and Exchange Commission should be one of independence as is the case
today.

We doubt if we are competent to express an opinion on the nature
of such a standards-setting body’s authority although it does seem to us
that there must be somewhere a "court of last resort" on controversial
accounting questions. As indicated previously, we believe that the ap
pellate function should be separated from the standards-setting function.
The enforcement of the standards-setting body’s decisions is, of course,
more than simply a mechanical function and will depend, ultimately, upon
the general acceptance by government, the accounting profession, business,
etc., of the pronouncements handed down by any such standards-setting body.
We believe that the general acceptance of such opinions would be enhanced
if our suggestion for creation of an Advisory Committee composed of cor
porate chief executives were adopted.
3. Composition of a Non-Governmental
Standards Board

We shall not undertake to answer all of the detailed questions
raised under this point. In general, we believe that any such standards setting body should contain representation from the accounting profession,
government, and financial executives from business. Inasmuch as such a
body should be the fountainhead of professional accounting doctrine, it
seems obvious that the membership should be composed of highly qualified
professional accountants.
However, decisions or opinions of such a body will often involve
questions of national and business policy which transcend the confines of
accounting per se. Accordingly, we renew our earlier suggestion that there
be created an Advisory Committee to—but not a part of—the Accounting
Principles Board, or any successor standards-setting body, which should
be composed of chief corporate executive officers. We believe that proj
ects under study by the standards-setting body should be referred to the
Advisory Committee at an early stage to permit time for its consideration
of the matter under review and to give the standards-setting body the
benefit of the view from the chief executive’s office.

Aside from those general observations made earlier, we offer no
comments on Items 4 and 5 in the - "Memorandum of Pertinent Questions."
We look forward to the opportunity of appearing before your
Committee on November 4.

Cordially,

President
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Mr. Leonard M. Savoie
Executive Vice President
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York
10019
Dear Len:
This will confirm our telephone conversation on
Thursday, October 8,
You were very kind in giving me a full picture of
the comprehensive and thorough manner in which the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and its Accounting
Principles Board seek the advice and recommendations from out
side individuals and interested groups on matters which may
become the subject of official Opinions of the Accounting
Principles Board.
I have been concerned for some time with the
fact that Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board, at
least on certain subjects, have an impact on American in
dustry which has vital top management implications as dis
tinguished from accounting policy or detail which is of
interest primarily to the financial departments of cor
porations. This is not intended to demean in any way
the enlarged role of the chief financial officer of cor
porations .

The interest of the chief executive officer in
the effect of certain Opinions of the Accounting Principles
Board on his company’s operation and corporate strategy has
been underlined in a number of the meetings of the MAPI ex
ecutive Committee, For example, when you deal with the
subject of product-line reporting, pooling of interests,
accounting for the investment credit, etc., the chief ex
ecutive of American companies is interested and concerned.
I suggested in our telephone conversation, therefore, that
since you acknowledged that your system of obtaining out
side advice does seem to have one gap in terms of direct
input of opinion from top management, this gap should be
filled in a way that is appropriate both from the stand
point of AICPA and American industry.

MACHINERY & ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANIZATION, COUNCIL FOR
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT, ARE ENGAGED IN RESEARCH IN THE ECONOMICS OF CAPITAL GOODS
(THE FACILITIES OF PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION AND COMMERCE)
IN ADVANCING THE TECHNOLOGY AND FURTHERING THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
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Accordingly, I have suggested that your organization ask a small
group of chief executive officers or chairmen of corporations to serve on
a top management Advisory Committee to the Accounting Principles Board.
I agree that this advisory committee should be relatively small in number
although you might want to have a second group of men at the same executive
level in a different group of companies who could be called on to partici
pate in a particular exchange of ideas when the date for the meeting is
inconvenient for a majority of your regular advisory group. We might call
this second group the "taxi squad” to borrow from football jargon. You
mentioned some reservation as to the possibility of the chief executive
or chairman asking that his place be taken at a particular meeting by the
chief financial officer of the company. Under those circumstances, you
would be merely duplicating information obtained from financial officers
through other means that you are already employing. My reaction to this,
as I indicated by telephone, is very simple and direct: have a "no sub
stitute rule" and enforce it. Industry, I am sure, would agree and un
derstand any such rule and its strict enforcement.

Another element in the suggestion which I am respectfully of
fering is that exchanges of ideas should take place between the Account
ing Principles Board or its designated subcommittee and the advisory
business group at a very early stage in the development of the Board’s
thinking on a particular problem or project which is listed for action
by AICPA. As is always the case in complex and controversial subjects,
a position can be frozen fairly early and in order to achieve the maxi
mum benefit from exchanges between AICPA and the advisory group, the
time of the exchange would have to precede any determination of basic
position or even before a strong direction of policy is established.
Finally, with respect to specifications for the individuals
who might be called upon, I would like to make these preliminary sug
gestions. I have already referred to the fact that he should be the
chief executive officer or the chairman, provided the latter is a work
ing chairman as distinguished from an honorary officer of the company.
The group should have a fairly broad spread insofar as types of business
are concerned. For example, the service industry should be represented
as well as manufacturing, etc. You probably would find especially help
ful the advice of a chief executive officer who has at some time in his
career had financial responsibility. Such a person as Frank Forster,
Chairman and President of Sperry Rand Corporation, Bill Blackie or Bill
Franklin, Chairman and President, respectively, of Caterpillar, etc.,
would meet this test. At the same time, it might be desirable to have
at least one person on the advisory group who does not have financial
background but is a broad-gauged top executive.

I appreciate the open minded way in which you received my
suggestion which is entirely consistent with your customary mode of
operation. I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter
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to Lou Kessler who is personally acquainted with my associate Charlie Derr.
Although we have taken no formal vote nor have we passed any resolution, I
can assure you that the views which I have expressed are in general entirely
consistent with the attitude of the Executive Committee of MAPI to which I
have referred above.
Cordially,
/s/ Charles W. Stewart

President
CWS:jd

cc:

Mr. Louis M. Kessler
President
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
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(Comments by W. L. Wearly before Study Group of A. I. C. P. A.
on Establishment of Accounting Principles - November 4, 1971)

*

*

* * *

My name is William L. Wearly and I am Chairman of Ingersoll-

Rand Company, a diversified manufacturer of machinery and
equipment.

Our total sales approximate $800 million of which

about $300 million are outside the United States, including $200
million U. S. exports.

I am here this morning to discuss with you a possible opinion
of the Accounting Principles Board having to do with product

line accounting since this committee is studying the operations
of the A. P. B.

The outline prepared by the A. P. B. states that the objective is
"to identify, and to permit evaluation of, the separable segments

of a company’s operations”.

The APB Outline does not state

why it is necessary or desirable to identify and evaluate separable
segments of operations, although it does negative the purpose

of comparing data of one company with another.

It is evident, however, that it does, in fact, permit comparing
and evaluating one segment of a company with a somewhat similar

segment in another company.

This does cause disclosure of

confidential information, information of extreme strategic
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importance to the future well being of the company, not only to

domestic competitors but particularly to worldwide competitors,
who are not similarly required by their accountants to make

such disclosures.

This is not materially different in effect

than requiring a company to disclose its product research and
development programs as they are being formulated.

I believe

you will agree, if an individual employee or outsider were
involved in the disclosure of a research program or of a marketing
strategy program, he would be subject to discharge and to suit

for damages.

I will demonstrate that the proposed disclosures

might become even more damaging and broader in scope.

Ingersoll-Rand’s business segments, product lines, or what
have you -- are by intent designed to have certain relationships.

Our so called segments involve some 27 product divisions and

300 or 400 product lines.

We charge our management with

creating and putting together product lines into divisions and

divisions into groups in such a way as to optimize customer service,
marketing impact, engineering and technological proficiency, and

deployment of fixed assets for the most efficient production
utilization.

This is managements stock in trade.

in this endeavor, we have highly profitable growth.

If we succeed

Conversely,

stagnation may indicate failure to develop proper product line
relationships.

Thus, we do not feel that our various business
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units, or segments, can have the same vitality if operated as

separate unrelated units -- for if they do, there is little purpose

in putting them together.

Clearly there should be no inference

made that segments could or should perform the same if
operated independently.

Therefore what is the valid reason

for an investor to have this information?

a segment.

He cannot invest in

Is it to permit him to invest in a new business to

compete with favorable segments?

We, as management of Ingersoll-Rand would like to know the

following about our competitors, so as to optimize our own

domestic and worldwide strategy.

We spend a great deal of

effort trying to get this data.

\

1.

Unit production of various product lines.

2.

Growth rate by product line over a period of years.

3.

Profitability and production cost over a period of years.

4.

Expenditures for product development.

5.

Nature of development.

6.

Which products are marginally profitable.

7.

Which products are highly profitable.

8.

Capital expenditures and depreciation charges over
a period of years.

9.

Where are profitable lines subsidizing low profit lines.

10.

Is market penetration being made in country ”A”
at expense of country "B”.
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We believe the proposed APB reporting in effect would lead to this

type disclosure much to the detriment of many United States
companies.

Do you know what a cost experience curve is?
what a typical cost experience curve is.

Let me show you

When plotted on log-log

paper, it typically follows a straightline and has a slope between
70% and 90%.

First, let me illustrate three typical price patterns represented by
the following Chart A.
Price Pattern X indicates a steady reduction in price as more and

more units are sold.

Price Pattern Y shows little or no price decreas

until competitive pressures force a reduction to a point where the
vendor did not survive.

Price Pattern Z indicates a variation of Y

but in this instance the vendor was able to survive and adjust his price

to meet competition and maintain a profit.

On Chart B we have added the cost curve to show the relation to Price
Pattern Z.

Note the cost experience curve follows the typical pattern

with a slope of between 70 and 90 percent as previously mentioned.

Chart C is an alternative pattern indicating a constant price through

the introductory period followed by a reduction in price paralleling
the cost curve as time goes on.

In this instance, the vendor has re

duced his selling price preserving a modest profit while at the same
time increasing market share by discouraging competition.
Chart D is the experience curve for an Ingersoll Rand product.

Pg. 5 - WLW

Note that the cost curve follows the expected straight line at an approxi

mately 85 percent slope.

Indicated on this curve is what we believe

to be the relative positions of two competitors with less experience.

I am already in the position of being the volume leader and low cost

producer.

If I drop my price to the cost level of competitor "A", I will

gradually force him to retrench or at least will curtail his desire for

further investment in this product.
to competitor "B".

The same reasoning can be extended

Furthermore, if I definitely knew their cost and

was willing to sacrifice current profits, I could drop my price below
the level of competitor "B" and project my volume out two or three

years at which point I would again be profitable and would have effectively
stopped competition.

Thus with sufficient knowledge of my competitor’s products you can
judge the formidable tool I have to use against them.

with so called predatory pricing practices.

You are familiar

If the APB rules force us -

American Industry - to disclose this information to the Japanese or
other foreign competitors they will pick off our products one by one

with great ease.

It is obvious that a small amount of disclosure leads to the requirements

for greater disclosure by way of explanation.

Where will this stop?

Won't this result in the disclosure of the complete game plan?

If I had

this data on my foreign competitors, my job would be infinitely easier
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in planning how to capture an important share of their markets but I
don't think they are going to reveal this kind of information.

they reveal very little.

In fact,

But, under the APB disclosure suggestions,

I will be revealing my data to them.

Do I need say how much more

effective this will make the Japanese invasion of the American machinery
industry.

Let me show you what has happened where the Japanese

have already invaded some of our highly visible industries.

Chart "E"

shows monochrome television sets and Chart "F" shows basic steel.

In both cases unit production, selling price and cost data, and many
of the answers to my 10 questions were readily available.

I think you

know the result.

You might reply that foreign competition is simply a matter of low
labor rates vs. our high rates.

factors.

This is only one of many important

There are still many areas in the machinery business where

by superior productivity we can compete.

But I don't want to tell our

competitors where this is and by how much.

In my letter of July 22, 1971 to the APB I registered my opposition
to the issuance of any opinion requiring presentation of financial in

formation as to segments and certification thereof and I quote a part

of that letter "We are strongly of the opinion that management is
charged with protecting the interests of its stockholders

and keeping information relative to segments confidential.
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It would appear that damaged stockholders would have

grounds for legal action to recover losses suffered from

your proposed disclosure of inside proprietary information. ”

I have requested our attorneys advice as to a possible remedy by

way of injunctive relief so as to restrain the APB from issuing such

an opinion.
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national society of

CONTROLLERS & FINANCIAL OFFICERS
of savings institutions
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, ACCOUNTING
AND REPORTING COMMITTEE
MONROE MORGAN, CHAIRMAN

111 E. Wacker Drive, Chicago, III. 60601

9601 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90210
PHONE: (213) 273-0440

October 22, 1971

Mr. Michael A. Pinto
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Pinto:
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the hearings
being conducted by the Institute for the purpose of examining
the AICPA's standards — setting role.

We believe that the recently evolved practice of holding
public hearings on the subject prior to the Accounting Prin
ciples Board or other committees reaching a position is a
sound one. We encourage the Institute to develop broad lists
of subjects having an impact on each issue being considered
and to seek out testimony on all sides of each subject.
Participation on the various boards and committees should not
be limited to practicing accountants only. While there are
some business and educational members on the Accounting Prin
ciples Board, it is my understanding that only members of
accounting firms are on other committees. For example, there
are no industry representatives on the Savings and Loan Audit
Guide Committee. This Committee has worked hard and done a
very professional job; but we believe that the addition of
industry representatives would make it even more effective
as a group.

644-3100
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Mr. Michael A. Pinto
Page Two
October 22, 1971

As the organization which represents the financial officers
of the bulk of the savings and loan associations in this
country, the Society looks forward to participating with
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in
its efforts to improve the procedures in establishing ac
counting principles.
Thank you.

Sincerely,

Monroe Morgan
Chairman

MM:sjm
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Savings Associations Financial Executives
9601 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD • SUITE 826 • BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA 90210
PHONE: (213) 878-5670

October 22, 1971

Mr. Michael A. Pinto
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Pinto:

We welcome the opportunity to participate with the Insti
tute in its effort to improve the procedures for establish
ing accounting principles. Our members, who are the chief
financial officers of nearly all the publicly held savings
and loan associations and holding companies, have worked
from time to time with the Accounting Principles Board
and the Savings and Loan Audit Guide Committee. We believe
these meetings have proved beneficial to both the profess
ion and the savings and loan industry.
We believe that the recently evolved practice of holding
public hearings on the subject prior to the Accounting
Principles Board or other committees reaching a position
is a sound one. We encourage the Institute to develop
broad lists of subjects having an impact on each issue
being considered and to seek out testimony on all sides
of each subject.

Participation on the various boards and committees should
not be limited to practicing accountants only. While there
are some business and educational members on the Accounting
Principles Board, it is my understanding that only members
of accounting firms are on other committees. For example,
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there are no industry representatives on the Savings and
Loan Audit Guide Committee. This Committee has worked
hard and done a very professional job; but we believe
that the addition of industry representatives would make
it even more effective as a group.

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in these
hearings. The Savings Associations Financial Executives
looks forward to participating with the Institute in its
continuing efforts to establish accounting principles
that are truly generally accepted.

Thank you.
Sincerely,

Monroe Morgan)
President

MM:sjm
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VESTAL LEMMON, President

National Association of Independent Insurers
Thirty West Monroe Street • Chicago, Illinois 60603
312 • 263-6038

October 25, 1971

Mr. M. A. Pinto, CPA
Administrative Secretary
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Pinto:

We appreciate the opportunity to submit a statement in reference to the AICPA
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles.
In view of the fact that the AICPA has created another committee, the Accounting
Objectives Study Group, to "refine the objectives of financial statements, " and as
this group lists as one of their first considerations "Who needs financial state
ments?" and "What information do they need?", we believe that this group should
complete their studies prior to the study on establishment of accounting principles

There is widespread agreement that financial statements should be designed to
meet the needs of the users. However, there is a real need to define who the
users really are. Many of the Opinions and other pronouncements seem to be
pointed towards the alleged needs of security analysts. We believe a definition
of other users would include individual stockholders, creditors such as banks
and vendors, customers, employees, political economists and, last but not
least, regulators. With respect to regulators, there should be full consideration
of regulatory requirements in developing accounting principles.
There has been a great deal of discussion about meeting users' needs and this
is the alleged reason for standardization of accounting. In fact, many of the
Opinions released by the Accounting Principles Board have been so complex
that skilled technicians in CPA firms could not interpret them. In trying to
reduce everything to rules to assist the user in analyzing financial statements,
the statements are so complicated that anyone other than a financial analyst has
great difficulty in understanding them. We believe that simplicity and consis
tency should be the rule in accounting and financial statements and the Accounting
Principles Board should give consideration to simplicity and consistency in
preparing their Opinions.
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It seems evident to us that not enough research in the specialized industries
has been undertaken before the APB publishes exposure drafts. The rather
extensive changes that have been made between exposure and finalization is,
in our opinion, proof of insufficient research.

Consideration should be given to including representatives from the insurance
industry on the Accounting Principles Board. We believe this is important as
the industry has much at stake and much to contribute.

Very truly yours,

J. F. Gill
Vice President and Actuary
JFG:lg
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A Presentation to AICPA Study Group (Mr. Francis M.
Wheat, Chairman) on the organization and operation of
the Accounting Principles Board.

For public hearings November 3, 1971

A Mul tiassociation Board to Establish

Accounting Principles

Adapted from a speech given at the Annual Convention
of the American Accounting Association, at the University
of Kentucky, August 24, 1971.

by Robert I. Dickey, Ph.D., CPA

Professor of Accountancy
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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SUMMARY of
A Multiassociation Board to Establish
Accounting Principles
by Robert I. Dickey

This presentation is directed to the following two "pertinent questions” of
the five listed by the study group:

1."Should the primary responsibility for establishing accounting standards
reside in
governmental or nongovernmental body?”
2.

"What should be the make-up of a nongovernmental standards board?”

It is believed that the wise policy followed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission of allowing a nongovernmental Accounting Principles Board to issue
Opinions should be continued. In spite of some shortcomings, this arrangement
seems to be much better, in the eyes of many accountants and businessmen, than
the detailed regulation of accounting in the railroad and public utility fields.

This writer believes that this nongovernmental accounting principles board
should not be completely under the control of one organization, which is the
situation we have today with the present APB operating as a committee of the
AICPA. The Committee on Accounting Procedure of the AICPA, predecessor of today’s
APB, was first in the field, with its first three Accounting Research Bulletins
issued in September 1939. In the years since then the AICPA has rendered valuable
service to the whole economy through the issuance of APBs and Opinions, first by
its Committee on Accounting Procedure, and since 1962, by the APB. The fact that
a committee completely controlled by the AICPA became predominant does not mean
that it should continue this way for the next 50 or 100 years.
The control and support of the APB should be shared by AICPA with three other
long-established national accounting societies, namely the American Accounting
Association, the Financial Executives Institute, and the National Association of
Accountants. Each of these three suggested organizations has conducted programs
of research in important areas of accounting.
The composition of the APB should be changed. The present requirement that
all members of the board must be CPA’s and members of the AICPA should be relaxed
to permit appointment of some non-CPAs if one of the supporting accounting societies
wishes to do so. The current restriction bars many highly qualified accountants
who are not CPAs. Further, the overheavy dominance of the present APB by CPAs
in public practice (14 out of 18 members) should be reduced. There should be more
high-ranking accountants with a strong background in broad business management
experience on the APB.

Current dissatisfaction with the present APB may lead other accounting organi
zations to issue formal opinions of their own. This presumably would constitute
"substantial authoritative support” for positions that might well be different
from those taken by the APB, If this happens, the resulting decrease in unifor
mity might cause the SEC to feel it necessary to take over the writing of the rules.
An accounting principles board sponsored and controlled by the four named
national accounting associations presumably would have a greater likelihood of
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2.

raising the substantially increased amounts of money needed for future research
in accounting. A centralized research fund should be better able to obtain funds
from its four supporting societies and from foundations, government, and business
in general, than the research program of just one association.

715

1.

Criticism of the AICPA's Accounting Principles Board

Many adverso criticisms have been made, particularly in the last few years,
of the Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of CPAs.

These

criticisms cover the composition of the APB, the methods it uses, and the
contents of some specific Opinions.

Some critics have gone so far as to say

that there is a credibility gap in published financial reports as a result of

the Board's actions or inaction.1
These criticisms have come from a broad range
of persons -- financial executives and managers in industry, bankers, financial
analysts, government officials, academics, and public accountants themselves.

Obviously some of these criticisms are contradictory and some probably would
have been made of most other agencies, public or private, had they been chosen

to perform the functions of the APB.

In the midst of all this criticism, it should be recognized that the APB

has made important contributions, not only to the accounting profession, but to

the entire business community and the investing public.

The American Accounting

Association Committee on Establishment of An Accounting Commission says in its

report, which was adopted unanimously by the committee members, "Whatever may

be thought of the eleven years’ activity of the APB, it cannot be denied that

For example, H. C. Knortz, Senior Vice President and Comptroller of
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, at the National Industrial
Conference Board panel discussion on "The Prospects for Agreement on Accounting
Principles" on Feb. 18, 1971 in New York, said of credibility in public reporting,
"An avalanche of public dissent is trembling on the brink." At this same session,
Frank E. Block, Senior Vice President of Girard Bank, Philadelphia, referred to
accounting’s severe deterioration of credibility over the,past few years. Leonard
Savoie, Executive Vice President of AICPA, referred twice to this so-called
credibility gap, in Journal of Accountancy, January 1968, pp. 37 and 38.

2
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progress has been made towards better reporting methods.

Even its harshest

critics give it some credit for having resolved a number of accounting prob
lems.2

The Institute has performed this service by a substantial expenditure

of money and time by itself, its individual members, and member firms.

It

reports that for the 11 years ended August 31, 1971, the combined costs of

the administrative and research efforts supporting the APB come to approximately
3a
$2,940,000.
This does not include, however, the imputed costs of time spent by

APB members themselves, and their advisors, and staff.

Marshall Armstrong,

1970-71 President of AICPA, says that many APB members spend from 50 to 75%

of their time on work for the Board and are assisted in this work by one or
more partners or staff on a full-time basis.

He estimates that if a monetary

value were put on all these hours worked for APB, it would amount to several

million dollars each year.3

The American Accounting Association committee came to the conclusion
that the formulation of accounting principles in an optimal manner was important enough, and the dissatisfaction with present methods strong enough, to

recommend the appointment of a Commission of five, part-time members, with a

supporting staff headed by a full-time director, to study the matter over a

2Report of the Committee, Accounting Review, July, 1971, p. 611.
3In "The APB and Corporate Accountability” in Financial Executive,

August, 1971, p. 30.

3aFrom letter of August 10, 1971 to this writer from Michael Pinto of

the AICPA staff.
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period of 18 months at a cost of approximately $260,000.

Action on this report

has been deferred, pending the reports of the two study groups sponsored by

the AICPA.

2.

Should the Government take over the Establishment of Accounting Principles?

At the annual convention of the American Accounting Association in August,

1969, Robert M. Trueblood, Past President of AICPA, concluded his important
speech, "Ten Years of the APB:

One Practitioner ’s Appraisal" with these words:

"Our professional alternatives, as I see them, are these:
...Accounting practices can revert to the confusion and disorder of the
days when every company went pretty much its own merry way, as is the.
case today in some nations.
...Or the Government, through the SEC and other regulatory agencies, can
take over accounting rule-making in an authoritarian way.
...Or the profession can improve its present rule-making procedures and
thus keep that function in the private sector.

What is to be our choice?"4
It is believed that very few responsible citizens would wish to follow the

first alternative.
The second alternative, rule-making by the government, is a prospect that

may materialize if dissatisfaction with self-regulation by the accounting profession
reaches an intolerable level.

The experience of many accountants and business

men with closely regulated industries such as the railroads and public utilities

tends to make them oppose an increase in governmental control over accounting.
4Speech given at American Accounting Association Annual Meeting at University

of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana, August 27, 1969, privately printed, pp. 14-15.
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In spite of present dissatisfaction with various aspects of the APB, this

writer doubts if a majority of accountants and businessmen would at this

time favor the SEC’s taking over the establishment of accounting principles
and standards for business in general.

The AAA report of the Committee on

Establishment of An Accounting Commission referred to above described the

possibility of a governmental agency such as the SEC taking over the job of

the APB as "a move which most people, including the SEC

itself, seem to want

to avoid.
It should be recognized that if a governmental agency were to take over

the work of the APB, it would face most of the difficulties of the present
APB.

It is sometimes said that members of the Institute’s APB have been

handicapped in agreeing on standards in the public interest by pressure from
important clients, and that a governmental bureau would not have these pressures.6

Although a governmental agency might not have these particular pressures, many
persons feel that it might well be subject to even greater pressures that would

not be in the public interest.

Further, although a governmental agency might

be able to move more rapidly in issuing standards because of its authoritarian

structure, this advantage might be more than offset by insufficient consideration

5Report of the Committee, Accounting Review, July, 1971, p. 611.
6Lawrence L. Vance, Changing Responsibilities of the Public Accountant,
Stanford Lecture in Accounting, Stanford University, Stanford, California,
June 5, 1970, privately printed, p. 13.
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given to certain valid viewpoints,

thus resulting in ill-considered regulations.

Those individuals who are inclined to favor having the SEC take over the

work of the Accounting Principles might also give careful consideration to certain

current major reorganization proposals made by President Nixon's Advisory Council
on Executive Reorganization, one of which would abolish the Commissioners at

SEC and place that organization under a single head.7

There seems to have been

very little discussion of this proposal so far in accounting circles.

Careful

thought should be given to how such a move, presumably towards a more authoritarian

structure, would affect the capability of the SEC to perform the functions of
an accounting principles board.
Consideration should also be given to the generalization that it is easier

to give a specific power to a governmental agency than it is to take away such

power, once it has been exercised.

The recent establishment of the Cost Accounting Standards Board by the
federal government presumably will create additional pressures for a critical
re-evaluation of all phases of the operations of the APB.

Although the area

assigned to the Cost Accounting Standards Board is a specialized one, it is

difficult to see how it can avoid dealing with some of the areas covered by

the present APB.

Thus, it may have a substantial impact on the methods used

to establish accounting principles for business in general.

Lyman Bryan, Washington Background, in Journal of Accountancy, April 1971,
7
p. 22, and also News Report, in Journal of Accountancy, May 1971, p. 9.
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A number of writers, in discussing the accounting profession’s relationship
with the SEC, have stressed the point that although the SEC has the authority to
establish accounting standards and procedures, it has preferred to allow the
accounting profession to develop them.

They have said that in general the SEC

has taken over the rule-making role only when it felt the profession was moving

too slowly.8
A different viewpoint was expressed by Richard T. Baker in an address before

the American Accounting Association Annual Convention in August 1971.

He stressed

the differences between the SEC and the APB, citing the well-known investment credit
fiasco of 1962-1964 and the difficulties on business combinations of the last
several years.

He says, "As a result of having two separate groups involved in

establishing accounting principles, [the APB and the SEC] a very confusing and

chaotic situation resulted.”9
To remedy the present difficulties, Mr. Baker suggests that there by only

one principle-making body and that it should be selected by the presidents of
the American Institute of CPAs, the American Accounting Association, the New

York Stock Exchange, the Federation of Financial Analysts, and the Financial

For example, Leonard M. Savoie, in The CPA, June 1968, p. 3; Robert M.
8
Trueblood, op. cit., pp. 2-3; and SEC Commissioner Hugh F. Owens in "The S.E.C.
and the Accounting Profession,” an address given to the Texas Society of CPAs,
Houston, May 25, 1971, privately printed, p. 2.
9”Why Aren’t We Solving Our Problems?, ” privately printed, p. 6.
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Executives Institute.

Further, he proposes that this new APB should include

"representatives whose backgrounds are other than strictly accounting, such as

economists, financial analysts, and other financial experts."

His explanation

of how the SEC would give up its rule-making activity is as follows:

"Practicing professional accountants and their clients must accept
and follow the principles that would be promulgated by this new
principle-making body.
It should then follow that statutory
authorities, such as the SEC, should not attempt to establish
accounting principles on a case-by-case basis, but should con
centrate their activities on making sure that reporting companies
and their independent accountants follow and disclose compliance
with the prescribed principles."10
This writer believes that it is very unlikely that the SEC will voluntarily

give up, or be compelled to give up, its power to step into the picture when it
feels it is advisable to do so.

3.

Keeping the APB in the Private Sector

Mr. Trueblood's third alternative was improvement of our "present rule
making procedures and thus keep that function in the private sector."

Mr.

Trueblood personally chose this 3rd alternative and made some specific pro
posals which have been publicly discussed.

This writer would like to propose a somewhat different procedure to keep
an Accounting Principles Board within the private sector.

Briefly, it is proposed

that an Accounting Principles Board be established and supported by not only
10

Opus cited, pp. 8 and 9.
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the American Institute of CPAs, as at present, but also by three additional

national accounting organizations so that it can be said more truly to represent
the accounting profession in the broad sense of that term.

The AICPA is the only

national organization composed exclusively of CPAs and it speaks primarily for

CPAs in public practice.

Its current membership of over 80,000 makes it the

largest organization of accountants in the world.

It is suggested that the

following three large national organizations of accountants also be included.
They are, in alphabetical order:
(1)

The American Accounting Association, which includes in its membership
a high percentage of all the university teachers of accounting in the

country, and which speaks primarily for university teachers, although

apparently a substantial majority of its members are employed outside
academia.

(2)

The Financial Executives Institute, which is the one national organi
zation composed exclusively of high ranking financial officers of a

wide range of entities, primarily in business.
(3)

The National Association of Accountants, which is the second largest

organization of accountants in the world, with approximately 70,000
members at present.

Although it is primarily interested in industrial

accounting it includes in its large membership not only accountants
in industry and commerce but substantial numbers in public accounting,
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governmental accounting, and in university teaching, including

a number of high-ranking individuals in each of these categories.
Each one of these three suggested organizations, like the AICPA, has conducted

programs of research in accounting for many years and each one currently has a
committee, or committees, which give to the present APB comments and suggestions

on drafts of proposed APB Opinions.

Each association would determine for itself

what requirements it would set for the individuals it appointed to the new APB.

Presumably the new, broader-ba sed APB would be implemented through a new
association formed specifically for that purpose by the four-named national

accounting organizations.

Perhaps the AICPA Accounting Research Association

might be used as the vehicle.
4.

Advantages of Proposed Plan

The writer believes his proposal has the following advantages.
(1)

The rules of the present APB require that each member be a member of
the American Institute of CPAs, and this means that he must be a CPA.

Although there is much to be said for the CPA examination as a test
of accounting knowledge, the writer thinks it is unfortunate that

every member of the Board must have the CPA degree.

There is a strong

feeling on the part of many against the doctrine that only CPAs are

well-qualified to legislate on accounting matters.

The requirements

for the CPA certificate have varied widely over the years and among
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the 54 jurisdictions in the United States.

The public accounting

profession is justly proud of the fact that for many years past
all 54 jurisdictions have not only been using the AICPA’s Uniform
CPA Examination but all have been having their candidates' papers

graded by the AICPA's Advisory Grading Service.

It is said that

this gives the public accounting profession greater national

uniformity than any other profession in the United States.
today, however,

Even

in spite of a general movement among the states for

many years to raise the educational requirements and reduce the
experience requirements, there is still a substantial variation
among the states on each of these requirements.

The more years

one goes back, the greater are the differences among the states.

Further, there presumably are a large number of AICPA members
today who passed a state CPA examination years ago which was

neither made up nor graded by the AICPA.

The present serious movement toward establishing requirements
for continuing education for practicing CPAs

11

is rather good evidence

that passing the CPA examination ten or twenty years ago is no

11For example, see "Required Continuing Education" in Editor's Notebook,

Journal of Accountancy, October 1971, pp. 39-40.
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assurance that an individual is well qualified to legislate on
new and controversial issues that the APB has to deal with today.
None of the above is intended to be derogatory of CPAs.12

The

point is simply that the possession of a CPA certificate does
not provide as uniform a background as might superficially appear.

There presumably are a number of financial vice presidents and

controllers of large and intermediate size corporations with successful
experience over a wide range of accounting and related business

activities who were barred by law from taking the CPA examination years

ago because their state required one or two years of public accounting
experience, with no substitute experience, accepted.

Attention is

called to the fact that the most recent edition (1970) of Profile
of A Chief Financial Officer, published by the firm of Heidrick and

Struggles, shows that a little less than one-third of the chief
financial officers of the largest corporations in the country
possess a CPA certificate.13

The long standing policy of the

AICPA of appointing only CPAs to the APB unfortunately carries the

implicit indictment that any individual who is not a CPA is incompetent

12The writer obtained his CPA certificate in 1942 and has been a fairly active
member of the AICPA since 1948.

13Page 3 of the report. Heidrick and Struggles wrote to the chief financial
officers of the 747 companies included in the Fortune compilation of leading
companies (500 largest industrials, 50 leading merchandising companies, etc.).
The figures in their report are based on the 441 who sent in the forms (59%).
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to be a member of the APB, regardless of his intelligence, education,
long years of high-level experience in positions of responsibility,
and demonstrated ability in accounting and financial matters.

This

is difficult to accept and is not calculated "to win friends and

influence people."

This writer's proposed APB would not have this

artificial restriction which bars some highly competent accountants

from serving on the board.
(2)

Closely related to the above would be an increase in the number of

accountants from industry on the Board.

Even when the APB had 21

members, the number of accountants from industry did not exceed

three.

At present the Board is composed of 18 members and only one is from

industry (Mr. Oral L. Luper of Humble Oil Co.).

In 1971, for the

first time in the history of the APB, there is a professional security

analyst on the Board, Mr. David Norr of the First Manhattan Corporation,
who is a CPA and has been a member of AICPA since 1952.

There are

two university professors of accounting and the other 14 members are
in public accounting practice.

As usual, the "Big Eight" public

accounting firms have one member each, with 6 from other public
accounting firms.
It has been said repeatedly that a company's published financial

statements are representations of the company's management rather than of
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the independent public accountant.

Tills being the case,

it would

seem logical that the accountants who are closest to the management,

and in many cases are themselves part of the management of business
enterprises, should have ¿1 stronger voice in the establishment of

accounting principles than at present.
Mr. Leonard Savoie, Executive Vice President of AICPA, has
said:
"Corporate financial management contains a vast pool of
knowledge on accounting and financial reporting matters
which must be made available to the Board if it is to
establish principles wisely."

"Management must be involved in determining accounting
principles, to provide assurance to all that the Board
is not acting arbitrarily without regard to real practical
problems.
This writer feels that the most logical way in which to
accomplish this would be to increase the number of accountants

from corporations on the APB.
In regard to the under-representation on the APB of persons
with broad business experience (in contrasting to auditing experience),

Herbert C. Knortz, Senior Vice President and Comptroller of International

14"Controversy Over Accounting Principles Board Opinions," Journal of
Accountancy, January 1968, p. 38.
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Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and President of the Inter
national Association of Financia] Executives, has written, "It
is impossible for the general business community to accept legislation

which is executed without the consent or the review of the governed."15
(3)

The issuance of an official pronouncement on an accounting subject
by such well-known national accounting organizations as the American
Accounting Association, the Financial Executives Institute, or the

National Association of Accountants presumably would constitute
"substantial authoritative support" within the meaning of the

Special Bulletin of October, 1964 by the AICPA on "Disclosure of
Departures from Opinions of Accounting Principles Board."

If such

a pronouncement were in conflict with some APB Opinion, this would
tend to encourage the use of different accounting procedures in the
same circumstances.

It seems fairly ]ike]y that the issuance of

just a few such Opinions would lower the status and usefulness of

the present APB and

push the SEC toward taking over the writing

of the rules.
What is the likelihood of such Opinions being issued?

This

writer does not claim the gift of prophecy but thinks that the longer
the present dissatisfaction continues, the greater is the likelihood

15From letter of August 5, 1971, to this author.
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that such Opinions will be issued.

Attention is directed to the

Membership Questionnaire: Summary published by the American Accounting
Association’s Executive Committee in The Accounting Review of July

1967 (pp. 605-609).

This shows that there was (and presumably still

is) a strong preference on the part of a substantial majority of the
more than l,400 AAA members who responded to the questionnaire, to
have the AAA take and publish an "official position" on such matters
as significant AAA publications in accounting concepts and principles,

AAA research studies, AICPA Research Studies, AICPA APB Opinions, and
pronouncements of regulatory agencies such as the SEC.

Further, the

procedure most favored by the AAA respondents to determine an "official
position" by the Association was a "mail ballot of members."

The

National Association of Accountants’ Management Accounting Practices

Committee was established in 1969 with the responsibility for issuing
statements representing NAA's positions on accounting principles and
practices.

This MAP committee and its many subcommittees have been

quite active studying various aspects of accounting, responding to

exposure drafts of the APB, and working with the new Cost Accounting
Standards Board of the federal government.
any statements of its own thus far.

The committee has not issued

Recent published remarks of NAA’s
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Executive Director16 and the current year's President,17

however,

indicate that at some future time NAA’s Management Accounting

Practices Committee may issue opinions.
If one accounting organization makes public pronouncements
on accounting matters, this may increase the likelihood that

others will follow suit, in part to give the members of that

organization "a voice that will be heard."

It seems preferable to

make an attempt, before it is too late, to have one accounting
principles board supported by the four major national accounting
organizations which can speak for the accounting profession as a whole.

16

William M. Young, Jr., Executive Director of the National Association of
Accountants in "A View from the Inside," in Management Accounting, February 1971,
p. 55, wrote: "The MAP Committee through a number of well-structured subcommittees
is now actively exploring those accounting problems which presently seem most
important to a majority of NAA members. Research is going forward and eventually
opinions will be offered either to be published as original positions of the
Committee or presented to other bodies for discussion and coordination."
An article, "Julius Underwood:
NAA’s New President," in Management
Accounting, July 1971, p. 12, says of NAA's 1971—72 President:
"The establish
ment of the Management Accounting Practices Committee. (MAP) he regards with
enthusiasm and says that the committee will eventually help to give industrial
accountants 'a voice that will be heard' in the deliberations on accounting
standards and principles. He suggests that as the MAP Committee gains experience
it will adhere more closely to the thinking of management accountants, rather
than merely adopting a "me-too philosophy agreeing with the Accounting Principles
Board."
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(4)

One of the proposals macle by Mr. Trueblood in his speech at the AAA
Annual Convention in 1969 (referred to above) was to increase the

amount spent for research for the APB to at least $5 million a year.

This is approximately 10 times the amount that was spent during the

past fiscal year (ending August 31, 1971) which in turn was up from
the $142,000 spent in APB’s first year of operations (fiscal 1961).
Officials of the American Institute of CPAs have indicated that the

expanded research needed in accounting will soon be too costly for

the Institute itself even with the help of its Accounting Research
Association established in 1967.

They think that it may become necessary

to go to the larger foundations or to the government for the large

sums that will be needed in the years ahead.

19

This writer believes

that the chances for getting substantial sums from the above sources

and from business concerns would be improved if most of the research

in accounting were centered in one. Accounting Research Foundation

which would be jointly sponsored by the four accounting associations
named above and which would support the work of the proposed APB.

It

would be worthwhile to examine carefully the organization and operation

of the Accountancy Research Foundation established in 1967 jointly by

18From letter of August 10, 1971 to this writer from Michael A. Pinto of
the AICPA staff.
19 Exposure Draft of AICPA Planning Committee Paper, Research, p. 2, January 2,
1968.
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the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and the
Australian Society of Accountants, and also of the Canadian Tax

Foundation, now in its 26th year of operation.

The Canadian Tax

Foundation is sponsored jointly by the Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants and the Canadian Bar Association, but is not

supported financially by these organizations, as such.

Its revenue

currently comes from about 4,700 individual members (accountants,

lawyers, academics, businessmen, etc.) and from over 400 companies
holding corporate memberships.

The companies furnished $142,000

(approximately 60%) of the total of $235,000 subscriptions revenue
received in the year 1970.

20

It should also be noted that the Accounting Standards Steering

Committee, established in 1970 by the Institute of Chartered

Accountants in England and Wales in association with the Scottish
and Irish Institutes, has now (1971,) issued the first in its series
of Statements of Standard Accounting Practice which will be similar

to the opinions of the AICPA.

21

20

From letter of August 9, 1971 to this writer from John M. MacLeod, SecretaryTreasurer of the Canadian Tax Foundation.
21News Report , Journal of Accountancy, June 1971, p. 24.
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5.

Possible Disadvantage of Multiassociation Board

It is said that when Michael DiSalle was Governor of Ohio some years ago
he had a sign on his desk which read, "I do not know the secret of success but

I can tell you the formula for failure--try to please everybody.”

This writer believes that no Accountring Principles Board, no matter how
appointed nor how constituted, is going to please everybody.

Ue might take a

more modest and realistic goal, such as that expressed by Justice Benjamin
Cardozo in a complicated tax case when he said, “The assessor’s task is to find

the least erroneous answer to an unanswerable problem."
It is recognized that the establishment of a multiassociation APB would not

be easy and it would take some time to implement.

This writer believes that

there is a reasonable probability that the unfavorable aspects can be minimized.

Some of the problems that might arise are:
(1)

Some of the four accounting associations suggested above for inclu
sion is the proposed APB might prefer not to take this responsibility.

Presumably the first move should be made by the AICPA because of its

full control of the present APB.

Much would depend on how the other

associations were approached.

(2)

Some other associations of accountants not included might wish to

participate.

This writer believes that at least at the beginning it

would be advisable to limit participation to the four well-known national
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accounting associations named, which have demonstrated over a long
period of years interest and competence in broad areas of accounting

rather than being devoted only to a specialized area.

(3)

It has been said that war is too important to be left to the generals,

and education too important to be left to the educators.

In the last

few years some critics have been saying that accounting is too impor
tant to be left to the accountants and they have been urging member
ship on the APB for nonaccountants from groups that use accounting

reports, such as financial analysts, bankers, and credit men.

An

example of this is the proposal by Richard T. Baker described earlier
in this presentation.

This writer believes Chat representa fives of

these nonaccounting groups should be invited to express their views

on exposure drafts of Opinions but that only persons trained, experienced,
and demonstrably competent in accounting should be on the Board which
actually votes on the proposed Opinions on accounting.
(4)

How many members of the proposed APB should be appointed by each of

the four constituent associations?

how many members of the Board

should be in the public practice of accounting, how many in account

ing positions in industry or commerce, and how many from university
accounting faculties?

Parenthetically,

the answers to these two

questions are not necessarily exactly the same.

Should a stated
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mínimum percentage of the members have the CPA degree and, if so,
what should that percentage be?

It is important to note that the

basic problems here arc not new but in the past they have been

resolved by the leadership of the AICPA alone,
four partners joining

Presumably, with

together to sponsor the new APB, agreement

would be more difficult to reach, but if the principals recognize

the desirability of an APB speaking for a united accounting profession,
the difficulties should not be overwhelming.

One specific suggestion

which has been made publicly within the past two months is that of Ettore
Barbatelli, immediatePast President of the National Association of
Accountants.

Speaking on a panel at the Annual Symposium of the

Federal Government Accountants Association this June, Mr. Barbatelli

criticized the present APB as being too heavily weighted with public
practitioners and suggested that the 18 member board should be composed

of 9 members from public accounting, 6 from business, and 3 from
academia.22

This,

and the previously mentioned actual makeup

of the present board, might be taken as the basis for negotiations.
Each association would probably, but not necessarily, confine the

choice of its nominees to its own members.

News Report, Journal of Accountancy, August 1971, p. 12.
22
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(5)

22

Establshment of the proposed APB would not rule out Robert M.

Trueblood's proposed 5 or 7-man full- time and fully compensated

board.

23

Such a board would simplify the questions just raised.

Representatives of the four associations would meet and decide

on the hiring of the best accountants available, without consideration

of firm or society affiliation or other background.

It seems, however,

that it would be more in keeping with the spirit of a coalition
organization representing a diversity of accounting backgrounds

to have a volunteer board no smaller than the size of the present

APB.

It might be headed by a full-time, paid chairman supported

by a strong staff of assistants larger than at present to lighten
somewhat the burden of the volunteer members, and thus make member

ship on the APB more attractive to highly competent individuals

who feel they cannot devote an extremely high percentage of their
time to work of the Board.

(6)

Decisions would have to be made as to how research would be per

formed for the APB and how financed.

It has been suggested above

that it is believed that the preferred answer is a centralized
Accounting Research Foundation which would receive funds from the

23

Opus cited, p. 9.
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four supporting associations as well as from outside sources.
(7)

One of the important criticisms of the present APB is that it has

been too slow in resolving problems and issuing Opinions.

Would

the proposed APB, presumably a less homogeneous group than the
present board, find it even more difficult to reach agreement,
and thus slow down the output of Opinions?

represents a distinct, possibility.

I believe that this

Much would depend on the

attitudes of the leaders of the four sponsoring associations and

on the personal characteristics of the individuals chosen to serve
on the

new APB.

The differences of opinion that might be revealed

within the new Board would not be new differences--they would
primarily reflect the differences which have existed all along
within the widely diversified accounting profession but which in

some instances have not had much representation inside the present
APB.

There might be a slowing down of the resolving of problems

at first but also there might well be a better acceptance of the
Opinions in the field because discussion within the APB would have
a better chance of avoiding or reconciling certain objectionable

features before publication of the Opinion.

Further, certain

Opinions containing rulings which might not be wanted by a

particular segment might be accepted with somewhat greater

26
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tolerance if the dissenters knew that their viewpoint was at

least presented within the APB.

All. members of the Accounting

Principles hoard, whether the present or a proposed one, must
maintain awareness that failure to make what would be accepted

as "reasonable progress" may result in a governmental decision
to take over the activity.

In closing, it is recommended that the AICPA take a careful look at a

specific alternative to the present APB.

Let us recognize that the APB of

the American Institute of CPAs is a very powerful body in the world of finance

Its rulings have an important, though usually delayed, effect on the reported

earnings of corporations large and small, and eventually on stock market price

in many cases.

This APB exerts great effort to increase the accuracy and use

fulness of financial reports for the benefit of the entire business community.

The board members spend a great deal of time studying the available facts and
figures, hold long discussions, read countless letters written by anyone who
wants to do so, hold hearings (and this year there have even been public
hearings, in contrast to the former hearings by invitation.)

But let us

remember that when all the material has been studied and the witnesses have

had their day-when the moment of decision comes, the voting is done by only
18 individuals, each one of whom must be a CPA, and must be a member of AICPA,

and all of whom have been chosen by the group that control the electoral
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machinery of the AICPA.

group of men.

This is real power, in the hands of a very small

On February 19th of this year at. the Conference Board session

on "The Prospects for Agreement on Accounting Principles", Herbert C. Knortz,
said in a speech24

that the AICPA was "a comparatively small private club."

Some of us might think it rather strange to describe in this way the largest
organization of accountants in the world, with over 80,000 members, and showing

a substantial net growth in membership year after year.

We should recognize,

however, that this is the viewpoint of some who arc outside the AICPA.
On May 14th, 1970 at hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the

Committee on the Judiciary, the Chief Counsel of the Committee (Kenneth
R. Harkins ) questioned the then Chairman of the SEC (Hamar H. Budge) about

the close relations between the SEC and the APB and asked if this did not involve
"a situation where the APB and the accounting profession arc engaged in an

exercise of Government power for the SEC."

The SEC Chairman assured the com

mittee that this was not the case and, in answer to a further question, said
the SEC’s policy of cooperation with the APB and the AICPA had been very bene

ficial to the public as a whole.25
In essence, this writer is suggesting that this power base be broadened
somewhat, and thus be less vulnerable to criticism, by including some additional

elements of the accounting profession.

It is believed that this change should

24
“Referred to in footnote 1.
2591st Congress, 2nd Session,

Investigation of Mergers and Acquisitions by

Conglomerate Corporations, Part 7, pp. 84-5.
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also improve the usefulness of the Opinions of the Board.
Some of these suggested changes could be accomplished within the frame
work of the present APB.

The AICPA could drop its requirement that all

members of the APB be CPAs and members of AICPA and specify that a certain
number of members of the Board need not have these qualifications.

It

could name to the APB certain individuals who were chosen, formally or

perhaps informally, by the other accounting associations named.
In the long road ahead which the accounting profession must follow to
maintain and increase its service to the whole economy, the choice of individual

steps is not clearly marked and the weary accountant traveler has many difficult

decisions to make.

The words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes remind us,

however, that this situation is not unusual for human kind.

He said

"...certainty is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.”

Robert I. Dickey, October 1971
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EXECUTIVE OFFICES

October 25, 1971

Mr. Michael Pinto
Administrative Secretary
Study Committee on Establishment
of Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Pinto:
Although we appreciate the opportunity to make a presentation at the public
hearings to be held in the Institute offices on November 3 and 4, we believe we
can make our position known by letter and, thus, are taking the latter route.

Accounting principles are those rules by which accountants present the financial
position of a business as of a date and determine the results of operations for
a given period. The principles determine the type of events to be recorded, the
bases on which events are measured, and the time periods to which they can be
identified.
Generally accepted accounting principles have been developed over a long period
of years on the basis of experience, usage and practicality. Such a basis
does not necessarily indicate that these principles are sound but they do indi
cate that substantial care must be taken in moving to other principles.

We believe it would be more accurate to continue to use the term accounting
principles rather than adopt some other term such as standards. We particularly
object to the use of the word standards because of its common acceptance as a
method of inventory valuation and because of the very probable confusion with
future edicts of the recently formed Government Cost Accounting Standards Board.
We believe that such principles should be developed in sufficient detail to
eliminate the possible confusion as to their intent and application.
The establishment of accounting principles must be done by a non-governmental
body such as the Accounting Principles Board. We believe that the pronouncements
of such a board can be enforced by members of the AICPA in their conduct of
audits and by the SEC in its review of registration statements and annual
reports.
As such reports and filings are the product of the business concerns whose names
appear thereon, we believe that business should have a stronger and more active
position in the establishment of the principles. Therefore, we recommend a
substantial change in the mix of th Accounting Principles Board with no increase
in its size. As a suggestion, the Board could total fifteen members, six of
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whom are members of the AICPA and who are practicing public accountants, five
who are members of the FEI, and two members each from the American Accounting
Association and the National Association of Accountants. Although the board
should welcome input from bankers, financial analysts, the SEC and other users
of the products of accountants, the board membership should be restricted to
those directly involved in the preparation and presentation of financial data.

Board members should be elected by their respective associations and serve for
a period of six years with one-third being elected each two years. The board
should have a full-time chairman elected for a period of six years. The chair
man should have an administrative and research staff, the budget for which would
be approved by the board. Financing should come from the public accounting
profession and from industry.
The combined organization of industry and the public accounting profession
should result in the board being more aware of developing problems and, thus,
able to start its research at an early date. The research staff should solicit
input from all interested parties to aid it in its study and the board should
continue to circulate drafts of opinions before they are issued in final form.
Although this procedure is rather cumbersome and certainly time consuming, it
appears to offer a maximum of input and, thus, hopefully, a minimum of signifi
cant objections on publication. The issuance of any opinion should continue
to require a two-thirds vote of the members of the board.

We recognize that the brief outline presented here requires considerable co
operative effort from many organizations and people, but feel that it is
necessary if accountants are to retain control of their profession.

Very truly yours

R. H. Palenschat
Assistant Controller
RHP:j

cc:

C. R. Allen
P. E. Priest
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In April 1971, the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) announced the appointment of a

special committee designated as the ’’Study on Establishment
of Accounting Principles” (the Wheat Committee) with former
Securities and Exchange Commissioner Francis M. Wheat as

Chairman.

The committee received its charge from President

Marshall Armstrong of the AICPA as follows:

’’The study should examine the organization
and operation of the Accounting Principles
Board and determine what changes are neces
sary to attain better results faster. This
will involve study, for example, of all the
many changes that have been suggested,
ranging from minor procedural suggestions
to complete replacement of the part-time
volunteer Board by a full-time Board with
a court-like appeal mechanism. It will
also involve consideration of entirely new
approaches.”

In July 1971, Mr. Michael A. Pinto, Administrative
Secretary to the Wheat Committee, invited the Management

Accounting Practices Committee (MAP) of the National Associ
ation of Accountants (NAA) to meet with the Wheat Committee

on September 21, 1971, to submit comments and suggestions
with respect to its objectives.

On receipt of this invita

tion, the MAP Committee reviewed the general area of study

by the Wheat Committee and concluded that this particular

effort would be beyond its charge and responsibilities.
However, it recommended that the broad-based composition of

-i-
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membership of NAA would be ideally suited to respond

because it includes prominent leaders from all segments of

the business community, covering industry, commercial enter

prises, public utilities, the Federal government, colleges
and universities, public accounting and financial establish

ments.
Accordingly, the President of NAA, Mr. J. G.

Underwood, appointed a special committee as follows:

Grant U. Meyers, Chairman of the Committee,
and Chairman of the Board of the Oil City
Iron Works, Inc., Corsicana, Texas
Ettore Barbatelli, President, The American
Appraisal Company, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin

I. Wayne Keller, CPA, former Vice President
and General Manager of International
Operations, Armstrong Cork Co., Lancaster,
Pennsylvania

James E. Meredith, Jr., CPA, Partner,
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery, New York,
New York

Thomas L. Morison, CPA, President-Emeritus
of Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts

J. G. Underwood, ex-officio member, President,
Harsco Corporation, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
All of the appointees are former National Presidents of the
Association.

In its deliberations this Committee was assisted
materially by several prominent members:

ii-
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Joseph Bond, Executive Vice President, Crowell,
Collier 8 MacMillan, New York, New York

R. Leslie Ellis, Vice President, Controller
& Director of Management Information, Armstrong
Cork Co., Lancaster, Pennsylvania
John J. Fox, Partner, Lybrand, Ross Bros. 8
Montgomery, Chicago, Illinois
E. W. Kelley, President and Chief Operating
Officer, Consolidated Cigar Corporation and
President, Consumer Products Division, Gulf
8 Western Industries, Inc., New York, New York

Alfred King, Controller, The American Appraisal
Company, Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Allen H. Seed, III, Vice President, New
Business Development, Gillette Safety Razor
Division, Gillette Corporation, Boston,
Massachusetts

As a professional organization devoted to con

tinuing education in the area of management accounting,
NAA is deeply concerned by the recent criticism of the

Accounting Principles Board (APB) and its method of opera

tion.

Some of these criticisms include the following:

a. The APB is not truly independent and
its members are not totally free from external
pressures.

b. There are evidences of inconsistencies
in the application of APB rulings by CPA firms.
c. In too many cases there is an inordinate
time lag in the application of APB Opinions.

d. The APB has reversed itself on several
occasions.
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e. The APB has become a rulemaking body
rather than one concentrating on accounting
principles.

f. The interpretations issued by the AICPA
are often more lengthy than the opinions they
are attempting to clarify.
g. Decisions in the accounting field are
usually private matters between the client
and the CPA firm, compared to the legal pro
fession, for example, where decisions are
published.

h. There have been incidents where client
organizations have ’’shopped” for a CPA firm
which will agree to a predetermined accounting
objective.
In August, NAA was invited to a Public Hearing

of the Wheat Committee scheduled for November 3 and 4, 1971.

Participants were requested to provide the Wheat Committee
with written statements of their views prior to the Public
All such statements will be a matter of public

Hearing.

record of the Hearing.

In compliance with the foregoing, this report sets
forth the views of this special NAA committee appointed by

President Underwood to respond to the pertinent questions
raised by the Wheat Committee.

It responds numerically to

the five questions (refer to Appendix) posed by the Wheat
Committee.

A sixth section is devoted to the financing

of the recommendations.

-iv-
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1.

Establishing Accounting Principles
the Task

--

Scope of

The NAA Committee concluded that its response
covers only accounting principles and/or standards as they
relate to financial reporting requirements and/or certifi
cations by accounting firms.

Also, it would be more accur

ate and useful to refer to ’’financial accounting and

reporting standards” than ’’accounting principles.”
In its discussion of what is meant by the term

’’accounting principles,” the NAA Committee reviewed such
areas as accounting concepts, principles, standards, rules,

disclosures and regulations.

It could not concur unanimously

on the definition of these terms and agreed that they must
be the subject of extensive future study.

Nevertheless, in general the NAA Committee
determined that:

a)

accounting concepts are relatively
fixed with respect to the function
of time,

b)

accounting principles change relatively
slowly over a somewhat shorter term, and

c)

accounting rules must be relatively
flexible with respect to changing
economic, social and political
conditions.

-1-
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We (the NAA Committee) recommend that separate
committees of a new body (refer to question 3, page 5 ) be

designated that concern themselves with each of these three

areas.
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2.

Should the primary responsibility for establishing
accounting standards reside in a governmental body
or a non-governmental body?
The NAA Committee, with one dissenting opinion,

recommends that the responsibility for establishing and
enforcing financial accounting and reporting standards
should reside in a non-governmental body.

The dissenting opinion was based not upon principle,
but upon economic considerations; the individual believing

that in full operation an effective body, adequately

supported by permanent staff, facilities and research, would

eventually become so costly that it would require govern

mental financing to support an effective level of operation.
We recommend that:

a)

the non-governmental body be supported
by private funds. It must be so
supported if it is to remain free of
political pressure.

b)

the body be sponsored by the AICPA,
but that it be independent in its
activities.

c)

the body be housed in a facility
contiguous to the professional staff
of the AICPA to take advantage of the
library, research and other services
of the Institute.

d)

close and continuing liaison be
established and maintained with the
SEC, the Congress and other interested
governmental agencies.
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The authority of the- body should be final, not

because of authority vested in it by government, but by
virtue of the background and stature of the individuals

comprising the body.

The pronouncements of the body should

be binding on all publicly owned enterprises and all public

accountants.

These pronouncements must be enforced through

the certifying authority of the public accounting firms

auditing the statements of such enterprises.

Essential to the success of the procedures we
recommend is the need for effective and uniform enforcement

by the AICPA.
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3.

Composition of a non-governmental standards board
NAA recommends that the non-governmental body

be comprised of approximately 18 voluntary voting members

with a suitably paid, full-time chairman serving on a
long-term basis of about 10 years.

The volunteer members would serve three-year

rotating terms to provide continuity.

We recommend that:

a)

no more than 50% be practicing
Certified Public Accountants

b)

no less than 25% be those who
actively participate in the
preparation of financial statements
and from the industrial, commercial
or public utility communities, and

c)

the balance of the members be selected
from colleges and universities and the
financial community, including
financial service organizations.

The initial non-governmental body and subsequent

appointments to it, consistent with the foregoing recommen

dations, should be appointed by the AICPA using its own
rules of order.
The full-time chairman of the body should be

selected by the AICPA.

We see the role of the chairman

as that of a strong chief executive.

practicing CPA.
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The contemplated new body should be supported

by a full-time staff.

This staff should be headed by a

professional and competent administrative officer.

It

would be responsible for:

a)

researching areas where opinions are
required,

b)

developing background material,

c)

making recommendations for the body,
including research into the results
of the applications of the standards
or rules through simulation, models, etc.,

d)

interpreting the pronouncements as
issued by the body.

We recommend that the practice of using volunteer

committees be continued.

In appointing these committees,

however, each should have representation from the three
categories recommended above for the new body.

The financing of the body and its professional

staff is treated in section 6.
We recommend that a new name be created for

this body to make clear that there is a complete change
in, and departure from, current procedures.

Suggested is

a designation such as:
a)

Council on Financial Reporting Standards

b)

Financial Reporting Standards Authority

-6-
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4.

Methods of operation of a non-governmental standards
board
The NAA Committee believes that the APB has

improved its operations through counsel with other profes
sional associations and groups, the wide circulation of

opinion drafts, public hearings and the analysis and

compilation of responding statements and replies.

We have studied the ’’Guidelines for APB Committee
Operations” issued by the Accounting Principles Board.

We

recommend that the new body consistently follow the steps
outlined below as its method of operation:

Step One:

The preparation of a public
statement, explaining the
terms, reasons and need for an
opinion in a particular area.

Step Two:

The distribution of the public
statement to all interested
individuals, groups or assoc
iations, soliciting a response.

Step Three:

Following an examination of
these responses, preparation of
a memorandum of opinion or
’’point outline."

Step Four:

Wide circulation of the memo
randum of opinion or "point
outline” to governmental,
business and professional
communities, both on the basis
of a representative distribution
list and by definitive selection.
Copies of the material should be
mailed to everyone requesting
inclusion on the distribution list
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Step Five:

Open public hearings be held
throughout the country to
encourage participation and
contributions on a geographical
basis.

Step Six:

Following the public hearings,
there be a study and analysis
of the input and the preparation
of an opinion draft.

Step Seven:

Empirical research to test the
effect of the proposed opinion.
(see page 9)

Step Eight:

The circulation of the exposure
opinion to interested parties
indicated in Step Four.

Step Nine:

The issuance of the final opinion.

Relative to the deliberations of the new body, we
recommend that a two-third's favorable vote be required in

order to issue a final opinion.

If swift action is required on a rapidly develop
ing problem, Steps Two, Three, Four and Five may be omitted

i.e., the distribution of the public statement; the prepar
ation of a memorandum of opinion or "point outline”; the
circulation of the memorandum of opinion or the ’’point

outline”; and the public hearings, respectively.

We believe that the new body comprised and
operating as final authority pursuant to the above recom

mendations does not require an appeal procedure.
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5.

Accounting research support for a non-governmental
standards board
Two types of research are necessary for effective oper

ation.

The first comprises theoretical research, ranging

from concepts and principles to broad conclusions.
The second and most important classification of research

comprises the empirical research.

We recommend that the

most effective type of research would project the effect of

a proposed financial accounting standard on the business

community (a model), thereby supporting it or causing it to

be changed before issuance.

We strongly feel that formulation

and testing of new opinions are mandatory to receive full

cooperation of industry, the accounting profession and others.
In both types of research, the responsibility rests

with the paid staff.

The work should be accomplished by the

coordination of prior research in the area and the use of
the most effective vehicle for new research.

Full advantage

should be taken of the research capabilities of universities,

professional associations and societies in the accounting
and related fields.
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6.

Method of Financing the Non-Governmental Body
The entire operation of the body, as recommended,

should be funded by the AICPA, as it is now.

Respectfully submitted by:
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ACCOUNTANTS
Special Study Committee

Grant U. Meyers,Chairman
Ettore Barbatelli
I. Wayne Keller
James E. Meredith, Jr.
Thomas L. Morison
J. G. Underwood, ex-officio

Per

Attachment:

APPENDIX
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Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles

Memorandum of Pertinent Questions

1.

Establishing Accounting Principles -- Scope of the
Task.

What is meant by the term "accounting principles?"
Would it be more accurate and useful to refer to
"financial accounting and reporting standards?" Should
the body with primary responsibility for formulating
such standards limit itself to fundamentals, should
it develop detailed standards, or should it undertake
to do both?
2.

Should the primary responsibility for establishing
accounting standards reside in a governmental body or
a non-governmental body?
Should the SEC, or another government agency, take
over the basic task? Or should it remain with a non
governmental body, such as the Accounting Principles
Board? If a non-governmental body, what should be
its relationship to the AICPA? To the SEC? What is
the nature of its authority and by what means can its
pronouncements be enforced?

3.

Composition of a non-governmental standards board.
Who should serve on the board? Should they all
be CPAs? Members of the AICPA? What is its optimum
size? In lieu of the present volunteer board, would
it be preferable if the Chairman or the Chairman and
some of the members, or all of the members, were paid
and served full-time? If so, what should be their
terms of office? What needs to be done about staffing?
How should the board be financed?

4.

Methods of operation of a non-governmental standards
board.

The procedures of the Accounting Principles Board
have evolved to the point where the Board now holds
public hearings on subjects for proposed opinions. Are
these proceedings satisfactory? How could they be
improved? By what vote of its members should a non
governmental standards board act? Majority? Twothirds? Other? What procedures would enable such a
board to take swift action on developing problems? Is
the present procedure for obtaining unofficial inter
pretations of APB Opinions satisfactory? If not, how
should it be changed? Should there be an appeal
procedure? To whom?
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5.

Accounting research support for a non-governmental
standards board.
What sort of research is necessary as a prelude
to the establishing of financial accounting standards?
Who should conduct it? What guidelines for research
studies would improve their quality and shorten the
time for their completion? How should accounting re
search be financed?
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CATERPILLAR

President

TRACTOR

Peoria, Illinois 61602

October 26, 1971

Mr.
c/o
666
New

Francis M. Wheat
American Institute of CPAs
Fifth Avenue
York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Wheat:
The development of generally accepted accounting principles
can be one of the most important factors in both national
and international affairs in the next few years. Because
the general public, investors, and Government rely so heavily
upon accountants’ work to determine the trend of economic
affairs, the need for meaningful principles grows constantly.
It has long been my contention, shared by my colleagues at
Caterpillar Tractor Co., that it is very proper for the inde
pendent public accountants to determine if businesses are
following ’’generally accepted accounting principles. ” It is
my opinion, however, that businessmen should have a strong
voice in determining what ought to be ’’generally accepted."
The public accountants have always stated that the accounts
to which they attest "...the client’s accounts -- not those
of the auditor" but under today’s arrangement the businessman
is being told by the auditor what he has to do.
Our Controller, R. A. Morgan, has reported to me the discussion
which occurred at the Northwestern University-sponsored meeting
on "Institutional Issues In Formulating Reporting Standards."
I understand you also were present at this meeting. It is my
understanding that many different groups believe they should
have representation on any newly formulated Accounting Principles
Board. There is no disagreement that users of financial state
ments, viz. security analysts, regulatory agencies, bankers,
and others should be given ample opportunity to indicate their
opinions regarding accounting principles. Whether all of these
groups should have responsibility for setting the principles is,
of course, the problem to which you and your committee are
addressing yourselves.

CO.
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CATERPILLAR

TRACTOR

Mr. Francis M. Wheat

CO.

October 26, 1971

In my opinion, submitting exposure drafts to business people
for their comments will be no more effective in making certain
that the conclusions represent the opinions of the practicing
management accountants and their employers than does having
congressional hearings on any topic assure that the end legis
lation reflects all points of view. To say it differently, it
is my opinion that those whose statements are being reviewed
must have a voice in setting the principles which are to be
followed.
I appreciate the seriousness of your assignment. It has to be
one of the most difficult projects undertaken by anyone in the
profession in recent years. Please be assured of our best wishes
for a successful completion of your assignment.

Sincerely yours,

WHFranklin
er
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HAYDEN Q. ANDERSON
C. DOUGLAS REED

Anderson & Reed
Certified Public Accountants
1202 Third Street, S.W.

E. LEO BURTON

JACK

P. O. Box 504
Roanoke, Virginia 24003

F. WRIGHT, JR.

October 20,

MEMBERS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
VIRGINIA SOCIETY OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

1971

Mr. Michael A. Pinto
American Institute of CPA's
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.
10019

Dear Mr. Pinto:
In response to your committee's request for remarks relative to
the Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles, I would like to
make the following comments:

Definition of accounting principles - broad range of fundamental
accounting rules when applied to financial transactions secure quality
and effect. There is currently no substitute for the phrase "accounting
principles". The term is broad based when applied to accountancy, yet
is narrow and restrictive when applied by the accounting profession.
A phrase such as "financial accounting and reporting standards" may in
time develop its desired meaning but "accounting principles" belongs to
the twentieth century.
Ordinarily the "body" with primary responsibility for formulating
accounting principles should limit itself to fundamentals.
However, the
"body" should be cognizant of the fact that thousands of accountants are
faced with the problem of not only recognizing but fairly applying
principles developed. With this in mind, it would be helpful to have
published the meaningful data, whether public or private, from which the
principles evolved.

The primary responsibility for establishing accounting principles
should reside in a non-governmental body so long as it assumes the res
sponsibility in a manner responsive to the public needs.
Such a body to
function effectively would, among other things, have to be independent
and experienced accountants.
Early this year I had the opportunity to visit with a regular meeting
of the Accounting Principles Board and I was very impressed. These men
appear to be outstanding accountants and are able to come to grips with
the problems discussed. Any board whether governmental or non-governmental
would be composed certainly of some of these same men.
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Mr. Michael A. Pinto
October 20,

1971

Sheet 2

I am not aware of the operational problems which the Board may
be encountering. The number of opinions it has issued in the past
couple of years indicate it is beginning to measure up to its intended
purpose.
My only suggestion is that practicing accountants be invited to
each meeting of the Board so they might see the depth of work involved
in developing opinions.
Sincerely yours,

ELB/aj1

Anderson & Reed, Certified

public accountants
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McIntire School of Commerce
Rouss Hall

•

University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia

22903

October 29, 1971

Mr. Michael A. Pinto
American Institute of CPAs
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Pinto:

I have been asked by Vernon Winquist, President of
The Virginia Society of CPAs to coordinate some effort on the
part of The Virginia Society to respond to the "Notice of
Public Hearing” on the establishment of Accounting Principles.
In this capacity, I submit the enclosed comments of Mr. Burton
and myself with regard to this study.

My comments are in the form of an abstract of a
paper which I have been working on concerning the establish
ment of accounting principles.
Though the paper will not be
ready for the November 3-4 hearings, I hope to have the paper
in a suitable form to submit to Wheat Committee at a later date.
Sincerely yours,

William G. Shenkir
Associate Professor
WGS/dg
Ends.
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INCREMENTALISM: A POLICY SCIENCE INTERPRETATION
TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
*
Abstract

The Accounting Principles Board is currently undergoing

intense evaluation by accounting analysts.

Some are calling

for a reconstitution of the Board and have suggested, for

example, that the Board should be smaller in number and con
sist of full-time members.

Supposedly, the output of this

new Board would be increased as well as improved relative to

that of the presently constituted Board.
raise the following questions:

Such evaluations

Will the output increase and

improve by changing the policymaking mechanism?

Or, is it an

idiosyncrasy of policymaking and the expert’s role therein
which affects the output?

The literature of policymaking has been virtually over

looked by accountants in their efforts to establish generally
accepted accounting principles as well as in the subsequent
evaluation of pronouncements of accounting principles.

This

paper draws upon the literature of policy science for the

notion of “disjointed incrementalism1" to provide insights

*William G. Shenkir, Associate Professor of Commerce,
McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Virginia.
1David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy
of Decision (The Free Press of Glencoe: 1963).
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- 2 into the aforementioned questions.

Incrementalism offers a

point of view or frame of evaluation that accountants should

at least consider in their efforts to meliorate the establish

ment of accounting principles.

This paper is exploratory in

nature and, therefore, its content is tentative.

Incrementalism holds that the "expert" or policymaker
faced with complex policy problems seeks remedial objectives

rather than utopian ones.

Consideration is given only to

those alternatives which differ incrementally from current
practice.

In examining these alternatives, the policymaker

does not even analyze all of their consequences.

In this ap

proach to policymaking, means and ends are adjusted, and data
are reconstructed.

Continuous interaction occurs between

data, means, and ends, which causes policymaking to proceed

serially.

Hence, "problems are never solved; instead some

analysis is done, a decision is made, unanticipated adverse

consequences showup, more analysis is done and more decisions
are made to remedy the adverse consequences, etc., ad
infinitum."2
Following the discussion of the incrementalist point of
view or frame of evaluation, this paper then proceeds to apply

it in an evaluation of the output of the Accounting Principles

Board.

This exercise, though perhaps not conclusively

K. A. Archibold, "Three Views of the Expert’s Role in
2
Policy-Making: Systems Analysis, Incrementalism and The
Clinical Approach," (Rand Corporation: 1970), No. P-4292,
p. 6.
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3
persuasive, may be dissuasive with respect to suggestions of
oversimplied approaches to the establishment of generally

accepted accounting principles.

An incrementalist evaluation

of the Board’s output cast the Board in a more favorable light
than other evaluations which have been offered.

Discussion of

the establishment of accounting principles in terms of incre

mental politics can be defended as long as the objective is
generally accepted principles, which implies consensus and
places their determination in a political context.

840North Lake Shore Drive

•

Chicago, Illinois

60611

•

Telephone: AC 312 / 787-3876
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Hospital Financial Management Association
Robert M. Shelton, FHFMA, Executive Director

October 29, 1971

M.A. Pinto
American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10019
Dear Mr.

Pinto:

Thank you for your letter to our Executive Director, Mr. Robert M.
Shelton, advising us of the public hearing to be held on November
3-4, 1971 on the AICPA Study on Establishment of Accounting
Principles.
We are very interested in this study but due to the
press of other activities will be unable to attend the hearing and
have not prepared a formal presentation in time to meet the es
tablished deadline.
The AICPA's standard setting role should begin with research, both
scholarly and imperically, to understand the behavior of those
things and activities being reported on and the methods and techniques
of reporting.
This implies a need for involvement by University
scholars, practicing public accountants and industry practitioners.
Those in a particular industry are the most knowledgeable about
the resources and how they are utilized in that industry, and full
use should be made of their knowledge.

A cooperative effort between AICPA and the various industries, assisted
by scholarly research, will produce more meaningful descriptions and
definitions of the "principle;" of accounting than could be established
by a governmental agency.
The authority of a non-governmental
group will come from the basic truths exposed -- in contrast to
official dictums from governmental bodies.

HFMA's 25th ANNIVERSARY

•

1946-1971

773
M.A. Pinto
October 29,
page 2

1971

Please keep us informed on the deliberations of this study group.
Should the opportunity be available to us, we would appreciate the
possibility of offering some considerations for the committee in
the future.

Very truly yours ,

William Fill
Director of Technical Services

WF:dg
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FINANCIAL

EXECUTIVES

INSTITUTE

50 WEST 44TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036 AC 212

661-3150

November 3, 1971
Mr. Francis M. Wheat
Chairman, Study Group on.
Establishing Future Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Wheat:
Enclosed per your instructions relating to the submission of written
statements as part of the record for the public hearings to be conducted
by the Study Group on November 3-4, 1971, are 25 copies of the
following:
1 .

FEI policy statement on the operations of the APB and
the establishment of "accounting principles."

2 .

Unofficial memorandum summary of supplemental
comments relating to the FEI statement.

The FEI spokesman who will be available to answer questions and make
an oral presentation is Mr. J.O. Edwards, Chairman of the FEI
Committee on Corporate Reporting.

In addition to the 2 5 copies requested, we will have extra copies available
for participants at the meeting.
Sincerely,

CC: AICPA Study Group
Messrs: Biegler, Levine, Olson, Pryor, Solomons and Smith
Mr. Michael A. Pinto, Administrative Secretary
enclosure
JAS:bh
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FINANCIAL

EXECUTIVES

INSTITUTE

50 WEST 44TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036 AC 212

661-3150

POLICY STATEMENT ON THE

OPERATIONS OF THE "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD"

AND

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FUTURE "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES"

November 3-4,

1971 Public Hearings

AICPA STUDY

GROUP

ON

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
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OPERATIONS OF THE "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD"

AND
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FUTURE "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES"

Financial executives and other members of management are responsible for all forms
of public reporting of financial information, including the financial statements of the
business enterprise. By virtue of their expertise and legal responsibilities, business
management must actively participate in the process of developing financial reporting
policies and practices which will communicate meaningful information to the public.

Financial Executives Institute's membership consists of the chief financial officers of
substantially all major United States companies. One of the primary objectives of the
Institute and its members is to promote the use of reporting practices and the related
accounting methods which will assure the timely reporting of meaningful financial in
formation to the public.

FEI believes that the public's increasing demand for financial information should be
encouraged in the interests of a healthy economy, and that this demand cannot be
treated lightly by management. FEI also recognizes that the apparent strains on the
credibility of published financial statements has been due in part to a small minority
of individuals who have abused their reporting responsibilities for personal gain and
to the fact that management in general has not, as yet, fully grasped the full implica
tions of the financial reporting controversy.
On the other hand, FEI believes that any decline in the public's confidence in published
financial statements should also be attributed to the failure of the accounting profession
to cope with the basic issues as to the process by which "generally accepted accounting
principles" should be formulated and as to the manner by which "accounting principles"
can be better accepted in the adjudication of specific business reporting situations.

Important questions have arisen in the financial community as to the appropriateness
and applicability of recent promulgations of "accounting principles" and of current pro
posals now under consideration with respect to other "principles" to be promulgated in
the near future. FEI believes that some of these recent pronouncements do not serve
to improve financial reporting to the public but may, in fact, obstruct the meaningful
reporting of financial information, by eliminating the use of otherwise sound reporting
practices.

Financial Executives Institute is, nevertheless, encouraged by and in agreement with the
recent actions of the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of Certi
fied Public Accountants, and others who have shown concern for these problems by es
tablishing independent study groups to develop recommendations for improving the finan
cial reporting process. FEI believes, however, that financial and other business man
agement - on the basis of their substantial interest in financial reporting as well as
their ultimate responsibility for the reports - must necessarily take a strong role in
pursuing all feasible avenues of cooperation with responsible groups to obtain basic im
provements in the framework within which financial reporting practices can be developed
to meet the legitimate information needs of the public.
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Financial Executives Institute believes that the financial community's lack of general
acceptance and support for the existing process of determining "accounting principles"
is the result of three basic deficiencies in the operations of the "Accounting Principles
Board":

1.

The lack of a broad representation on the Board, which mitigates
against an adequate understanding and resolution of the practical
operating problems confronting the financial community in their
attempts to apply rigid "rulings" in diverse business situations.
The recent addition of a financial analysts' representative on the
Board, accomplished by eliminating one of the two remaining
business representatives, cannot be considered a constructive
response to the "representation issue. "

2.

The failure to maintain adequate communications with the respon
sible segments of the financial community; to solicit their early
participation in the identification and evolution of proposed changes;
and to avoid unnecessary delays in achieving their understanding
and acceptance of financial reporting restrictions. The Board's
introduction of public hearings in connection with their delibera
tions is a progressive step, however, consideration should be
given to the timing of the hearings and the need for initial inputs
at the onset of their deliberations.

3.

The failure to recognize and fully accept the critical role of re
search; to develop empirical data on the effects of proposed
changes in reporting and to utilize the corollary role of research
as a means to condition the financial community to accept the pro
posed financial reporting improvements.

FEI believes that the proper approach to restoring public confidence in published financial
reports and judicial acceptance of financial reporting standards involves a departure from
the existing process, as presently constituted in the "Accounting Principles Board" of the
AICPA. FEI's recommended program to achieve an authoritative body with a member
ship more representative of the financial community consists of the following major ele
ments:
1.

The body should be organized within the private sector; it
should have an equal number of members representing the
public accounting profession and the business management
community, plus a lessor number of members drawn from
public interest groups, such as financial analysts, the aca
demic community, government, etc. In FEI's opinion, the
body should consist of no more than twenty members, and
both the accounting and the business groups should each have
as much as 40% of the total membership of the body. Mem
bership in the AICPA should not be a prerequisite for repre
sentatives other than the public accountants, and the selection
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of those members not representing the AICPA must be made
only after careful consideration of the recommendations of
the appropriate associations or groups who are actively engaged
in the area of financial reporting.
2.

The terms of appointment for members of the body should be
staggered so that the body can maintain continuity and have the
benefit of new member appointments on an annual basis. For
example, if appointments are for a three-year term of service
with options for reappointments, one-third of the members’
terms should expire each year.

3.

The members of the body should not necessarily be asked to
devote full-time to this activity. It is, of course, possible to
envision a body that would have both full-time and part-time
members. FEI believes that the organizational aspects of the
body can be resolved and that proper utilization of support ser
vices, such as research, full-time staff, etc. , can effectively
overcome the resistance to part- rime service on the body.

4.

The body should be sponsored and funded by the financial com
munity; those elements of business and public interests who are
concerned with financial reporting should bear their share of
the costs of operating the body and of providing support services
and, in conjunction with the public accounting profession, be
prepared to subsidize the appointment of public members.

5.

The body should actively seek the advice and participation of all
responsible parties at the earliest possible stage of its delibera
tions and in the planning and scheduling of its program; it should
involve professional associations, government agencies and,
where appropriate, trade associations in the initial phase of each
project, initiate in-house or outside research studies, utilize the
services of knowledgeable people who are not members of the body
to work on its various committees, hold public hearings and main
tain a public record, issue exposure drafts, and otherwise solicit
the participation of the financial community.

6.

The body should anticipate potential accounting abuses or the use of
innovative reporting practices and initiate early action to forestall
these potential problem areas in financial reporting; an effective
staff organization and a coordinated research program coupled with
a responsive communication and feedback system with the public
should provide the body with adequate lead time.

7.

The operations of the body should provide for an appeals procedure
whereby an interpretation and a clarification of the applicability of
its pronouncements to unusual situations and events can be given a
full hearing.
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8.

The body's actions must, as a necessary prerequisite, be based
on adequate research; the nature of the research required may
encompass the evaluation of the existing knowledge in a specific
area, conceptual and empirical studies, and an evaluation in
actual case studies of the practical implications of the various
alternatives under consideration. Since each of the professional
accounting and financial management associations now have re
search functions, it would be appropriate for the body to utilize
these resources. Accordingly, FEI recommends that these asso
ciations commit a substantial portion of their research efforts to
the body and that they be responsive to the body's need to take a
lead role in the planning, scheduling, and follow-up of the research
studies to be undertaken.

In summary, Financial Executives Institute believes that business management can
make a substantial contribution by participating in a viable program to improve re
porting practices that meets the public's information needs. Moreover, it is FEI's
conviction that management has a unique responsibility for all aspects of the reporting
of financial information to the public and that that responsibility encompasses a major
role in both determining the reporting practices to be used and in determining how
these practices are to be developed.

FEI is, therefore, prepared to commit resources to support a representative body
and to promote the participation of individual business managers and their corporations
in contributing their expertise and capabilities to the task of developing and promulga
ting financial reporting practices that will insure the timely reporting of meaningful
financial information to the public.

4
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UNOFFICIAL MEMORANDUM SUMMARIZING SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS
RELATING TO THE FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE STATEMENT ON
ESTABLISHING "ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES"

I.

ISSUE:

New Authoritative Body vs. Restructuring APB to Achieve More
Practical Representation

'The business community should maintain an elastic approach to the alternative
of a new body vs. a restructuring of the APB. A push for a 40% representation
for business on the APB itself leaves control within the AICPA---- I don't
agree that this organization should necessarily be in a controlling position.
However, the composition of the accounting profession representation may be
composed of APB members or any other segment of the public auditing pro
fession. Representation on the body should include academicians. This is a
very vocal group and the body should have the benefit of their detached and
objective ideas and viewpoints. Another group that experience suggests a
need for representation and subsequent involvement is that of the government
sector. "

"As a practical matter, restaffing of the existing APB to achieve a 40% business
representation would probably be more acceptable to the AICPA than would its
replacement by an entirely new body. This evolutionary approach might also
represent the more efficient alternative---- at least initially------- in maintaining
the thrust of professional activities with respect to the GAAP issues currently
under consideration. It would also assure continuity of jurisdiction over the
development of accounting policy guidelines during the transition to a broader
based organization. I would presume that the proposal to restructure the APB
would be that academicians, financial analysts, and other persons outside the
public accounting and business communities be represented to the extent of a
20% participation in the total membership of this body.

Restructuring the APB entails some risks, however, as noted by Mr. Baker and
the AAA. The APB has an adverse image in some quarters, which may extend to
its reorganized successor and hamper its effective operation. Perhaps this image
problem might be offset by renaming the successor organization. 'The Council
on Accounting Policies, ' for example, might not call forth the emotional reaction
which could attend the continued use of the Accounting Principles Board. Never
theless, the question of the AICPA's control over the restructured and renamed
'body' would remain, and it is questionable if the AICPA would readily accept an
expansion of the number of non-certified representatives on the restructured board,
as would flow from adoption of the proposal. Accordingly, I believe that an entirely
new organization would probably be required if it is to operatewith maximum
effectiveness. "
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"I subscribe to the new body concept because it is an absolute necessity that the
private sector gain proper representation on the proposed rule-making body from
a number of standpoints.

Among the most important benefits to be derived is for industry to have input to
any deliberations at the very inception of the rule-making process rather than
at a point in time 'after-the-fact' when the proposals set forth by organizations
such as the APB are so firmly entrenched in the minds of the issuers as to render
any changes and/or improvements thereto virtually impossible. Many of the in
dustry viewpoints and/or objections could then be considered, debated, and re
solved in the committee stage prior to exposure.

A second improvement which would result from this approach is the development
of more practical solutions to the financial reporting/accounting questions cur
rently under study. Too often in reading APB exposure drafts and SEC proposals,
one gets the feeling that positions have been developed from an ’ivory tower' with
little awareness of such factors as implementation problems or investor needs.
Industry representation on such a body would go far toward injecting these points,
whenever appropriate and applicable, into the rule-making process.
Other more obvious potential benefits such as improved setting of priorities,
screening of less important efforts, and acceleration of needed opinions and regu
lations could also result from the establishment of the proposed body. "

"I would be very reluctant to completely abandon the APB in favor of establishing
a 'new authoritative body. ' There is too much to be done at this time to disrupt
the progress they have made and to 'waste' the knowledge and experience this
group has accumulated over the years.

I would support a move to a 'new authoritative body' as a long-term goal, ac
complished gradually-----say over a 3-5 year period, and perhaps accomplished
by a gradual change in the structure of the existing APB.
However, it has taken the APB several years to achieve the level of effectiveness
which they now have. We can be critical of some of the actions, or lack thereof,
they have taken in the past, but on balance I feel they have done a fine job and
are improving their processes with each passing day.

Also, if an immediate move were made to create a 'new authoritative body' and
if it failed to be as effective as the APB, I am afraid that the SEC would tend to
take accounting matters more into their own hands, and we would soon find this
government body promulgating more and more accounting principles. Put
another way, the SEC seems to be willing to work with the existing APB, and
I would not want to make a drastic change which might destroy the relationship.
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Nevertheless, I completely agree that management clearly has the responsibility
to report meaningful financial information to the public, and thus must play a
major role in determining the 'rules of the game.1 I conclude then that the only
way to preserve public confidence, maintain 'expertise, ' maintain the existing
relationship with the SEC, and at the same time accomplish more meaningful
participation by management is to gradually move towards an 'authoritative body. '
I would think this could be achieved by going 'all out' to achieve - over a period of
years - a 40% business representation on the existing APB. This, of course,
would be accompanied by sharing of the combined resources and a strong business
voice in specific appointments for board membership.

To sum up, my overall feelings on the subject are that I am not nearly as critical
of the APB as some, but I have to agree that there is considerable room for im
provement, and that one of the major weaknesses in the present process is the
lack of meaningful participation by business financial executives. However, I
can't think our past performance has earned us the right for a complete overhaul
at this time, and we should instead push hard for gradual equal representation as
we demonstrate that we are capable and willing to accept this responsibility. "

"I disagree with the new body concept. My reasoning stems from the fact that the
SEC has sufficient authority to mandate accounting practices but has deferred to
the AICPA. Also, the IRS is taking steps which tend to influence accounting
practices. Complete governmental control of financial reporting is less apt to
come about with the existence of a relatively independent organization establishing
generally accepted accounting principles. I prefer that the AICPA maintain the
lead role but arrange for a more positive and influential voice from business man
agement. Business should be given 40% representation on the APB and the twothirds majority vote rule should be continued. "

"In our opinion, a new body outside the AICPA is not a viable solution. Therefore,
the goal should be to secure greater representation of the business community on
a restructured APB. "

"We believe that the activities and policies of AICPA have helped to establish a
general credibility level in financial and government circles. Establishment of
a separate body could create confusion and lead to a loss of credibility. We be
lieve that the activities and efforts of industry should be concentrated on increased
business representation on the APB. We recognize past frustrations in attempting
to achieve such increased representation, but believe this continues to be the
preferable course of action. "
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"My personal reservation relates to whether a proposed new body to establish
financial reporting practices is in fact a viable approach. I share the feeling
that business representatives must assume greater responsibility and attain
and active and participative role in establishing reporting standards. How
ever, I feel that the proposed body is likely to prove too revolutionary to have
much chance of success. Certainly, without the full and active support of the
AICPA, I do not see how such a body could be established. Therefore, it is my
feeling that greater numerical representation by business on the APB, however
difficult to achieve, may be a more practical solution. "

"I strongly support the ’new body’ concept since to me it represents the only hope
of getting greater business representation in the membership of the 'rule making
body. ' This viewpoint is predicated on the fact that all efforts to date to obtain
increased membership in the present APB have not only failed but, despite such
efforts, the business representation has been reduced from 3 to 1 in recent
years. Further, there is little assurance that the representation may not be
entirely eliminated under the system whereby the AICPA president appoints all
APB members subject to ratification by the AICPA Board of Directors. "

"I do not believe that there is much hope for the adoption of a new authoritative
body by the AICPA. It has been responsible for making the rules for the
accounting profession for the last 33 years and I believe it [AICPA] is desirous
of continuing that role. Accordingly, I think a more realistic position would be
to strive for greater [business] representation on the present APB.

Since concerns have been expressed that the present APB has too many members,
perhaps the number of members should be reduced. An example of how the mem
bers could be pro-rated to achieve equal representation from the public accounting
profession and the business community with a smaller representation from public
interest groups, would be to have the Board consist of 4 members from CPA firms,
4 from business, and 2 from public interest groups. Assuming that the present
APB two-thirds assenting votes requirement for the issuance of an Opinion, the
assenting vote of 7 members would be required. Obviously, no single group would
be in control. "

"The APB has progressed from a group whose primary mission was to distill
'accounting principles' out of existing practice to one where it is a selfperpetuating body, responsible to no one but itself, engaged in writing rules of
financial reporting that have a tremendous impact on entire industries. I sug
gest that it is time that we try to determine what the APB is, to whom it is re
sponsible, and its method of perpetuation. "
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"While not satisfied with APB performance, I am in favor of APB set-up with
accelerated public hearings and stronger research effort. I am lukewarm on
necessity of greater business representation on APB. Have seen little evi
dence that business could do much better in solving problems. Change in
organization at this time would add to credibility gap on financial reporting.
Agree as to doubts that SEC would defer to such a body. "

"I question the feasibility of a ’new body' concept. The body would appear to be
less independent and impartial than the existing APB, and therefore even more
susceptible to charges of influence by the sponsoring organizations and business
in general. I continue to think that finding widespread and continuing financial
support for the body, sufficient to match the resources available to the APB,
will be a serious problem. I believe that it is much more practical to strive for
greater representation on, and communication with, some 'body' under the
sheltering wing of the AICPA. "

"I am not sure what is meant by the proposal that a new body should be organized
within the private sector of the economy. Certainly, someone is going to have
to decide on the specific membership of the body and it must be vested with
authority of some sort if it is to be effective. In order to be effective, I would
expect that the AICPA members would have to agree to be bound by its pronounce
ments --- and while this would not seem unreasonable so long as the AICPA mem
bers represented 40 percent or more of the membership, the AICPA might think
differently. Because of these practical problems, I guess I believe that we may
end up with a considerably expanded APB with the increased business represen
tation which we are asking. However, even though we may have to settle for
less, I amwilling to go along with the proposed new body. "

"I believe that a more viable solution is a modification of the present APB. I sup
port the premise of equal representation from the business community and the
accounting profession. It is extremely doubtful that the AICPA and the SEC
would throw their support behind a completely new body. I believe the SEC will
continue to defer to an authoritative body provided it is satisfied that the body is
one relatively independent from the influences of limited interest business factions.
It therefore appears that the most practical way to obtain the support of the SEC
and thereby avoid government agency mandates on accounting principles is to
modify an existing organization whose promulgations have been accepted as
authoritative announcements. The business community can achieve the desired
improvements in reporting practices by obtaining equal representation on the
existing APB. "
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Part-Time Service vs. Full-Time Members on the Body

"The proposed full-time activity by the body members is in keeping with the
basic deficiencies of the APB viz. , better communication with responsible
segments, avoidance of lengthy delays in achieving necessary acceptance of
financial reporting restrictions, and the need for more in-depth research.
Also, the fact the existing APB has many important matters that are not
even scheduled for review for another two or three years suggests the handi
cap of part-time participation by the APB. The answer to this difficulty may
be sufficient funding for the body to enable it to pay salaries commensurate
with the abilities of the level of qualifications that members should have to
serve on the body. "

"It is my opinion that public interests will not be best served if the body is a fulltime activity; I doubt seriously that the caliber of people needed from the busi
ness community would be available if there is a full-time requirement. My
reasoning is that it will be difficult to get executives who are active to leave
their company for a period of years. One of the reasons that business execu
tives are needed on the body is that they are in touch with the practical problems
of current-day financial reporting. If representatives sit full-time on the body
for, say, five years, those individuals will rapidly lose touch with 'current
practical problems'. "

'The problem of recruiting qualified business representatives on the body is
unquestionably severe, and its feasible solution is absolutely necessary. In
my opinion, the responsibilities of the business representatives on the proposed
body cannot be effectively discharged on a part-time basis. The expanding in
terest in corporate reporting and the increasing number of issues under con
sideration at any given time suggest that the body will require both full-time
representatives and the support of a subordinate full-time staff. I also believe
that many qualified potential representatives may not be available for service
as representatives by reason of their heavy work commitments within their
companies and in other areas of activity. Other potential candidates might not
be interested in such service by reason of its possible impact on the attainment
of their personal career and financial objectives.
Two possible approaches suggest themselves to me as possible solutions to this
business representative staffing problem:

A.

The proposal might stipulate a relatively short term of service
on the body, such as 18-24 months. This approach would have
the merit of spreading the burden of service among a larger
number of companies and individuals and reduce the extent of
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deprivation to be expected through the 'loan' of financial execu
tives to the body.
An unknown potential career impact would still exist on this
basis for the individual representative, but his corporate
'prospects' might be better than under a longer term of pro
fessional service, by reason of his shorter absences from
his company. Such professional service might, in fact, serve
as a broadening opportunity for high potential individuals----similar to Harvard's advanced management program-----which
companies might be interested in using for their 'seasoning'
prior to promotion to a position of higher responsibility.

Under this approach the business representatives on the body
might be still in the dynamic growth period of their careers,
and their performance as representatives might be expected to
be maximally vigorous and beneficial to the profession. On
the other hand, such individuals might not yet have attained the
breadth of experience and maturity of judgment possessed by
more senior executives, who very likely could not easily be
released for such service by reason of their heavy personal
responsibilities. One other adverse aspect of this alternative
would be that it would necessarily involve some loss of
effectiveness, as compared with an approach involving a
longer term of service, resulting from the increase in start
up and shut-down time involved on this shorter-cycle basis.

B.

The proposal might suggest the recruitment of business repre
sentatives from the ranks of the newly retired financial execu
tives. Such individuals would be able to serve for the longer
term which would seem to be required to meet the continuity
criteria for the body. These 'financial executives emeritus'
might also be expected to have the greater breadth of experience
and maturity of judgment that younger executives, still actively
employed in the financial management function, have not yet
attained. On the other hand, these older representatives would
probably be less vigorous, more subject to absence due to ill
ness, and less in touch with current problems and topical issues.

On balance, I believe that the body would be more effective if its business represen
tatives were financial executives still actively employed in the financial management
of their companies and serving relatively short terms on the body. "
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"I doubt that it would be possible to obtain business representatives of the caliber
that this job would require who would be willing and able to serve full-time. "

"The advantage of part-time representatives is the ability to bring a continuing
practical approach to business problems. I support those who feel that fulltime appointees might well become isolated from day-to-day problems. Per
haps the body could have a full-time chairman and a full-time staff with the
members of the body on a part-time staggered basis. "

"I think that the main point to be made is that the body should be made up of
individuals who are close enough to the operating facts of a business to be com
pletely conversant with what would be the normal resulting impact of the appli
cation of a theory. I say this because it seems to me that the 'Accounting
Principles Board' has in some of its recent opinions gotten out of touch with
operating reality.
If this is accepted as a reasonable premise, then it is likely that the body would
be increased in size inasmuch as it would have to include representatives from
various industries.
I know that this is a far cry from a Supreme Court of Accounting concept which
many people are advocating. I feel that such a court would aggravate the con
dition that presently exists inasmuch as it is likely to be composed of theoreti
cians responsible to no one. I think another point to be made is that whereas
the U. S. Supreme Court interprets laws, the Supreme Court of Accounting would
be in fact called upon to make laws. Further, since the trend seems to be toward
extreme codification of accounting rules, such a Supreme Court would be required
to make extremely detailed laws. This, lacking a background in operating prac
tices within an industry, would verge on the disastrous.
I feel it would be a mistake for anyone to serve as a full-time paid member of
the Accounting Principles Board for the reasons I recite above.

The only additional significant comment that I feel may be appropriate is that I
feel that there could be a variety of industrial groups represented on the body
who would deal with problems as they might relate to their industries. This
would overcome the objection that it would be impossible for responsible execu
tives to devote full-time to the body since it is unlikely that a single industry
group would be involved in all of the problems all of the time. It might also
make the point that the only way one can reasonably codify accounting principles
is by industry groupings. "
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”I am concerned about the full-time vs. part-time make-up of the body because
I cannot visualize top business candidates being willing to give up three to five
years of their business career to work on the body full-time. As you can ima
gine, there are many problems which relate to home life, career objectives,
credits for retirement pay, etc. It would be a shame to require full-time
service only to end up with second rate candidates.
In order to obtain top representatives of industry, the accounting profession
(public auditors), and others, I do not believe there should be a requirement
that membership on the body be on a full-time basis. I believe the commitment
should be for a given period of time such as five years and, perhaps, on a half
time basis. If it subsequently turns out that the ideal representatives could
serve on a full-time basis, then it could be reconsidered. I do believe that the
body should be supported by several full-time professionals who could do much
of the work under the guidance of the body. "

”I join those who have previously expressed concern on whether or not qualified
financial executives would be willing and able to serve on a full-time body. The
suggestion of a substantial but subordinate full-time staff working for part-time
body members seems to be a start in answering this concern. "

"I agree with those who believe that a part-time body (as opposed to full-time
members) would be more responsive to the practical considerations of new
accounting issues and therefore would best represent actual business situations. "

III. ISSUE;

Financial Support to Fund the Body's Operations

"It seems to me that the cost of supporting the body should not be funded in pro
portion to the representation of the various interested parties. Academic and
government representatives should be on the body without any requirement that
their organizations pay the freight - business wants the body to have the benefit
of their views. The business community ultimately will pay the freight for
itself and the CPA's anyway, so this might as well be recognized in the form of
some means by which collections will be both mandatory and automatic - but in
a form in which business will know that it is paying for part of the cost. Today
the CPA's take full credit - yet actually pass the full cost on to their clients in
their fees. "
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"There is a negative connotation to the proposal that the business community
underwrite an equal share of the cost of operating the body, including subsi
dies for public and governmental representatives. The danger is that this
could be misinterpreted as 'muzzle power'. "

"There is one side of the financial funding support question (which applies equally
to the representation issue), and that is - despite the fact that the business com
munity should, and probably would be willing to, pay its fair share of the costs,
the system to accomplish this has to maintain integrity of independence in both
directions. That is to say, not only can there be no way for business to apply
economic pressures on the body, but the business community and its various
elements must retain their right of dissent and have an open forum in which to
air their views with respect to proposals by the body. "

"The body should be sponsored and funded by the several elements of the financial/
business community represented on the body. I do not agree that it is either
necessary or desirable to subsidize all public members. While this may be
appropriate for members from the academic community, I do not believe it is
appropriate for the financial analyst member(s). Most important is the question
' How can the body be funded without undermining its independence?' I'll have to
leave it to those who are more familiar than I with the structure and mode of
operations of the present APB and the financial needs of the new or revised body
to come up with a workable solution. "

"Despite the assurances to the contrary, I think that finding widespread and con
tinuing financial support for the body, sufficient to match the resources of the
APB, will be a serious problem. "
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Accounting now stands at the threshold of fundamental changes which will
alter not only its role in society, but also its very definition.

An

early sign of these changes is the appointment of the Wheat and Trueblood

Committees, which can also be important catalysts of these changes.

The

public accounting profession can elect to resist change and wind up as a

peripheral, barely relevant institution, or it can elect to capitalize on

it for the ultimate benefit of society.

We are concerned, when studying the proposals submitted to this Committee,

that some persons are motivated primarily by a desire to quell criticism
of the present Accounting Principles Board, and have no desire to consider

real change.

If their mean and narrow view of the role of accounting

prevails, the profession will surely reap derision in the future.

A much preferable approach would be to analyze the proper role of accounting

in society and then deduce a system for establishing accounting principles
which is consistent with that role.

The remainder of this statement follows

that approach, and concludes that the current Accounting Principles Board

provides a ready foundation on which to build an appropriately broadened,

socially responsive instrument for establishing accounting principles.

The Role of Accounting in Society

A national economy is a more-or-less loosely organized, goal-directed

system, in which the goals include meeting the physical and cultural needs

of the people.

In order to meet these goals, society organizes into
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functional units of manageable size, each of which takes responsibility

For example, businesses provide goods and services,

for certain sub-goals.

universities meet the need for education, and the Federal government
provides for national defense.

The fact that there are national goals implies

the necessity of a control system to measure and correct discrepancies

between actual results and hoped-for goals.

An important component of any control system is the information feedback
loop -- the system which measures physical results and reports them to

the decision makers.

The sensitivity of the feedback loop is of critical

importance to the efficient functioning of the whole goal-directed system.
Consider, for example, a heating system with no thermostat.

It would

supply heat without regard to temperature conditions, and would be
absurdly inefficient in achieving the goal of constant temperature.

Now

consider a heating system with a thermostat, but a system in which the

signal took six months to travel from the thermostat to the furnace.

In

this case, the heat supplied by the furnace would be governed by actual
physical conditions, but the result would be to intensify temperature

extremes instead of eliminating them.

Clearly, an effective feedback loop

in any control system must work quickly and accurately.

In fact, the

efficiency of the feedback loop will unfailingly serve to limit the

efficiency of the entire system in attaining goals.

Accounting is the feedback loop in an economic system, and the efficiency

of the accounting system will have a tremendous influence on how effectively
society can meet its goals.

It is therefore vitally important to national,

and indeed, international welfare,that accounting function in the most
effective possible way.
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The public accounting profession, through its function of establishing

accounting principles and attesting to financial results, has effective
control of this feedback loop, but it will surely lose this control

unless it recognizes and accepts the responsibility implicit in such
a vital position.

Preparing the profession to meet this responsibility

is the challenge facing the Wheat and Trueblood Committees.

The Need for Establishing Accounting Principles

Because accounting is principally concerned with reporting physical results,

it is not obvious that there is a need for establishing accounting principles.
No august body established the law of gravity; it was there for Newton to
see.

th

The layman would be apt to think that an accountant need only observe

'facts ' and then report them.

This, however, is a simplistic view:

- The number of physical events during an entity’s existence

is immense.
all.

It would be impossible to communicate them

The accountant is therefore faced with the need to

decide which events to communicate and which to ignore,
and of those communicated, how they will be recorded,

summarized, and reported.

These decisions necessarily

impose upon the accountant the responsibility for interpretation,

and make total neutrality all but impossible.

The accountant,

therefore, records those facts which in his judgment are most

relevant to the users of the information, and records,
summarizes, and reports them in the most relevant fashion,

according to his judgment.

For example, accountants

typically report the depreciated cost of fixed assets, but

not their current worth, age and condition.
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- Modern enterprise has developed business methods which are

exceedingly complex.

In many cases, complicated transactions

are resolved only over extended periods of time.

The

economic substance of many of these transactions is by no
means obvious.

Two equally competent, neutral accountants

may observe the same phenomenon and disagree on the economic
substance.

For example, a contractual stream of payments in

return for the use of property may be a financing arrangement,

a sale of property, or a mere rental.

The accountant is

saddled with the responsibility of interpreting the economic

substance of complex transactions.

The immense amount of interpretation involved in accounting may be suggested

by pointing to the common three or four page set of financial statements

of commercial enterprises; these reports are typically the synthesis

of millions (in some cases billions) of individual transactions, many of
which may be quite complex.

If accounting is

implicitly an interpretive discipline, and if equally

competent interpretations of given events may differ, what is implied about

the need for accounting principles?

In the absence of accounting principles,

each accountant would be free to select his own decision rules, and the
wholly predictable result would be a confusing disarray in financial

reporting.

Persons using financial statements would have multifarious,

noncomparable, nonconsistent reports to deal with.

It is highly probable

that this state of affairs would seriously detract from the efficiency of the
accounting feedback loop in the overall economic control system.
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In view of the complexities of accounting, it is inconceivable that any
system of individually interpreted general rules could work.

Therefore,

given the practical need for a reasonable degree of uniformity in
accounting, some body with authority and credibility must set rules to

be consistently followed.

Who Should Establish Accounting Principles?
If practicing lawyers do not establish the law, why should practicing
accountants establish the accounting principles?

The law, which at a point in time is the codification of contemporary

social standards, is intended to govern action.

It is a legitimate

exercise of government power to establish and enforce the law.

Accounting reports, however, are merely bundles of information, which,
by its nature, is morally and ethically neutral.

The need to regulate

this information is neither legal nor moral, only practical.

If one

accountant sees a particular transaction as a lease and another sees
it as a sale, neither can be said thereby to be corrupt; neither

interpretation is morally superior.

It is simply impractical to have

divergent reporting for similar events.

Because the need for accounting principles is neither legal nor moral, it

need not be a government function to establish accounting principles.
In fact, most persons are in agreement that it is an exceedingly dangerous

exercise of government power to intrude in the flow of information.
Government control of information flow is rightly resisted on other fronts,
and should be in accounting also.
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One of the principal aims of the first amendment to the United States

Constitution was to prohibit government from interfering with the flow
of information.

Government control of accounting information flow would

be about as desirable as government control of the press.

The establishment

of accounting principles should be a function solely of the private sector.

Any body establishing accounting principles must act with a view toward
the public interest.

In fact, since the accounting feedback loop is a

component of the goal-directed system serving the public interest, the

efficiency of that loop can be measured only in terms of the public interest.
It frequently occurs that the narrow interests of those being reported on or
specific users of financial information conflict with the broad interests

of society.

In these cases, it is obvious that the broader interests of

society must unfalteringly predominate.

This implies two requirements:

the body establishing accounting principles must be imbued with broad
social concern and resistant to pressures from narrow interest groups.

Because of the vital importance to society of an efficient accounting
feedback loop, any body establishing accounting principles must ultimately

be responsive to public interest and desire.
or elected,

Whether the body is appointed

the selection process must be sensitive to public pressures.

Not only must it be sensitive to public pressures but it must also appear
to be sensitive as a logical condition for public acceptance and support.

Whether or not public pressure is expected, there must be formal machinery
to recognize and react to it.

Even if members are appointed to an accounting principles body, rather than

elected by a broad constituency, it is possible to build some safeguards

into the appointive process simply by permitting the appointments to be
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made by diverse and heterogeneous groups.

In no case should a single

person or organization have effective (or apparent) control over the

appointive process.

A heterogeneous appointive process may not guarantee

a diverse range of opinion in the principles body, but it would certainly

improve the chances of achieving that result.

Accommodation to public interest can also come through heeding the voices

of public criticism.

Criticism should not be lamented and abhorred, but

rather embraced as an essential force for reform.

In fact, only the total

lack of criticism should be lamented, for that would surely signal a public
judgment of irrelevance.

Because accounting is a highly complex technical discipline, any body

establishing principles must have a solid core of technical expertise,
or the principles established will be naive and impractical.

Only accounting

experts could have the detailed knowledge of what is possible or practical
in the field of information recording and reporting.

It would be a grievous

mistake to entrust the establishment of accounting principles to any body
wholly innocent of technical expertise.

A final requirement for any effective body establishing accounting principles

is that its decrees must be enforceable.

practical enforcement mechanisms:

There appear to be only two

legal controls, and the ethical self

regulation of the public accounting profession.

To rely on legal controls

is to involve government in the information control business, and that is
unacceptable.

effective.

Fortunately, self-regulation by the profession has proven highly

(Only one Opinion of the Accounting Principles Board has failed

to receive unanimous application by the profession, and that case was
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aggravated by the intervention of the Federal government.)
profession

If the

is to enforce the decrees of a principles body, that body will

need to be an arm of the profession, for it is unlikely that this profession

(or any other) would unconditionally commit itself to carrying out the
regulations of a totally independent entity in the absence of a legal

requirement to do so.

Any body constituted to establish accounting principles must have the full

support not only of the public accounting profession, but also such authorities
as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the stock exchanges, various

governmental agencies, and other professions.

These authorities have

placed their confidence in the public accounting profession to assure the

fairness of financial reporting.

It is unlikely that any public or

governmental body could achieve or hold that confidence.

Furthermore,

the resources and support of the public accounting profession are essential

to an intelligent formulation of accounting principles, and these resources
and support are most easily available to an arm of the profession itself.

The ideal accounting principles body should meet all of the requirements
outlined above.

Unfortunately, some of them are in partial conflict.

For

example, the requirements of technical expertise and enforceability imply

that the body should be primarily made up of expert public accountants,
but the requirements of public interest and independence from pressure by

narrow interest groups suggest a group more representative of society and
less closely associated with finance and industry.

Similarly, a professional

group may be, or may appear to be, less responsive to public pressure and

interest.
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Perhaps the theoretical ideal would be to establish two bodies:

the first,

made up of members of the public, would articulate the broad objectives of

accounting principles; the second, made up of expert public accountants,
would translate those objectives into detailed accounting principles.

As

a practical matter, however, such a two-body solution is probably not

feasible at the present time.

The lack of agreed social objectives and

competent advocates for them would surely reduce the public body, if it could

be staffed at all, to interminable philosophical debating, with very little
practical output to guide the professional body in developing detailed rules.

A practical compromise solution would be to constitute a single body, under
the aegis of the public accounting profession, with a dual membership:

on

the one side would be expert public accountants, on the other, representatives
of the public.

In this way, the technical expertise of the accountants could

be melded with the public interest in a practical working arrangement.

The lack

of a fully coherent social philosophy would not prove an insurmountable barrier
to such a group, as it would be free to move toward such a philosophy in small
discrete steps.

Furthermore, the work of such a body would not be inordinately

delayed while the public representatives defined and learned their duties.

In

order to assure that such a body would be as responsive as possible to public

interest, the accountants should be nominated by a heterogeneous process (e.g.,

by their own firms) and the public members should be nominated by organizations

(or persons) totally independent of the accounting profession.

This process
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would reasonably assure that the body represented a sufficiently wide

range of views, since its appointment would not be in the hands of
any single group, such as the officers of the American Institute of

Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).

Nevertheless, veto power over

nominees should be given to the profession to reduce the possibility
of capricious choices being inflicted upon the principles body.

The

terms of all members should be staggered and limited to provide for
reasonable evolution of views, but not too brief to permit continuity

of operations.

Some critics have questioned the ability of public accountants to remain

completely independent in the face of client pressures with respect to
establishing accounting principles.

However, there is a wide range of

client interests bearing on any public accounting firm, and a considerable
amount of diversity among firms themselves; therefore, it is unlikely that
significant pressures could be brought to bear on such a principles body
by a single narrow interest group.

In the event they were, however, the

public members of the body would be a sufficient foil for these pressures.

Proposals of Others
A number of proposals have been advanced by others for the composition of

an accounting principles body, including such recommendations as these:
- Establish a small, full-time accounting principles body,
staffed, perhaps, by ’’elder statesmen” of the profession.

- Turn the function of establishing accounting principles
over to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

- Turn the function of establishing principles over to
investors.
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- Give equal representation in establishing accounting

principles to financial executives.
- Abandon the attempt to prescribe uniform accounting

principles, and rely instead on full disclosure.
- Establish a three branch structure for formulating

and enforcing accounting principles: constitutional
(to determine broad objectives), legislative (to make

the detailed rules), and judicial (to hear appeals).
- Establish appeals courts.

- Elect the members of the body.
- Broaden the composition of the Accounting Principles
Board to include lawyers, economists, and/or other

financial experts.

Several proposals feature a body with paid, full-time membership, independent
of public accounting practice.

These plans raise a number of important

questions:

- Would remoteness from public practice mean that such
groups might develop isolated and irrelevant stances
on practical issues?

- Could the Institute, or any other financing agency,
afford to hire members of the caliber of those who now
serve voluntarily?

- What accounting principles would be considered "generally
accepted" if a majority of the largest accounting firms
deemed a pronouncement of such a body irrelevant and

agreed to apply different rules?
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- How would such a body be selected to assure acceptance

by both public accountants and the users of financial
information?
- How would the public interest be represented in such a

board?
- How would such a board be responsive to public pressures?

If the answer to any one of these serious questions is unsatisfactory,

that would be sufficient to disqualify the proposal.

In the absence

of demonstrated, satisfactory answers, however, we believe that

the

answers to all of these questions are unsatisfactory with respect to
the public interest.

As to the proposals of some to staff such a body with "elder statesmen”

of the profession, who, being retired, would serve for nominal stipends,
we do not believe that age is a logical qualification for such a job, nor

that failure to attain such an age is a logical disqualification.

Staffing

such a body solely with retired experts would probably lead to a very

competent board of unimpeachable integrity; but it would surely exclude

the substantial majority of those who could make a great contribution.

Proposals to turn the function over to the Securities and Exchange Commission
blithely ignore the dangers of turning the control of information over to

the government.

They also ignore the fact that when the government turns

to regulatory matters, it tends to be highly conservative and noninnovative;
these qualities are precisely the opposite of the creative innovation which

is so necessary in accounting.
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Proposals to turn the function over to investors, or to include other
representative users of financial information in a principles body,
suffer two infirmities:

not only would these persons lack the

accounting expertise to make practical rules, but they would not even
be very good representatives of the public interest.

The interests of

financial statement users are, if anything, just as parochial as those of

the entities being reported upon.

By including users instead of producers

of financial information on the body, we might alter the bias of the body,

but not necessarily in consonance with the public interest.

For example

the interest of corporate officials may be to adopt accounting principles
which permit smoothing of income and disguising of poor results, in order

to justify high salaries and assure job security; investment bankers and
brokers may prefer to adopt accounting principles which encourage many new
issues of securities; lenders may prefer principles which minimize their

credit risks; investors may favor principles contributing to boom-time

psychology so that their investments will appreciate.

Any or all of these

parochial interests may conflict with the real needs of society.

Not only

is there no real need for these interests to be represented on the principles
body, but there are excellent reasons to exclude them.

The proposals to give equal representation to financial executives are

especially callous to the public interest.

They would not only give

representation to one exclusive narrow-interest group, but they would
virtually hand control of the body to that group.

Proposals to abandon the attempt to prescribe uniform accounting principles

seem impractical.

No one could seriously argue that this approach would

improve the understandability and efficiency of financial information.

If
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accountants are unable to untangle the complex accounting issues, what
hope is there that a typical user could supply a better interpretation,

upon merely being given the ”facts”through voluminous disclosure?

A formal, three-branch structure to establish and enforce accounting

principles must of necessity be a rather cumbersome affair, lacking in

efficiency and rapid responsiveness.

Final resolution of complex issues

would invariably depend upon the results of the appeals procedure, which
could not even begin until the detailed rules were promulgated, a time
consuming stage, which, in turn, could not begin until objectives had been

clarified.

This whole lengthy procedure could break down entirely if the

three groups became deadlocked.

It seems highly unlikely that such a

system would prove practical.

The notions of an accounting court and an accounting appeals board (or court)
are borrowed from the law.

In legal cases, the losing party is subject to

harsh penalties (such as imprisonment, fine, or monetary judgment), so the

law provides for appeal to maximize the probability of a fair result.

However, in governing information flow, there is no similar threat of
penalty.

A company which is ruled against must merely adopt the same

accounting methods that its competitors are using.

Not only are such courts

not needed, but they could well have the practical effect of vitiating the

public interest, because they would predictably hear appeals mainly from

aggrieved corporations or user groups, as it is unlikely that the public
could focus its interest sufficiently to take up appeals proceedings.

The

result would be to abet precisely those pressures that should be minimized.
And finally, appeals procedures would nearly certainly be time-consuming,

formal affairs which would leave the financial results of appellants under
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a cloud until cases could be resolved.

At what price, then, would stock

trade while a company's financial results were in question?

The result,

most certainly, would be decreased confidence in accounting principles
and financial reports.

The proposal to elect members of the body does not seem to offer much promise.
If the voters were public accountants, there would be no significant change
from the current composition of the board.

If the voters included various

narrow-interest groups, such as corporate officers and user groups, the
interests of society would not be enhanced, and would probably be harmed.

Public election is, of course, impractical.

In any case, election of

members would suffuse the whole process with undesirable political overtones.

We can enthusiastically support the proposals to broaden the composition

of the body, provided, however, that members selected for that purpose
represent solely the public Interest.

Our Proposal
In recognition of the logical requirements discussed above, we propose the

establishment of a single body with the following characteristics to
establish accounting principles.

Membership
The body should have twenty-one members, distributed as follows:

International and national public
accounting firms

10

Regional and local public accounting firms

2

Distinguished professors of accounting

2

Technical experts (subtotal)
Public interest representatives
Total

14
7

21
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Selection

To assure a broad range of interests in the body, a heterogeneous
selection process should be publicized and used.

The public accounting

members should be nominated by their firms; the nominees should be
expert technical accountants with the authority to implement the
decisions of the body within their own firms.

The distinguished

professors of accounting should be nominated by a prestigious

academic society, such as the American Accounting Association.

The

public interest members should be nominated by designated persons or
organizations totally independent of government and the accounting

and financial world;for example, a lawyer, if included, could be

nominated by the American Bar Association; these persons should
be selected for their intellectual breadth and ability to recognize

and serve the public interest.

All of these nominations should be

subject to confirmation by the AICPA.

Although no particular area of specialization would guarantee that a
member would best serve the public interest, expertise of the following

types could be of great value to the body in its deliberations:
behavioral science (the only measure of the
effectiveness of accounting is the way it
changes behavior)

law (accounting reports affect formal relationships
among organizations)
economics (accounting is the feedback loop in the
overall economic system)

history (broad social goals must be considered in
a historical context)
philosophy (social goals have ethical and philosophical
implications)
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Sociology (the whole economic system is a social structure)
political science
(all human activity occurs in a
political matrix).

Other specialties would undoubtedly be relevant also.

The omission of government, business, and financial members does not
mean that the interests of these groups would be ignored in the

deliberative process.

Indeed, their opinions should be vigorously

solicited in the research stages; there should be adequate opportunity

for all interested parties to present their views.

However, it is not

necessary to go one step further and give special interest groups
voting power as well.

Many persons who would be otherwise highly qualified to serve on

the accounting principles body might be disqualified by reason of
their membership in some special interest groups.

If these persons

had expertise in one of the disciplines relevant to the public
interest members of the body (as outlined above), and a broad outlook

on the nature and function of accounting, there could be no objection

to their membership in the body, provided they severed their connections
with their special interest groups and became independent representatives

of the public interest.

Such members should then be compensated through

the AICPA or other appropriate organizations.

Voting
Decisions of the body should be by two-thirds majority.

This would

be a large enough majority to assure general acceptance by accounting

practitioners, but not large enough to give effective veto power to
the public interest bloc (which would represent just one-third of the
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voting strength).

To give veto power to this group might conceivably

make progress impossible and put the body completely out of business.

The public interest bloc would not need voting control to exercise its
function.

If its positions were truly in the public interest, it would

be most probable that it could win support among the practitioners.

However, even in the event the practitioners refused to recognize
valid objections of the public interest bloc, there would still be the

right of dissent.

A stream of rulings issued by the body, all carrying

the unanimous condemnation of the public interest members, would cause
a prompt crisis of confidence in the body and lead to some type of
reform.

With an organization and voting structure of this nature, the public

interest members could gradually lead the board to a more enlightened
philosophical approach without having the ability to obstruct
production completely or force change at an undigestable rate.

And

this structure would ultimately leave technical decisions in the hands
of qualified technicians.

Term of Membership
Members should be appointed to the body for staggered, nonrenewable

terms of five or six years.

This would permit gradual evolution

without unduly disrupting continuity.

Full-time Chairman (and Planning Committee)
The chairman, and perhaps a three-man planning committee, of the
body could well serve full time, to permit efficient organization,

timely follow-up on pending matters, continuous liaison with re
searchers, etc., although this is not an essential feature of our

proposal.
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Research

The AICPA should fund adequate research programs to provide the
board with high quality decision-making information.

programs should be both empirical and theoretical.

These research
In funding re

search, adequate recognition should be given to such relevant dis
ciplines as behavioral accounting, operations research, decision
theory, cybernetics, etc., with regard to both the technical and
broad social goals of the body.

All of the theoretical and per

haps many of the empirical studies should be conducted by academic
personnel.

In addition to securing high quality research, this

practice would have the salutory effect of bridging the lamentably
wide chasm which now exists between practicing and academic

accountants.

This move, by itself, should cause a dramatic improve

ment in the quality of accounting research, because more superior researchers

would obviously be attracted into a discipline in which they could
aspire to have some measure of influence over the actual course of
events.

One important advantage of this proposal is that the present structure
of the Accounting Principles Board provides an existing, functioning

base on which to implement these reforms, without disrupting current
progress, and without the need to establish credibility in a completely
new institution.
★ ★ ★

The implementation of this proposal would, I believe, be an enormous
step toward broadening the consciousness of accountants and creating a
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socially relevant and responsive role for accounting during the remainder

of the twentieth century.

I implore the members of the Wheat Committee to

reject all proposals which take a narrow and static view of the role of
accounting in society.
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Group

I appreciate this opportunity to present my views on the subject
study by your Group. No attempt will be made to offer solutions
problems that exist. However, this presentation should afford a
understanding of the present problems and thus aid your Study
in arriving at sound and lasting solutions.

Attached as Appendix A is a paper entitled "A Critical Analysis
of the Present Institutional Framework for Formulating Financial
Reporting Standards, " that was presented by me to the Northwestern
University Center for Advanced Study in Accounting and Information
Systems Conference. It includes, among other related matters, a candid
review of the Accounting Principles Board’s role, its history, its
strengths, its weaknesses and its relations with other groups.
This
information is relevant as there is much to be learned from the present
system, its struggle to cope with changing conditions (pages 14 to 19) as
well as its problems (and failures in some areas) in so doing (pages 19
to 27).
For example:

Loss of Confidence in Financial Reporting
I believe the primary cause of loss of general public confidence
in today’s system of financial reporting stems from the actions of a very
few managements (page 2) and the independent auditors’ inability or
unwillingness to cope with these situations (pages 3 and 4).

Independence of the Board (pages 26 and 27)
I firmly believe that independence of the Board is a false issue
and has had little to do with either the loss of general public confidence
in financial reporting or the Board’s inability to operate more satisfactorily.

The Board’s Voting Rule (pages 22 and 2 3)
The necessity for a two-thirds majority vote to issue an opinion
or a statement has taken its toll on both the quality of opinions and the
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efficiency of the Board's operations. On a number of occasions, periods
of constructive analysis, consideration of the input of others and
meaningful debate on the issues, was followed by voting which left the
Board short of a two-thirds majority. There was then no other course
but to redebate the issues and seek compromise solutions.
It is my
estimate that the rehashing and compromising on Opinions 16 and 17
added at least six months to the time schedule and caused a 180° shift in
the purchase/pooling conclusion.
If lack of confidence in the present Board - due either to its
organizational structure or its performance - is such that it cannot be
trusted with a simple majority vote, then I would favor whatever changes
are necessary to create an organization that could be so trusted.

Small Full Time Paid Board (pages 21 and 22)
I am concerned that the proponents of this solution may not have
given it as much study in depth as it must have. This, of course, is now
the responsibility of your Study Group. My chief areas of concern follow:
1.

It is assumed that better, sounder opinions will flow
from a small Board. Is this a safe assumption?
If so, why?

2.

No matter how sound future opinions may be, nor how
efficiently a new organization performs, nor how
it is constituted, nor whether it is inter-disciplinary
or AICPA sponsored, its actions will affect many
and it will be subjected to criticism and pressures.
Under these circumstances, will acceptance of a
small Board in the private sector last longer or
evaporate faster than acceptance of a broader based
Board?

3.

If a degree of disenchantment in the small Board develops
at some later date, will the source of its operating
funds continue or dry up?
Today, the major portion
of operating costs represents donated time and out of
pocket expenses, borne by Board members or their
firms.
In my opinion, a larger firm would be
extremely reluctant to withdraw from the present
Board. To do so would put it at a competitive
disadvantage in serving its clients.

4.

Much has been made of the "off again-on again" operation
of the present part-time Board and the greatly added
efficiency that a full time Board would have in being
able to continuously consider a matter. Neither type

2.
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Board can give continuous thought to any one subject.
Both must pause for gestation periods, while others’
views are being sought, while the results of public
hearings are being tabulated, while decisions are being
drafted, while an opinion is out for exposure, etc.
On balance, though, I believe a small Board would
spend less time in deliberation than would a large one.

5.

The manner of selecting members for a small Board must
be given careful consideration to avoid any suspicion
of "packing the court. "
My seven and one-half years
on the Board convinced me that the experiences and
natures of individual members (and firms to some extent)
had molded them so that their voting patterns were
predictable to some extent. Some were basically
"conservative" (less susceptible to change) while others
were "liberal" or "progressive" (far more willing to
consider new approaches).

Research

The problem of realizing more support from the research effort
(page 20) must be solved and will represent the same challenge regardless
of the structure of the Board itself.
One final observation - the Board is currently moving at the
fastest pace in its history (page 28). Four opinions have been issued in
8 months, at least 13 projects are on its current agenda and 10 research
projects are scheduled for publication in the next 3 years.
Any changes
made should assure that this momentum is maintained.
Respectfully submitted,

3.
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By LeRoy Layton
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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR FORMULATING
FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS

My selection for participation in this conference and the

request that I cover "a critical analysis of the present institutional
framework for formulating financial reporting standards" undoubtedly

stems from 7-1/2 years experience (to December 31, 1970) on the
Accounting Principles Board, the last 2-2/3rds years as its chairman.
Accordingly, I shall concentrate on the role of the APB, its strengths,
its weaknesses and its relations with other groups.

This is not to

suggest, however, that other groups are any less interested in
financial reporting standards.

RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES FOR ACCOUNTING

Paul Grady1 observed that in our country both governmental

and economic institutions reflect systems of checks and balances against
abuses of power and other human weaknesses.

Similarly, the

responsibilities and authorities for accounting and financial reporting
of business enterprises constitute a mosaic in which:
o

The primary responsibility and authority rests with

the board of directors and management, and
o

is supplemented by secondary responsibilities and

authorities of independent certified public accountants,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, regulatory
commissions and stock exchanges.

1
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The Board of Directors and Management

Management’s primary obligation for the fairness of its financial
statements is well established.
in all cases.

However, it has not been fully understood

Recent litigation, with claims of astronomical damages

for the issuance of allegedly false and misleading financial statements,

has done much to promote an increased awareness of the duties and
obligations of management and corporate directors for financial reporting
of the entities in their trust.

Most managements, in attempting to present their companies’

financial results in the most meaningful manner possible, have contributed
very appreciably to the continued improvement of reporting standards
over many years.

Some managements, in attempting to take advantage

of favorable alternatives, have used many of accounting's fine points to

improve earnings per share.

Occasionally, a few managements have

taken an attitude of "going for everything" and have depended on their

auditors to draw the line between the acceptable and the unacceptable.

This can be dangerous as that line sometimes is difficult to determine.
Also some managements may have been too persuasive for their own

good.

This attitude has done little towards improving financial reporting

nor enhancing management's image.
A number of organizations, representing various segments of
those who prepare financial statements, have been very active in

programs to improve financial reporting.

Their programs have included

research studies, pronouncements, written articles, etc. as well as
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cooperation in the development of APB Opinions.

The latter will be

touched upon later when these organizations' relationships with the

APB are covered.

The Independent Certified Public Accountant - Attest Function

Though secondary in nature, the independent auditor's

responsibility for those financial statements he has examined and on
which he has expressed an opinion equal management's.

At times the

financial consequences of misstatement for the auditor has actually
exceeded the consequences to management.

Auditing firms are acutely

aware of this and the even greater potential consequence of loss of

reputation.

There is no way of measuring the cumulative beneficial effect
that the attest function has had upon financial reporting, but it must be

tremendous.

A constant dialogue exists between management and the

auditor on specific financial reporting problems.

In most instances

that dialogue results in improved financial reporting.

Sometimes, however, decisions or actions of commission or
omission are taken, the later disclosure of which shakes confidence in

the system of financial reporting.

and make lurid news.

These tend to surface quite quickly

Certainly it is fortuitous for those who make

their living in reporting the news and for those who feel they need the
publicity.

The danger, of course, is that it has and will continue to

cause an over reaction by many who in turn have the potential to effect
the evolutionary process of improved reporting standards, i. e. the
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public, members of the judiciary system, the regulatory bodies, members
of federal and state legislatures, etc.

By "over reaction” I mean

precipitous action based on a belief that conditions are so bad that

drastic cures only will solve the existing problems of financial reporting.
I am sure that one drastic cure -- the idea of transferring the attest

function from the private to the public domain -- has occurred to a

number of our civil service minded public officials.

CPA firms must improve their performances.

Most are

already spending large sums on recruiting, training, developing and

These programs apparently need to be

supervising professional staff.

more effective.

Each firm should consider having key decisions and

work papers reviewed by or under the control of an independent partner

prior to issuance of reports.

Accounting gimmicks (innovative accounting

approaches, apparently within the confines of generally accepted

accounting principles but of questionable soundness) should be reported
to the AICPA as part of an early warning system rather than be used

to enhance client relations first.

The expression of an opinion on an

accounting treatment currently under consideration by the client of

another auditing firm can and should be put under much more effective
constraints than now exist.

In those rare instances where management's

real reason for changing independent auditors is that they have found

the old firm too tough or exacting, more difficulty should be experienced
in finding a replacement.

It has been my experience that the eager new

firm rarely contacts the outgoing firm before agreeing to take a client.
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Securities and Exchange Commission
The Securities and Exchange Commission has played a vital

role in the financial reporting picture.

The four principal statutes

administered by the Commission are the Securities Act of 1933, the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.

The SEC exercises

its authority over financial statements filed with it by the issuance of

regulations, Commission rulings and Accounting Series Releases.

The Commission consistently has taken the following positions:

o

Management has the primary responsibility for their

financial statements.
o

The independent auditor's opinion is necessary as
a check on management's accounting.

o

The Commission's review of financial statements

accompanying filings with it, may require changes
but is not intended to add authenticity to the financial
statements.

o

It would not be in the public interest for the Commission
to undertake extensive accounting rule making and the
accounting profession should take the lead in the

development of improved accounting principles and
reporting standards.

The Commission has had a very considerable influence in the
improvement of reporting standards since its creation.

One factor in

this gain is the many informal decisions of the Chief Accountant's office
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concerning their review of financial reports filed with the Commission.

There are those who decry the fact that most of these decisions have
never been reduced to writing and codified.

Possibly the Chief

Accountant feels that this would have inhibited his office to some extent.
At present, these decisions are communicated throughout the accounting

profession somewhat on a "grapevine" basis.

Regulatory Authorities

A number of industries are so vested with the public interest
that they have been subjected to regulation by Federal or state commissions.

Where monopolistic or near monopolistic conditions exist (electricity,

gas, communications, transportation, etc. ) the authorities have the
power to approve rates to be charged for services.

Where the public's

concern rests mainly in financial stability (banking, insurance, etc. ) the
authorities have the power to prescribe capital, reserve and liquidity
safeguards.

Both types of authorities have been granted the power to prescribe
accounting procedures and the exercise of this power has had considerable

effect on accounting in these industries.

However, the authorities have

been prone to use accounting to accomplish their regulatory ends and
the development of generally accepted accounting principles for broader

stockholder reporting has been hampered rather than aided in a number

of instances.
In the last several years many of the regulatory authorities

have become more aware of and involved in the efforts of the Accounting
Principles Board. This is welcomed, as a better understanding of the
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differences between special regulatory accounting and stockholder

accounting must, in the long run, bring improvement to both.
Stock Exchanges
The New York Stock Exchange participated with the accounting
profession in the early 1930’s in establishing the foundation for generally

accepted accounting principles.

2

At about that time the Securities and

Exchange Commission was created and they rather than the Exchange
became the arbiters on the question of what constituted reasonable
disclosure.3

However, the Exchanges have continued to exert an influence

in the development of improved financial reporting by their:
o

Listing requirements,

o

Continuous review of annual and interim reports of

listed companies,
o

Recommendations to listed companies that they follow

promulgations of the accounting profession.
Other Influences

There are, of course, many other sources of influence in the

process of improving standards of financial reporting, i. e. the
pronouncements of other professional societies and industry or trade
organizations, written views of individuals and the impact of income
tax statutes, to name a new.

The new Cost Accounting Standards Board, created under an

amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950, will exert an influence
on reporting standards, particularly in the defense industries.

7

However,
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it is too early to predict with any certainty the role that it will play in

the establishment of generally accepted accounting principles.

THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION’S EFFORT
Broad Effort

The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has

been very active in its efforts to improve financial reporting for more
than four decades.

o

For example:

A Committee on Accounting Procedure issued fifty-one
Accounting Research Bulletins and four Accounting

Terminology Bulletins until its demise in 1959.

o

Its successor, The Accounting Principles Board, has
issued twenty-one Opinions and four Statements since
then.

o

An Auditing Procedure Committee has issued forty-six

Statements on Auditing Procedures to date.
o

These are only two of about one hundred and ten
committees of the AICPA all of which are dedicated to

increasing the proficiency of the accounting profession.

The bulk of this effort concerns, directly or indirectly,
the improvement of financial reporting and the auditor's

role in attesting to the fairness of financial statements.
For example it includes extensive staff training and

professional development programs, a code of
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professional ethics to govern actions of its members,
practice review procedures to encourage compliance

with accounting and auditing standards, a consultation
service to assist members with difficult technical

questions on a timely basis, etc.

o

The AICPA has a permanent staff of approximately
330, that includes a sizeable number who possess

excellent technical backgrounds and its current total

budget exceeds $11,000, 000.

THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD

Origin and Authority

There was a belief by a number of leaders in the profession in
the late 1950's that:

o

There had to be a greater commitment by the Institute

toward the improvement of financial reporting, and
o

The promulgation of improved accounting principles

had to be changed from a "piecemeal" effort of solving
immediate problems to an effort, based on research,
that would develop an integrated, consistent and

comprehensive set of basic principles in support of
improved procedures.
Council of the AICPA approved the APB's Charter in early 1959,
stating the Board's authority as follows:
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"The Board shall have the authority and the duty to

issue, in its own name, pronouncements on accounting
principles.

It may, in its discretion, revise or

revoke, in whole or in part, or issue interpretive
statements as to any pronouncements previously issued. ”

Nature and General Purpose
Also covered in the Board’s Charter was the following concerning
the nature of the Board’s pronouncements:

"Such pronouncements are expected to comprehend basic
postulates, broad principles, and rules or other guides
for the application of accounting principles in specific

situations, such rules or other guides being developed
in relation to basic postulates and broad principles

previously expressed.

They are to be based on what

the Board determines to be adequate research and are
expected to be regarded as authoritative written
expressions of generally accepted accounting principles. "

Further, one of the basic purposes of the APB was incorporated
in the Charter and reads:

"The general purpose of the Institute in the field of

financial accounting should be to advance the written
expression of what constitutes generally accepted

accounting principles, for the guidance of its members

and of others.

This means something more than a

survey of existing practice.
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It means continuing

effort to determine appropriate practice and to
narrow the areas of difference and inconsistency

in practice.

In accomplishing this, reliance should

be placed on persuasion rather than on compulsion.
The Institute, however, can, and it should, take

definite steps to lead thinking on unsettled and

controversial issues. ”
Early History

The Board held its first meeting in September 1959, amid great

expectations and with the enthusiastic backing of most of the profession.

How could it help but succeed?
on the Board.

Top partners of the largest firms were

Both industry and the academic world were represented.

Funds were available for research and staff support.

The two-thirds

majority vote requirement would force careful consideration until the best

solutions were reached and would assure more solid support in practice

for its opinions.
And then--------- nothing seemed to happen.

not unusual.

However, this was

As in any drastic overhaul of procedures, interruption of

visible progress was inevitable.

The Board had to establish operating

procedures and had to initiate specific research studies.

A Challenge

Then, two years later, came a change in the Federal income
tax law, a reduction in tax based on facilities acquired.

The purpose

of the tax act was to encourage expansion of industrial capacity.

It

required a quick answer by the Board and the Board found itself split
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between:

(b)

(a)

immediate reflection of the tax savings in income and

reflection of the benefits over the life of the assets on which the

tax reduction was based.
After bitter debate, the Board approved the latter by a bare
two-thirds majority.

The largest CPA firms were split and three of

the dissenting firms decided to defy the majority and go their own way.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, noting the difference of

opinion in practice and under heavy pressure from industry and the

Administrative Branch of the Federal Government, decided to accept
both methods.

Two procedures, alternatives, were born for absolutely

identical situations; obviously only one should have survived.

This event had far greater impact than the birth of a relatively
minor alternative.

o

The profession was forced to examine the proposition
that the Board's opinions should gain force through

persuasion and gradual acceptance, as provided in
the Charter.

The alternative was to provide for some

sort of compulsion and this was abhorrent to most.
o

The investment credit battle demonstrated to the news

media that accounting principles could be newsworthy.
They haven’t forgotten it since.

o

Also, industry began to realize that the APB would be

influencing their financial statements in the future.
Up to this point they had taken little note of the Board's

existence; the Investment Credit Opinion was only the

second Opinion issued.
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The challenge to the authority of APB Opinions, brought on
by the investment credit, simmered for two years and came to a head

in 1964.

Disclosure of Departures from Opinions
A three-day debate by the AICPA's Council led to adoption

in October 1964 of a Special Bulletin
Opinions of the APB.

4

dealing with departures from

This stated, in part, as follows:

"If an accounting principle that differs materially in its

effect from one accepted in an Opinion of the Accounting
Principles Board is applied in financial statements, the
reporting member must decide whether the principle has

substantial authoritative support and is applicable in the
circumstances.

a.

If he concludes that it does not, he would either qualify

his opinion, disclaim an opinion, or give an adverse
opinion as appropriate.

Requirements for handling

these situations in the reports of members are set

forth and in the Code of Professional Ethics and need
no further implementation.
b.

If he concludes that it does have substantial authoritative

support:
1)

he would give an unqualified opinion and

2)

disclose the fact of departure from the Opinion
in a separate paragraph in his report or see that

it is disclosed in a footnote to the financial
statements. "
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The Special Bulletin also concluded that for the immediate

future the failure to disclose a material departure from an APB Opinion
would be deemed to be substandard reporting rather than a violation of

the Institute’s Code of Ethics.

This Bulletin, and the controversy that led to it, has had a
salutory effect.

All firms seem to have committed themselves to follow

Board Opinions and I know of no instance where disclosure of departures

have had to be made.
Present Organization

The Board today has 18 members each of whom is a member
of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, two are

academicians, one is a financial analyst, one is from industry and the

balance are in public accounting practice.

Written approval by at least

two-thirds of the members is required before a pronouncement may be

published.

The Board operates under:

o A charter, which was revised by vote of the AICPA’s Council

in 1969 and
o

Written operating policies, which can be changed by majority
vote of the APB, subject to approval by the AICPA's Board
of Directors.

Adapting to Change

The Board has had to make a number of changes in its operating
methods to cope with changed conditions and an ever-increasing work

load.

I will cover them briefly.
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1.

Committee Operations
At first, Opinions were developed by the full Board.

Now they are developed by small, 3 to 5 man committees
of the Board.

This permits a heavier concentration by a

few and the concurrent development of several Opinions.

However, it has resulted in a much heavier work load

for Board members as each generally is on 4 to 6
committees.

Recently non-Board members have been placed on
committees so that members’ time can be spread further.

2.

Advisors

A majority of members have involved partners as advisors.
Advisors:

(a) attend both full Board meetings and committee

meetings with or for members, (b) help with the mountain
of homework that must be done between meetings, and

(c) as noted above are members in their own right on some
committees.
Many Board members have involved additional partners
and professional staff from their firms on numerous Board

projects, particularly when they are committee chairmen.

3.

Opinion Development Procedures
The use of carefully developed point outlines and questionnaires
was initiated about five years ago.

They help identify the

more important facets of each project and facilitate meaningful
discussions by committees, the full Board, and others outside

the Board, who provide input to the Board's deliberations.
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4.

Stepped-Up Pace

There has been an ever-increasing tempo in the Board's

activities.

In the initial years the Board met 2 to 3 times

per year for 1 or 2 days each.

This increased soon to 5

or 6 times per year for 2 or 2-1/2 days each.

For the

past several years the Board held 8 meetings per year,

a number of which lasted 4 full days.

scheduled for 1971.

Nine meetings are

Many days have started at 8:00 a. m.

and finished at 7:00 p. m. and one went to 10:30 p. m.
5.

Increased Staff Support
Initial staff support, 12 years ago, consisted of 2 men in
research.

Today this has been increased to:

o

6 Professional and 4 clerical staff in research.

o

5 Professional and 3 clerical staff in

administrative support.
Included in this support is one staff member who is
engaged in writing unofficial interpretations of Opinions.
6.

Involvement of Other Groups and Organizations

As the result of a program started several years ago, the
Board has been able to involve other organizations to a

much greater degree in its deliberations.
a.

For example:

The Financial Executive Institute (FEI),

representing the top financial executives in
industry, has a Committee on Corporate

Financial Reporting that is somewhat

comparable to the APB.
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They have appointed
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subcommittees that parallel APB committees
on each project in which they are interested

and liaison between committees is established
early in the development of an Opinion.

This

cooperative effort has worked well on some
projects and not as well on others.

b.

The Financial Analyst Federation (representing

stockholder users of financial statements) and

the Robert Morris Associates (representing the

credit grantor users of financial statements)
have structured themselves somewhat similarly

to the FEI.
c.

Other groups such as National Association of
Accountants (NAA - the accountants in industry),
the American Accounting Association (the

educators), the Investment Bankers Association
(the underwriters), the stock exchanges, the

American Bar Association, the American Bankers
Association, the American Petroleum Institute

and many other trade or industry associations,
have expressed a keen interest in the work of the
Board, and want - in varying degrees - to be part

of the effort.
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d.

The SEC has always been directly interested
in the Board’s deliberations and there has been

continuing close cooperation with them at
many levels.
e.

These interested organizations are receiving

APB committee point outlines and questionnaires,

used in developing the foundations for Opinions,

and their answers and viewpoints are being
considered along with those of Board members.

f.

Conferences or symposiums of representatives
of these organizations have been held during the

development of Opinions.

While the interplay of

divergent ideas and viewpoints has been helpful to
each group in understanding the problems of the

others, it was felt that these meetings were not
broad based enough.

The Board has now turned

to public hearings in which any interested individual
or group may participate.

g.

The Planning Committee of the APB has met

periodically with its counterpart of the FEI, the
NAA and the Financial Analyst Federation to discuss

the effectiveness of lines of communications and
other problems of mutual interest.

- 18 -

h.

Several of the groups including the FEI and NAA

have initiated research on areas under Board
consideration.
i.

Each organization has expressed a desire to be

heard at an early stage in the deliberations and
APB Committees are trying to accommodate them.

Most of these organizations are constructively
critical but helpful during the period that Opinions
are being developed.

Some, however, turn to

lobbying once an Opinion is exposed and go to

considerable lengths to put pressure on the Board.

7.

Changed Nature of the Board

The Board, as conceived, was a private, rather judicial arm
of the AICPA.

It has grown into a quasi public (though still

just as closely identified with the AICPA) legislative-like
body.

This has its effect on the pronouncements, though

it is believed that the net result will be an improvement
in quality.

Current Problems
If the above sounds like I was pleased with the organization and

the results, while I was the Board’s chairman, I was not.

Our output of

Opinions, was painfully slow, although the pace has quickened in the last

12 months after Opinions 16 and 17 were issued.
specific problem areas, as I see them.
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1.

Research

The Board has never been able to realize as much support
from the research studies as was initially expected.

answers to knotty problems just do not roll forth.

Ready

Possibly

the initial expectations were unrealistic.

The research studies that have been started, whether they
were assigned in-house, to CPA firms or to academicians,

all have taken much longer than originally planned.

This

has forced changes in long range scheduling and has meant,

in some instances, the development of Opinions before the

benefit of complete research was at hand.
I am not being as critical of the AICPA’s Research Division

as it may sound.

They, particularly the director, have been

of invaluable help in developing, writing and rewriting a

number of Opinions and Board Statements.

Filling the

Board's needs in this area has delayed, of course, progress

in their regular work.

The APB has recommended to the AICPA's Board of Directors
that consideration be given to a greater commitment of funds

and manpower, including:
o

Increasing the full-time paid staff.

o

Borrowing experienced men from accounting
firms and industry for one or two year terms.

o

Greater use of researchers in the academic field

for the more theoretical studies.
o

Financial support from outside the profession.
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2.

Board Manpower
I don't believe that much more time can be wrung from the

APB's members.

point now.

a.

They probably are close to the breaking

Several suggestions have been made.

Increase in membership.

An increase in membership

would increase the total capacity of Board committees,

which represents its capacity to develop Opinions.

Personally, I would like to see the use of an associate,
non-voting membership which would be available to

qualified CPAs who could afford to contribute as

much time as full members.

This would afford

increased capacity in the APB and would broaden
the number of firms directly involved.

It would

permit the involvement of all large firms without

the necessity of granting permanent voting privileges.
b.

Drafting talent.

members.

Much of the drafting is done by Board

Some make good authors but others do not.

Writing styles are different.

AICPA staff drafting

talent needs to be increased and more is being
sought; however, this skill is not easily found.

c.

Full time, paid Board.

Several critics have suggested

that a change be made to a 5 to 7 man full time, paid
Board.

I personally do not favor this for a number

of reasons, the most important of which is the

possibility of lack of involvement and continued
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commitment by firms handling publicly held clients.

In that event a serious question would exist about
the general acceptability of its pronouncements.

A

full time, paid Board would not increase the overall

manpower, as the present Board logs well in excess

of 5 to 7 man years per year; but it would materially

increase costs.

Further, the manner of selection

of members would be of concern to prevent "packing
the court", particularly if a simple majority vote

were permitted.

d.

Full time paid Board Chairman.

A full time, paid

Board Chairman was discussed by the full Board

and has been recommended to the AICPA's Board
of Directors, if the right man can be found.

This

might represent a first experimental step towards
a full time, paid Board.

It also might enable the

Board to operate without loss of momentum during
a period of organizational transition.

3.

Board's Voting Rule
As Chairman, I found the two-thirds majority voting requirement

to be most vexing.

Our present age of challenge and dissent

seemed to rub off on the members just enough to result in many

11 to 7 votes.

It did not matter that the dissenters were on

completely opposite sides; some of them wanting to go further
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than the proposed positions, while the balance of the

dissenters wanted less.
The two-thirds rule, I am sure, was designed as a safety
factor to force continued consideration of each matter until

a substantial majority were sure that the best solution had

been found.

This has been the result in some cases.

In

other cases, it has forced compromises that leave very
few completely satisfied and which represented poorer

answers, at least from the standpoint of the majority.
This was the case in the long, drawn out battle on the

Business Combinations Opinion, where the voting rule
linked with the absolute need for improvement - forced
the final compromise position.

Contrary to popular

belief, it was not outside pressures that carried the day
for the pro-poolers.
While the effect of the voting rule on the quality of the
Opinions is of greater importance, a by-product of the

rule is to increase very substantially the time it takes

to issue Opinions.

4.

Quality of Opinions
The APB has been criticized for writing cookbook Opinions

by some, and for not including enough guidelines by others.
While these two criticisms sound contradictory, probably
both are legitimate to a degree.
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I believe the Opinions will continue to appear complicated,
although some simplification will be possible.

Procedures

for covering many Opinion details in unofficial interpretations

have been worked out in the Board's Administrative
Director's office.

The first attempt in this area was a

pamphlet of 100 interpretations of the Earnings Per Share
Opinion.

Accumulation and publication caused delay, so

the unofficial interpretations of the Business Combinations

and Intangible Assets Opinions are being issued on a
piecemeal basis.

When reasonably perfected, the unofficial

interpretations are included in the printed, codified loose-

leaf service along with the Opinions and Statements.
Many believe that the lengthy written dissents by individual
members of the Board detract from the Opinions and are a

disservice to the profession.

A majority of the APB

members do not favor eliminating the dissents.

However,

I hope that this matter will continue to be studied and that

dissents can be eliminated eventually.

Possibly they can

be carefully drafted and made part of the unpublished, but
public records of the Board.

5.

Need for Quick Decisions

The Board was conceived and created to develop Opinions

deliberately, generally after research, with public exposure
and under definite rules for balloting.
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There just is nothing
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hasty about this process.

However, because the profession

has taken the lead in developing improved standards of
financial reporting, the APB is finding it increasingly

necessary to consider emergency action.

Both the SEC

and stock exchanges check the APB’s attitude towards a

practice they believe objectionable, particularly when

they know the practice is under current study by the Board.

These emergencies usually are fielded initially by the

Institute's Executive Vice President.

It would be easy to

tell the SEC or the stock exchanges that the Board should
not be solving their current review problems.

However,

their requests are legitimate attempts to cooperate with
the profession in its effort to establish improved
standards.

Several procedures have been used to cope with the need
for relatively quick decisions:

o

The unofficial accounting interpretations referred
to earlier.

o

On a number of occasions, the matter for decision
was already under consideration by an AICPA
industry or audit guide committee.

If that

committee had reached a conclusion on the matter
in question, its position was then reviewed quickly
but unofficially by all or a majority of APB

members.

The APB chairman then has permitted
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the publication of that committee’s position.

This

procedure does not represent an APB pronouncement
but does afford sufficient authoritative support for

the SEC.
o

On two occasions, articles in the Journal of

Accountancy have been reviewed in advance, again
unofficially, by a majority of APB members and
an understanding established that the SEC and the
profession would follow the method or principles

prescribed in the Journal article.
None of these methods fully solves the problem and the study

must continue.

6.

Early Warning System

Board members are asked periodically for a list of developing

problems they think the APB should be considering.

This

should act as an early warning system but it has not been too
effective.

In other words, a better system is needed for

spotting trouble areas well before they are introduced in the
financial press.

This should not be too difficult as firms of

the APB members audit the great majority of publicly-held

clients.

7.

Appearance of Independence

The 18 month struggle with Business Combinations and its
final conclusion have subjected the Board to the criticism
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that it was too responsive to the wishes of management.

Some

elements of management, however, have been equally critical

that the Board was not sufficiently responsive to their
expressed viewpoints.

From my personal experience, I

reject flatly both criticisms as being completely groundless.

I appreciate that the "appearance of independence” is another

matter, although I recommend strongly against making any
changes solely for appearance sake.
Some Personal Conclusions

There is no question that continued improvement in financial
reporting is needed and will be accomplished, if not by an arm of the
private sector, then by some agency or board of the government.

There

is also no question in my mind that the initiative should stay in private
hands.

To accomplish this, there are two basic prerequisites:

o

There must be general acceptance of the changes
that are promulgated, and

o

There must be some method of enforcement.

At the present time, the APB strives for general acceptance through:

(a) close cooperation with other organizations whose interest in accounting
principles is just as great as theirs and (b) its structure which provides
broad representation to firms who handle the bulk of publicly-held opinion

work.

Hopefully, sound Opinions will be the product of the Board's semi

public, legislative-like procedures.
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The enforcement factor is a tenuous linking of the Accounting

Profession’s discipline, which binds practicing public accountants to
its official pronouncements, and the insistence of the SEC and the
stock exchanges for clean opinion audit reports.

At the moment, I

can see no substitute for this in the private sector and, therefore,
believe that the Board should stay under the control of the AICPA.

One further observation - the APB is currently moving at
the fastest pace in its history and has just issued its fourth Opinion
in 8 months.

It has at least 13 additional projects on its current agenda

in varying degrees of development.

Also, there are 10 research

projects scheduled for publication in the next 3 years.

While most

critics want faster action, there is a limit as to how fast the preparers

of financial statements can safely absorb intricate changes in accounting

principles.

I hope that recommendations of the Wheat Study Group

will assure that this momentum be maintained.

THE CURRENT STUDIES
Accounting Principles Study Group

The Wheat Study Group has set public hearings for November 3

and 4, 1971 in New York City.

I urge all with constructive suggestions

on how accounting principles should be established, regardless of the

thrust of their suggestions, to pass them on to the Study Group.

Also,

I would urge all to place their confidence in the Group and to accept and

support their final recommendations, whether they are in accordance
with or contrary to our personal or firm's views.
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Accounting Objectives Study Group
The Trueblood Study Group has asked for written presentations
by December 31, 1971 on the objectives or functions of financial

statements and general or specific recommendations for their

improvement.

While this project may not seem as spectacular as

the other, I believe it is the more difficult and for the long run may

be the more important.

Again, all who can, should contribute to this

effort.
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1

Paul Grady, "Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles for Business Enterprises, " Accounting

Research Study No. 7 (American Institute of Certified

Public Accountants, 1965).

2

Audits of Corporate Accounts, Correspondence between the
Special Committee on Co-operation with Stock Exchanges

of the American Institute of Accountants and the Committee
on Stock List of the New York Stock Exchange (American

Institute of Accountants, 1934).

3

George O. May, Financial Accounting (Macmillan, 1943),
p. 257.

4

Disclosure of Departures from Opinions of Accounting
Principles Board (American Institute of Certified Public

Accountants, 1964).
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Corporate Accountability Research Group
1832 M STREET, N. W. - SUITE 101
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
(202) 633-3931

The Accounting Profession provides a vital service.

Accountants interpret, translate, and communicate to the
public the financial state of a corporation. Investors,

creditors, government regulators, and the public as a
whole rely oh certified financial statements. In return

for this reliance, the profession must be responsive to

the public interest.
The Corporate Accountability Research Group would like

to present four challenges to the Accounting Profession.
In brief:

1. A greater degree of accounting uniformity
must be strived for so that certified
financial statements will be comparable and
thereby useful.
2. Accountants must regain their independence,
even if this requires accounting firms to
divest themselves of their management
consultant divisions.
3. Accountants must accept responsibility for
their work.

4. Accountants must take a leadership role
in Innovating for the public good.
I

The debate between uniformity and flexibility has been

raging for decades within the accounting profession. Which

ever side an accountant might take, he must accept the
conclusion that without uniformity of accounting procedures,

financial statements of different companies will not be
comparable. Without comparability, no investor will be able
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to make wise investment decisions, no creditor will be able

to gauge the credit worthiness of a corporation, and government
regulators will find it impossible to compile meaningful

aggregate data.

Therefore, if financial statements are to be of use,
some greater uniformity of accounting procedures is in order.
If uniformity is not feasible on an across-the-board basis,

the AICPA must at least require firms within the same Industry
to adhere to uniform procedures. Industrial classification

could be based on the Standard Industrial Classifications

or some refinement thereof. If an individual company objected
to its assigned classification, it could appeal to the APB.
II
The courts have held that an accountant’s principal

loyalty is to the public, not to the company which hires

him.
An observer of the profession is forced to ask himself

two questions. First, can an accountant hired by a particular

company’s management be truly Independent? Second, can any
individual who suggests a course of action objectively evaluate
the result of following his own suggestion?

The first question closely relates to the issue of
uniformity. If an accountant is restricted in his choice
of accounting procedures, he cannot succumb to management

pressure to choose a procedure that, although generally
acceptable, will deceive those who will rely on the certified
state
ment.
2
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The second question relates to the present state of affairs,
where all the large accounting firms, and several others, offer

management consulting advice as well accounting services.
The consulting advice is not restricted to suggestions relating
to accounting systems.

A potential conflict of interest situation occurs

when one is asked to evaluate the results of one's own work.

Yet this is what happens when the CPA firm which gave a
company advice is called on to certify statements reflecting

what happened when its adviced was followed. The present

lack of available and disclosed information makes it impossible

to analyze whether potential conflicts of interest have become
actual conflicts of interest. If the AICPA is to perform its

public role, it must not refuse to exercise jurisdiction
over the consulting divisions of accounting firms. In exercising

this jurisdiction, the AICPA should:

1. Require accounting firms to disclose the
names of those clients to whom they give
consulting advice.

2. Flake routine examinations of those companies
who use the same CPA firm for consulting and
accounting services, to ascertain whether the
financial statements of those companies are
in any way Influenced by the fact that the
CPA firm evaluating the companies’ performance
was the same firm that suggested the course of action.
III

The trend in the past few years has been for the accounting
profession to try to restrict the areas where an accountants
can be held liable. The AICPA disclaimed liability
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because an accountant’s work was performed in accordance with

generally accepted accounting principles, despite the fact
that the work was misleading to reasonably prudent men.

In the short run, it seems wise from an accountant’s point
of view to cover himself, always knowing that as long as he

chooses from among the many generally accepted accounting

principles, he is free from potential liability.
In the long run, however, from the public’s and the accounting

profession’s point of view, accepting liability is the better
approach. If an accountant knows he will be held accountable,
his own professional standards will be foremost in his mind
during every assignment. Should an accountant be asked by

management to present a misleading financial picture, he can
assert his own potential liability as an impartial reason for

refusing the request.
IV

Accountants are privy to the financial goings on of the

large corporations, the very corporations which today have
such an enormous impact on the communities in which they exist.

Consequently, the accounting profession is in an unparalleled
position to take a leadership role to innovate for the public

good. Specific ways the profession can Innovate include:

1. Developing new interpretive indices to analyze
the social costs of corporate action. For instance,
what is the cost in terms of lives in failing
to implement safety features in cars, and what is
the cost in terms of health in falling to curb
pollution?
2. Joining in the fight for greater corporate disclosureby advocating greater detail in product line
e.g.
reporting.
- 4 -
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3.Serving as an Ombudsman to encourage corporate
honesty. Accountants can attempt to curb fraudulent
practices before they have a chance to hurt innocent
consumers.

The ways the accounting profession can innovate to serve

the public are innumerable - accept the challenges.

5 -
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STATEMENT BEFORE THE STUDY GROUP ON
ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

Philip L. Defliese
Chairman
Accounting Principles Board, and
Managing Partner
Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery

November 4,1971
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Statement Before the Study Group on Establishment of
Accounting Principles (chairman, Francis M. Wheat) of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, on
November 4, 1971, in New York City.

The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be
attributed to his firm, the AICPA, or the Accounting Principles Board.
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In its 1 2-year history the Accounting Principles Board (APB)
has produced four Statements, 21 Opinions, and a thousand
critics. Criticism of operations of the Board comes from
many sources. Too often, perhaps, the criticism veers from a
constructive to a superficial base. Even within our own pro
fession we hear some strident cries of a few who wax vocal
whenever their pet theories are rejected — or their viewpoints
fail to withstand the two-thirds vote of the Board.
I am happy today to set the record straight, as I see
it, since, in all hearings of this nature, those not seeking
radical changes rarely come forward.
I think it essential that this study group examine the
current status and operations of the APB, and the promise
they hold for the future, rather than to concentrate on the
past. The APB has had a tumultuous history in its short 12
years; it has dallied, procrastinated, erred, and even reversed
itself. But, in all of this, it has achieved maturity through
experience.
It would be foolhardy, indeed, to dismantle a
machine that is now coming into its own. Further improve
ments are, of course, necessary and will be made unless the
present forward thrust is seriously interrupted.

THE PRESENT

Both the responsibilities of the public accounting profession
to the American investing public and the need for improving
financial reporting to fulfill that obligation are well docu
mented. Although the American investing public is the best
informed, much still needs to be accomplished in the area of
standardizing and restructuring the accounting principles

1
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upon which our capital markets must depend. In this respect
I am in agreement with much of what has been said at these
hearings. I am convinced, however, that the present APB — or
a simple modification of it — is the best vehicle for the task.
The reason is simply that the Opinions of the Accounting
Principles Board and the monthly Interpretations now pub
lished under its aegis are generally accepted and followed by
business, the SEC, and the profession.

This is because the Board includes representatives
from all the major accounting firms and most other large
firms, and these practitioners operate with a sense of dedica
tion and objectivity that cannot be surpassed. By virtue of
their involvement, their firms in recent years have naturally
committed themselves to adherence. Despite threats to the
contrary, recent Opinions have not been judicially chal
lenged.

Moreover, the SEC has indicated publicly — and
proven in practice — that it will support the Opinions and
Interpretations. This has not always been the case, but has
come about in recent years only because the Board has
demonstrated its ability to cope with the issues. For many
years the SEC was critical of the Board’s reluctance to move
rapidly or even adequately. In those years the Commission
went so far as to threaten to exercise its legislative right to set
accounting principles. It must be remembered that the ulti
mate authority for establishing accounting principles for
most publicly held companies does rest with the SEC. The
Commission has in effect delegated this authority to the APB
(with some strings attached), and I believe that it is satisfied
that the Board is now moving along rapidly enough to merit
that delegation.
Also, the financial executives of this country — no
matter how much they may disagree — consider the Opinions
and Interpretations as generally accepted and adhere to them.

2
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They know that the SEC is backing the Board, and they now
have reason to be confident that the Opinions will neither be
far out nor incapable of reasonable implementation.

Finally, the publishing of Opinions and Interpreta
tions is no longer inordinately delayed. The Interpretations,
although they are American Institute publications, frequently
receive the attention of the full Board. These are issued on a
timely basis, and give prompt assurance that practices will
not diverge. The procedure assures quick answers to knotty
questions. In a business environment that is becoming more
complex and innovative daily, this promptness is essential.

THE PROBLEM
What, then, is the problem? Some critics, particularly
financial analysts, refer to the accounting transgressions that
occur through the use of allegedly liberal (vs. conservative)
principles. They do, however, concede for the most part that
the disclosures are such that they can spot these and adjust.
Some analysts consider it more important to expand and
improve disclosures than to create rigid conformity. Of
course, this is not good enough for the typical investor, and
financial reporting needs our attention even if, in some cases,
we must become somewhat arbitrary in establishing greater
uniformity.

In my view, much of the furor about accounting prin
ciples and the Board’s alleged failures are, in many instances,
the red herrings of publicity-seeking critics that divert atten
tion from other and more serious problems, many of which
are not directly related to accounting principles. Those
problems fall within the purview of the Institute’s auditing
procedure committee, which is trying valiantly to catch up.
For example, many of the “horror” stories of accounting —

3
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those involving lawsuits and accusations of fraud against the
auditors by the SEC — are not as much a matter of account
ing principles as a matter of auditing and reporting standards.
These involve independence of auditors, valuations of re
serves and realizability of assets, material accounting changes
that are not disclosed because they offset, and interpretation
and disclosure of relevant facts regarding transactions. Many
of these are auditing questions, not questions of accounting
principles.

In some instances, the issue may be one of materi
ality. The Board is criticized for not speeding up its study
and issuing an Opinion on this subject. But materiality is
more a matter for the conscience and integrity of the auditor
than pure theory, and no amount of study or opining will
alter that.
I feel that however important criticisms of the ethics
of the profession and the enforcement mechanisms of the
Institute are, they simply have no place in a discussion of the
procedures by which accounting principles should be set.
These are separate issues, and they merit the attention of
those within the Institute who have the responsibility for
dealing with them.

ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC CRITICISMS
Objectives

It is said that the APB has failed to fulfill one of its primary
charges: to develop a Statement of basic objectives and con
cepts of financial statements upon which all Opinions could
rest. (It is generally conceded that the Board is working hard
on the other charge, that of narrowing alternatives.)

4
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In the early years of the Board — soon after the first
research studies — the debates on this subject quickly indi
cated that there was widespread confusion about the con
cepts as they existed vs. what they should be. The urgently
needed brush-fire Opinions got mired in this debate. The vex
ing question was: On which premise should these Opinions
rest? The Business Combinations Opinion was one that
bogged down on this point. The Board committee that was
formed in 1965 to formulate a Statement on future concepts
ultimately decided that it first needed to reach agreement on
present concepts. And so it did. In 1968 another committee
was formed to study future concepts. The latter, headed by a
vocal critic of the Board’s procrastination on this subject,
awaited the results of the first committee’s work and only
recently began to work itself. But agreement on present con
cepts did not come easily. And so far, no one, not even one
of the vocal critics, has come forth with any reasonable,
well-integrated approach to future concepts.
It seems eminently clear that we need to narrow the
alternatives and firmly establish present concepts before we
move into a futuristic approach to accounting. While it is
generally recognized that the historical cost basis of account
ing falls short of presenting economic reality, we cannot
move into an uncharted area without considerable esoteric,
empirical, and implementary research. The underpinnings of
our economic stability cannot be tampered with until the
new foundation is firmly laid. Our recent attempts to give
greater recognition to market values in accounting for
marketable equity security portfolios is ample evidence of
the profound effects such attempts can have.
In the meantime, the APB should continue its efforts
to further the evolution of accounting principles. This can be
done within its structure or through timely special efforts
such as the Trueblood Study Group. The important element
is the assurance of practical implementation before pro
nouncements are made.

5
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Effectiveness
The Board is scored for its long discussions and delay in
issuing Opinions. Arguments are repeated and changed; drafts
and redrafts made. But anyone who has observed this process
cannot help but acknowledge that no matter how time-consuming it may be, it ultimately provides the most work
able answer. I have seen responsible people change their views
radically through this process. The give-and-take debate
among the top technicians of the country produces a far
superior product than that which would result from a quick
vote based on briefs. (Here, again, one should be realistic
enough to expect intemperate criticism from some of the
dissenters.) When a better result is obtainable through reason
able debate, then I am all for it.
The Board is assailed at times for operating too
slowly and at other times taken to task for moving on a
“crash basis.” Again, this “damned if you do and damned if
you don’t” attitude is something that must be accepted and
dealt with. As Truman said, “If you can’t stand the heat, get
out of the kitchen.” When you’re charged with decision
making, the heat is an occupational hazard. Actually, when
time permits, ad hoc committees of other Institute members
are formed to produce a specialized paper or industry guide,
as has been done in the land development and real estate
fields. The results can be implemented with deliberation.
When events create an urgency to move faster, the Interpreta
tion route is taken and the effect immediate, as in the case of
computer leasing. This procedure is a recent development in
the Board’s operations, and many critics have not yet
digested the full significance of it.
Anticipation

It has been said that many of the Opinions involve matters
that have faced the profession for many years, and that the
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Board, by not dealing with the issues earlier, let too many
things get away from them.
This is true. But we are living in an imaginative and
innovative business environment where things change very
fast. Who, for example, could have anticipated some of the
“funny preferreds’’ of the Sixties? During that go-go era we
did not have the mechanism of the “official’’ Interpretations
of the Institute to which the SEC could refer its questions
and problems, as it now does.

Appeals Procedure
It has also been charged that there is absolutely no appeal
from an APB Opinion. In point of fact, in our country there
is an appeal for everyone from anything. Rulings of regula
tory agencies, for example, are constantly being challenged in
the courts. In accounting we" have a built-in appeals
mechanism in the SEC. The SEC, as indicated previously, has
the legislative right and responsibility to set accounting prin
ciples, and it has informally delegated this to the APB. Thus,
appeals from APB Opinions can be made directly to the SEC.
This was done officially once, resulting in the issuance of
Accounting Series Release (ASR) 96, which permitted flowthrough accounting for the investment credit despite APB
Opinion No. 2, which forbade it. However one might feel
about the merits of that issue, he must concede that the
appeal worked. I know, too, of other cases where the SEC
has issued rulings which departed from APB Opinions be
cause of unusual circumstances, and I feel that in most of
these cases the decisions were justified.
Furthermore, rulings of the SEC can be taken to the
courts, although this is rarely done. Nevertheless, the process
is available.

7

861

The Board Members
Much is made of the fact that the Board members are volun
tary, part-time people who, because of their responsibilities
to their firms, cannot devote adequate time to the task. What
is overlooked is that these people, when not attending Board
meetings, are just as deeply involved in Board matters as
anyone could be. By virtue of their positions, these execu
tive practitioners are making decisions hourly on all aspects
of the issues confronting the Board. This hands-on experience
adds a practical dimension to the theoretical, and provides
insight that assures the workability of Opinions. Board
members who take this broader view of their efforts readily
concede that they are, in reality, full-time members.

Independence

Are the Board members pawns of their clients? Are the Big
Eight a united fraternity functioning as an arm of business? A
quick look at the voting records should quickly dispel any
such notions.
Let’s examine the independence question more
closely. When the size test for pooling was being debated, it
was claimed that the Board “backed down’’ because of client
pressure. Of course, clients were outspoken, and they had
every right to be heard. But in this case, the exposure draft
that called for a size test lacked the necessary two-thirds
support when it was published. It was inevitable that it could
not be passed without modifying or eliminating the size test.
As a result of this experience, the Board’s policy now pre
cludes exposure of a draft before it has the necessary vote.
This is probably unfortunate because a trial balloon is some
times needed.

8
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Principles vs. Practices
Some say that the top rule-making authority should limit
itself to formulating broad principles and leave their imple
mentation to a lesser group. One suggestion would require
the senior group to approve pronouncements of the lower
group. This sounds fine — but it won’t work. Under this
system, broad pronouncements would need to be delayed
until it became clear that their implementation was sound,
practical, and feasible. The Board has frequently gone down a
wide path only to back away when it was realized that
practice could not follow. Once the Board unanimously
issued an Opinion embodying a very fine theoretical concept
requiring allocation of the proceeds of convertible debentures
between debt and conversion features, only to rescind it
when the Board found that it was impractical and, in some
instances, produced bizarre results. Since that time the Board
has stressed detailed procedures.

THE DEFECTS OF THE PROPOSALS
Perhaps the most alarming of all the new proposals is that
calling for a small full-time super-Board. This proposal is
categorically unsound.

First, this super-Board implies a politics of selection.
The biases of prominent accountants are pronounced and
well known. Will we have a “Nixon Board’’ or a “Warren
Board,’’ or will we have a “balanced group’’ so that 4-3
decisions will set the future of financial reporting? The con
cept of a small group further implies decisions by an elite. I
would rather have a larger group of the best volunteers — all
peers — so I could rely on the safety of numbers to balance
off the strong biases.
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Second, the small super-Board would slow, rather
than speed, resolution. The small isolated group, withdrawn
from the practice arena and restricted by new administrative
rules, would have more difficulty than the present Board in
obtaining the necessary input. The result would be a need for
expanded hearings and virtual dependence upon the sub
mission of briefs and counterbriefs. Those being “regulated”
by this process would require more opportunities to be
heard. A look at the “speed” of our regulatory bodies and
our courts should be convincing.
Third, it is the participation of all segments of the
profession in the present body that provides an in-depth
democratic support.

Fourth, a small courtlike body does not make for
economies of either time or money. The efforts presently
expended by accounting firms in the rule-making process
would need to be increased in order to monitor the Board’s
activities, prepare formalized briefs, request hearings, see
what others are doing, respond to client requests for briefing,
etc.
Finally, I would prefer that those formulating the
Opinions be deeply involved in day-to-day decision-making.
The crucible of practice is the only test which tempers the
most extreme theorist. And, in accounting, principles and
practice cannot be separated. (The term “generally accepted
accounting principles” has been deemed to include the
methods of applying them.) This has been discussed before. I
have also observed over the years the frequent meta
morphosis of the charged-up theoretician into the pragmatic
practitioner through close association with those Board
members making day-to-day decisions.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

I have said earlier that much still needs to be done to improve
the rule-making function. Here are my recommendations:
Research. A broader research program supporting the
present Board is needed. The emphasis should be on both
empirical and experimental research designed to satisfy the
implementation demands of new Opinions. Researchers re
cruited for a period of from one to two years from the major
firms could augment the present research group. Drafting
assistants are also needed. This follows closely the recom
mendations made by the APB to the Institute’s board of
directors in late 1970.
The chairman. A full-time chairman would be able to moni
tor the research program more closely, be available for meet
ings with interested groups, and generally guide the Board
better than a part-time chairman. Not that the chairman
presently isn’t almost, in fact, full-time; but some of his
APB-related time is devoted to his firm and its clients, a
responsibility he cannot completely shake off. This is not
suggested to indicate that there is the need for him to be
independent of practice; rather it is a matter of concentra
tion. It should be possible to obtain at least one prominent
accountant — at the peak of his career — to accept a full-time
term of three years, with possible renewal. Apart from having
occupied the top technical position in his firm for many
years, he should be a good administrator and leader. This is a
tough combination to find, but I am sure one can be found
every three to six years.
The Board

Size and composition. Because the resolution of an account
ing problem requires complete exposition of all its aspects
and the need to consider all viewpoints, I feel strongly that it
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is undesirable to limit the number of those charged with the
decision-making obligation. Some limitations must of course
be set, as it would be impossible to accommodate an overly
broad spectrum of views that could arise on some issues.
Consequently, I am recommending both a fixed and a flex
ible Board membership, with wide representation, one that
will provide for expansion and contraction, as need dictates.
A frequent criticism from industry is that it is inadequately
represented. I am sympathetic to this complaint.

Permanent membership. I feel the Board should consist of
21 members, rather than the present 18, as follows:
•
•

•
•

•
•

One full-time chairman.
Thirteen practitioners — selected to include people
from the major national firms at all times, the lesser
national firms and the regional firms (on a rotating
basis), and one small firm.
Three CPAs occupying responsible accounting posi
tions in industry.
Two academicians well known for their qualifications
and interest in accounting theory.
One financial analyst.
One investment banker or practicing attorney active
in securities registration work (alternately).

Supplementary membership. When the Board undertakes an
issue that is concentrated in a particular industry or involves
a specialized area requiring an expertise that may not be
found among the regular Board members, the membership
should be temporarily enlarged by the appointment of four
ad hoc members, viz.:

•

12

Two practitioners who are specialists in the area
under study, selected to bring varying views to the
Board.
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•

Two industry accountants drawn from the affected
industry, or who have had similar industry ex
perience, chosen from the related industry or ad hoc
committee, also to bring varying views to the Board.

These four members would join the three permanent
members of the Board designated by the chairman to form a
committee of the Board to oversee research, drafting, hear
ings, discussion, etc., needed to publish an Opinion. For this
purpose, the four added members would be considered as
voting members of the Board.

Qualifications. Most Board members should be CPAs, be
cause many of the discussions and decisions require a pro
found understanding of the technical accounting and auditing
procedures underlying the issues. This might seem to dis
criminate against some highly qualified non-CPAs in industry
and universities, but since their qualifications are more diffi
cult to assess, it had better be played safe. There is an ample
supply of highly qualified CPAs in industry and in univer
sities, so I consider it better to maintain this requirement at
present.
Obviously, the practitioners chosen should be the
best technicians their firms have to offer, with years of
decision-making under their belts. Accounting decisions are
frequently predicated upon a keen comprehension of the
relevant facts and the ability to ferret out those facts. And a
sharp auditing sense is a prerequisite.

Selection. The permanent members of the Board should be
named by a standing committee of the AICPA consisting of
the president of the Institute and the four most recent past
presidents. This would provide for considerable continuity in
the selection group, making possible an in-depth survey of
possible candidates in ample time before selection.
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Nominations should be solicited regularly from all the appro
priate sources, and the candidates for selection should be
investigated and interviewed in order to ascertain their avail
ability, attitude, and competence for the task.

The ad hoc members should be selected by the execu
tive vice president (technical) of the AICPA, with the
approval of the chairman of the APB and president of the
Institute.
Tenure. The present rule providing for a maximum of two
full three-year terms seems appropriate. Interim appoint
ments may sometimes extend a person’s tenure to about
eight years, but this, to me, is the outside limit. In rare
instances, it may be appropriate to re-elect a highly qualified
person who has had maximum tenure after an absence from
the Board of at least one year.

Board operations. In light of the recent record of progress, it
is decidedly preferable that the Board continue operating as
it is at present. The public hearings are developing well and
our procedures are continually improving. (It should be
noted that hearings of some sort or other were begun in
1966.) The “official” Interpretations aid in improving prac
tice although they occasionally take too much of the time of
the full Board. Committee delegation should ease this load
and expedite issuances.

Voting procedures. The present two-thirds rule is a great
safety valve, providing the essential safety in numbers I
referred to earlier. I would not like to see far-reaching
changes in accounting made on the strength of one vote. On
the other hand the two-thirds rule may strengthen the
opposition unduly. I would recommend a 60 percent
approval vote (i.e., 13-8 for a 21-man body; 15-10 for a
25-man body). I would insist on similar proportions for votes
on exposure drafts of proposed Opinions.
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Dissents and qualified assents should not be published
or voters identified. These serve no useful purpose, and just
provide a forum for tirades that are not only frequently
irrelevant and demeaning, but also definite impediments to
progress.
In summary, I believe that the Accounting Principles
Board is a workable vehicle, that it has proven eminently
progressive, and that it offers the financial community and
the American investing public a good chance for bringing
financial reporting up to a new level of dependability. I hope,
in this spirit, that my own recommendations are weighed
fairly and that the basic concept of the Board receives the
support it deserves.
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UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98195

Graduate School of Business Administration
and School of Business Administration
Office of the Dean
October 29, 1971

Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles
c/o Mr. Michael A. Pinto, CPA
American Institute of CPAs
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Dear Sirs:

It was my privilege recently to become acquainted with a memorandum which Mr. A. Carl
Tietjen addressed to you under date of October 7, 1971. Mr. Tietjen is a Partner in
Price Waterhouse in New York.
Having given considerable thought to the mode by which accounting principles are
currently established in the United States, I have developed a strong conviction
that the present approach of the APB is disaster bound because of its ever-increasing
reliance on mechanistic technicalities rather than broad issues of philosophies and
standards. I feel very strongly that prudent-men-type of standards are required
before procedural details should be worked out and that the former is presently
missing from our professional machinery. Hence I find myself in complete agreement
with the statement submitted by Mr. Tietjen and would like to urge you as strongly
as I can to give this statement your most careful attention and consideration.

Gerhard G. Mueller
Professor and Chairman

GGM:sc
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AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

J. FRANK FORSTER
Chairman

November 2, 1971

Mr. Francis M. Wheat
Chairman, Study on Establishment
of Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr. Wheat:
I would like to emphasize the need for the
creation of an Advisory Committee of top corporate
management to the Accounting Principles Board as
outlined in the presentation by the Machinery and
Allied Products Institute. May I address myself only
to that portion of the memorandum of pertinent questions
pertaining to the composition of a non-governmental
standards board and the method of operations of such
a board.
The actual membership should be composed of
highly qualified professional accountants. While their
experience may have been derived from time spent in
government, in business or the profession, present
affiliation should not demand a stance that represents
their employer's point of view.

The study bears on the development of accounting
standards but this only relates in a narrow sense to
the broader problem of its contribution to the
preservation of the free enterprise system. The
increased interest of stockholders, security analysts,
administrators of the federal security acts and the
enlargement of public interest makes it highly
important that the growing public cynicism toward
financial accounting cannot become a serious weapon
in the hands of those that wish to attack the present
system.
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November 2, 1971

In general, most of the abuse has been generated
and a great deal of the controversy has arisen because
of the particular self-interest of a sector that has
used flexible accounting practices to foster short-term
expedients. The solicitation of views on "exposure
draft” of APB Opinions necessarily reflect the views of
the specific interest of financial executives, analysts
and others but generally there is a cross section of
views that pertain to a particular self-interest.
The question remains as to how to best obtain a broad,
unbiased and long-term view. So often the financial
executive does not have the freedom to comment broadly
if the viewpoint is divergent from his own company’s
specific interest.

I share the belief that only the chief executive
officer sees the enterprise in its entirety thus
enabling him to discern and assess the impact of APB
Opinions on a business enterprise as a whole.
This suggests that, beside the criticism that
is being directed against public accounting firms,
there are similar movements against Directors. The
trend toward audit committees of the Board of Directors
suggests that an additional qualification of an
Advisory Board member might be experience on a Board
of Directors of companies other than his own.

JFF:dl
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TO:

STUDY ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

FROM:

FINANCIAL ANALYSTS FEDERATION

Establishing Accounting Principles

- Scope

The need for defining principles has obviously been recognized
with the establishment of the Trueblood Committee.
There has
been a virtual failure of the existing institutional structure.
It is our opinion that the most important function of any group
charged with establishing accounting standards is to set an
explicitly defined body of accounting principles.
The contin
uous drafting of rules to cover leaks in the system is not only
time-consuming but seems to be self-destructing.
Some unify
ing concepts such as fair value, matching of income and taxes
appear more fruitful than the present patching of the. opinions,
guides and accepted practice.

2.

Governmental or Non-Governmental Body

The responsibility of establishing standards should only in
directly be a governmental function.
The cooperation between
an accounting standard-setting group and the SEC should be made
more explicit.
Through SEC adoption of rules, these will be
come part of securities law, so that there is no question as
to the authority and effectiveness of the opinion.
The stan
dard or principle setting procedure should remain private but
intimately interwoven with the SEC practice.
The relationship
with the SEC should be formalized in some fashion by law, if
necessary.
3.

Composition of the Board
The board should be highly competent professionals with fulltime, limited tenure of perhaps two or three years.
The number
of people should be adequate to perform the task of setting up
a body of principles.
The group should have a permanent staff
of research people of high caliber training and ability with
economic, financial, statistical as well as accounting back
grounds.
These do not necessarily have to be CPA’s.
In addi
tion the Board should have the right to commission research
input from outside the organization.
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Method of Operation
The operation of the Board should emphasize participation by
interested parties.
The circulation of exposure drafts at very
early stages of the decision process would be helpful for
participants.
The vote on all questions should be a majority
of the Board.
The two-thirds rule has been limiting.

The Board needs a procedure to publicize a coming action or to
alert accountants and clients to dissatisfaction with current
practice.
An informal procedure appears universally required.
The present procedure is cumbersome and time-consuming.
Some
method must be devised so that all are aware that a specific
practice is misleading and violates the basic body of principles,
before it becomes ingrained in annual reports.
Change then be
comes too painful and is fought vigorously.
If the interested
parties are notified at early stages that a specific treatment
is likely to be banned or altered, then we would prevent the
development of vested interests in poor accounting practice.

An appeal procedure is vital for the working of any system to
alert a board to changes in the economy - national, international,
sociological, as well as technological.
These should be published
with the testimony, supporting data, and decision.

5.

Payment for Research

Accounting research should be financed by the dues of the mem
bers plus a specific tax on all corporations; e.g., $5 myn. or
more in assets.
This could probably be as small as $100 per
company.
Research studies should be tied into the overall development
of guidelines.
This should not only search past history, but
simulate changes and project potential effects.
An overall study and codification of practices, opinions and
audit guides would be helpful as well as clarifying for accoun
tants, security analysts and management.
The result could be
less abuse of GAAP and in addition, such actual and potential
abuses could be cited at that time.

Financial Accounting Policy
Committee
Financial Analysts Federation

Frances Stone,

Chairlady

THE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS FEDERATION
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Additional Commentary on
Establishment of Accounting Principles
by
William C. Norby, C.F.A.
AICPA Public Hearings for
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles
New York
November 4, 1971

In this commentary I will attempt to illuminate some of
the opinions and attitudes of our Officers, Directors, and Com
mittee members who have discussed this important subject from
time to time, both within our organization and with the Study
Committee.
These attitudes are concerned more with matters of
responsibility than details of organization.

The problem of establishing accounting principles may be
divided into two parts: (1) Who will have the responsibility;
and (2) how will they be organized.
Members of The Financial
Analysts Federation have expressed conservative views on both
of these issues.
Who will be responsible ?
The FAF has consistently held
the view that professional accountants should establish account
ing principles.
There is a particular fear of government res
ponsibility for this function, having in mind the political
pressures, legal and bureaucratic road blocks to progress, and
the usually slow pace of change that characterize government
bureaus. This is not to deny that government agencies have
not made many contributions to corporate reporting or have not
sometimes prodded the private sector to action on accounting
matters.
But we believe that an organization in the private
sector will over the long run have greater flexibility and
show more responsiveness to the needs of investors and busi
ness.
When we say professional accountants should have the
responsibility, we mean exactly that.
Not only do they have
the professional competence, but they have independence from
the various special pleaders.
Numerous commentators on this
subject have suggested that The Financial Analysts Federation
or financial analysts should have a role in decisions.
We
are complimented, but we do not think it appropriate.
By the
same token we do not believe organizations representing busi
ness management should have a role in decisions either.
Busi
ness is the subject of accounting measurement and therefore should
not be a participant in establishing the standards of measure
ment.
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We believe financial analysts, business management, and
other parties affected by accounting rules should participate
in the discussions and take positions of advocacy.
In this way
they can make an effective contribution to the development
of accounting principles.
But they cannot be both advocates
and judges or decision makers.
This is not to say that if your committee recommends partici
pation in some way by other organizations, we would not cooperate.
Under those circumstances we believe that financial analysts
must be involved.

Linked to the determination of responsibility is the problem
of enforcement.
The APB and the Securities and Exchange Commission
have a relationship developed through custom and practice, and it
is this relationship, derived from the SEC’S legal powers, that
give implied force to APB Opinions.
Perhaps this relationship
could be strengthened or made more explicit as we have suggested
in our statement.
The principle of the securities industry self
regulatory agency as related to the Securities and Exchange
Commission may provide a model.
Admittedly the self regulatory
concept is currently being questioned in the securities business,
but the circumstances of accounting principles are somewhat dif
ferent,

I would also suggest that the SEC’S authority in accounting
matters be primary among government agencies, so that other re
gulatory bodies do not require public companies to issue statements
that are not consistent with general principles.
The separate
ways of the several agencies in the past has been a disservice
to investors.
Organization of the Board.
Voluntary membership organizations
have different and difficult problems of organization.
They are
not really equipped to respond promptly to increasing demands, nor
are fast decisions usually feasible.
We believe the APB in recent
years has made extraordinary progress in the pace of its opinion
issuing relative, that is, to these inherent organizational limit
ations.
Yet the problems seem to be multiplying and greater speed
is demanded from all corners.

The reformation of the organization structure thus is very
important.
Our Accounting Committee has recommended full time
membership of professional accountants for limited terms.
We
all recognize that the present voluntary members of the APB are
devoting practically full time to the task now, but from an
organizations point of view the full time compensated member would
appear to have two advantages: (1) better continuity of effort;
and (2) complete independence of employer or client relationships.

-2-

We do not wish to imply in any way that present members
have not been faithful to their mission on the APB but the
independent stature would give the APB increased creditability
in many quarters,
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we believe.

Within our organization, as in others, there is a diversity
of viewpoints.
Many of our senior members, including our Directors,
prefer the present voluntary type membership of the APB.
This
preference is based on the idea that voluntary members will be
closer to the current practical problems through their firms
and their decisions will carry more acceptance than decisions
made by. an independent group which might tend to become too
"academic.”
They believe the establishment of accounting prin
ciples is a pragmatic, quasi-legislative process and that it
is not necessarily bad if the members are close to the pressures
of practical problems.

We also have different views as to the composition of a
full time independent board,
I should mention the excellent
paper by Mr. Ellis at the recent Northwestern University Symposium
on "Institutional Issues in Formulating Reporting Standards."
Mr. Ellis is a member of our Financial Accounting Policy Com
mittee.
He proposed a broader group than professional accountants
but nonetheless .would require independence.
No member would
retain any employer or vocational tie.
The purpose would be
to bring to bear a wider range of viewpoints to the total problem
of corporate reporting.
This is not at great variance from
the Committee’s recommendation.
I should state that my own view, based on observation
of voluntary organizations over a number of years, favors a
full time, compensated board.
I believe this is the only way
the APB will be able to keep pace in the next few years, and
achieve full creditability as an independent agency.
I believe
board members can be selected in a way which will insure a
continued responsiveness to practical problems.
The criticisms of the APB seem to arise in part from the
desire for speedier action.
Naturally, once a problem is iden
tified we would all like to have a prompt solution.
However
there are many parties at interest and their acceptance of
final opinions rests on their opportunity to present recommendations
and listen to argument.
This takes time and will be difficult
to speed up no matter how the APB is organized.
These other
parties at interest are also voluntary organizations.
Accounting
is not their primary objective or concern, although it may be
very important to them.
We at the FAF recognize that we must
expand our capability to provide input to the APB from financial
analysts, because it is desirable to settle accounting issues
more rapidly.
But ours will be an evolutionary expansion.

-3-
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Consequently, I believe I reflect the preponderant opinion
of our organization that we are suspicious of some of the grand,
sweeping reorganizations of the accounting principles setting
process that have been proposed.
An evolutionary change and
improvement, building on what has already been developed by
the AICPA and other organizations is the more practical approach.
I believe our Committee’s statement is consistent with that
approach.

-4-
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CRANSTOUN, PENNEY & CO.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS • 140BR0ADWAY • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005

November 9, 1971

Mr Francis M Wheat, Chairman
Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

Dear Mr Wheat:
We would like to offer our views for consideration by the Study Group on
Establishment of Accounting Principles .
Some observations on which our conclusions are based are:

1.

The Accounting Principles Board has been subject to criticism
from both within and without the profession. A considerable
part has been unjustified and represents either a lack of knowl
edge or prejudice stemming from self-interest. At the same
time, we believe that changes are in order and that the time is
ripe to reconsider constructively the whole area of development
of accounting principles and standards, but on a reasoned and
informed basis.

2.

The Board has operated in an atmosphere in which it is almost
impossible to avoid criticism.
a.

It has become a quasi-regulator but has had to rely
for enforcement too heavily on the loyalty of the AICPA
members and on its own ability to convince through the
text of its Opinions. In fact it has, with help from the
SEC, gained considerable stature since it was established
on September 1, 1959. Its Opinions have been generally
accepted, however grudgingly, even though they lack legal
sanction and departures from them are not even a violation
of the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics .

b.

The source materials, such as "generally accepted account
ing principles”, do not provide the broad framework of
fundamental accounting authority within which the Board, or
any similar organization, can resolve many of the problems
presented to it.
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c.

Because of the dynamic nature of American business
and the necessity of accounting for novel types of trans
actions and for old transactions in new settings, the
Board has had to expend much of its efforts in dealing
with immediate problems. Had it done otherwise, the
entire program would have fallen into disrepute.

d.

The Board started with a virtual mandate to move in the
direction of uniformity in an atmosphere in which diverse
accounting was widespread. Understandably, it took time
to reverse the flow into the desired direction, because
every attempt at change was met with determined and
well-entrenched opposition.

f.

During recent years accounting firms have been made
defendants in legal actions for substantial money damages,
and some members have even been subjected to criminal
prosecution. It was in this environment of erosion of
public confidence in financial reporting that the Board has
had to function.

e.

A number of different governmental agencies have the
authority to establish accounting practices . This inevit
ably has created diversity of practice. Diversity was
also furthered by tax requirements and considerations .

It is our view that considering these conditions, the Board has performed
admirably.

Many of our conclusions are based upon the assumption that a group estab
lished to promulgate timely accounting pronouncements must give first priority to
current problems and cannot devote much time to the development of basic concepts.
This should not be read to imply that there is no need for a broad framework of basic
authority. It is our view that a new and separate group should be constituted with that
as its only mission. We consider this to be a long-range and possibly permanent activ
ity because we have grave doubts that even with the best of talent the progress will be
rapid or that its output will meet with ready and general acceptance. Formation of this
group should await the formal report of the Trueblood Committee.
We have reached the conclusion that the establishment of accounting princi
ples and standards must be the province of the accounting profession. The Institute has
the largest reservoir of accounting experience and talent. The fact that the AICPA is
a cohesive group and can achieve a certain measure of compliance through its attest
function provides an initial thrust to the Board’s Opinions which is not obtainable else
where. The importance of the foregoing in terms of the composition of the Board and
the representation on it from the laity should not be underestimated.

HURDMAN AND
CRANSTOUN, PENNEY & CO.
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We would like at this point to express our views as to a full-time or a
part-time Board. We would rephrase the question to be whether the Board members
should or should not be paid for their efforts and furloughed by their firms. We
believe that we have, for all practical purposes, a full-time Board now. We do not
believe it would be possible to get the same dedicated effort from a paid Board that
is being furnished by the volunteer members . All of those accepting membership
should do so on the basis of a first priority commitment to furnish whatever time
is needed to accomplish the Board's activities. For example, there should be no
reason for not extending a three-day meeting to a full week or more when necessary.

While we believe that a full-time paid Board would be undesirable and
even less productive, we strongly recommend a full-time paid chairman, indepen
dent of any firm or company. He should be selected primarily on the basis of his
executive ability, personal prestige, judgment and wisdom rather than on his
accounting capabilities.
In our view, one of the Board's deficiencies has been the lack of breadth
in thinking, experience and expertise stemming from the dearth of members from
other disciplines . There is, at present, only one corporate executive on the Board,
and only in the past year was a financial analyst appointed to Board membership.
Groups such as economists, investment bankers, and the legal profession are not
represented. We believe that the composition of the rule-making body should be
approximately as follows:

A Board of 21 persons of whom 13 should be practicing public accountants
and members of the AICPA. Industry should be represented by three members and
the academic world by two members. The remaining representatives should be from
investment banking, security analysts, economists and the legal profession The
objective is to give the Board the breadth which it now lacks both in operation and as
a matter of image. Organizations suchas FEI, NAA, IBA, and FAF should be con
sulted with respect to the selection of non-practicing members, and such members
should not be required to be CPA's or members of the Institute.
The practice of retaining a permanent seat for a particular accounting
firm should be abolished. When it was established there may have been good reasons
for this caste system. It is our view that those arguments no longer are compelling,
and the practice cannot be defended. In our experience this has been the principal
factor cited in the charge (which we strongly condemn as false) of lack of independence
on the part of the Board.
We believe that the conduct of the Board’s meetings leaves something to
be desired. The Board should operate in a manner similar to a political, delibera
tive body. There should be a requirement to sit until all of the important and timely
agenda items have been cleared. For example, the recent meeting of the Board in
Houston, Texas, should have been held in session until an accounting interpretation
on foreign exchange could be approved for issuance, and thereby made available for
use in the preparation of financial statements for the third quarter.

HURDMAN AND
CRANSTOUN, PENNEY & CO.
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Further, the presently required two-thirds affirmative vote for issuance
impedes the effectiveness of the Board. It has not only resulted in compromises which
are satisfactory to no one, it has also necessitated last minute, hurried redrafting
with resulting obscurity of language and failure to clearly set forth the Board’s intent.
We grant there are hazards in permitting issuance on the vote of a simple majority.
However, we do not believe the criticism that a simple majority vote would impede
general acceptance is a valid one. The combination of the prestige of the Board, co
operation of the SEC and the posture before a court of the company and its accountants
in a law suite which involved a question of deviation from a Board Opinion, would all
mitigate against that. At the same time, we do acknowledge that for this and other
reasons, departures from Board Opinions need to be included among the violations of
the Code of Professional Ethics . We believe that a 12 of 21 votes requirement (11 of
18 if the latter number is continued) would best accommodate all of the pro and con
considerations which have been raised.

Among the gross inadequacies in the present operation of the Board have
been insufficiencies in research staff and drafting talent. The basic work of the Board
should be performed by subcommittees. Toward this end the number of persons sup
porting the Board's effort should be expanded. We recommend above that there should
be an increase in the number of Board members. Under the present method of operation,
projects are delayed unduly because too many of the subcommittees are manned and
chaired by the same individuals . Essentially, a Board member should serve as chair
man of a subcommittee and rarely serve on other subcommittees, although his special
ized talents and experience would be available to any subcommittee.
Each subcommittee should draw on non-Board members who, together with
its chairman and the research and drafting staff, should furnish the full Board with a
position paper based upon substantial study and research. This mode of operation
should effectively increase the input of pertinent data and result in obtaining a broader
spectrum of views. Presumably they could also maintain closer liaison with other
organizations. They should be in a position to provide ready answers to questions
raised by individual Board members. Once the Board has reached its fundamental
position, drafting should be done by those having appropriate skills working with the
chairman of the subcommittee. Only upon completion of this phase should a draft be
passed along to other members of the subcommittee for comment and ultimately to the
full Board. The subcommittee should be free to call upon other Board members and
non-Board members for views and comments.
Turning to another point, we believe that the relationship between the APB
and the Committee on Auditing Procedure should be studied. Accounting principles
and the presentation of accounting information in financial statements cannot be fully
divorced. Recent examples of troublesome situations are the evolution of SAP No. 47,
"Subsequent Events", and the proposed statement on reporting on the statement of
changes in financial position. In this connection we believe that it is urgent that the
standard short-form report be appropriately revised without delay. The one presently
in use does not adequately describe the auditor's role and the responsibilities which he
purports to assume.

HURDMAN AND
CRANSTOUN, PENNEY & CO.
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In order for the Board or any similar organization to be effective, it is
necessary to have the support of its code of professional ethics, albeit, the relevant
provisions must be couched in language which permits departures in order to render
the financial statements not misleading. Nothing should inhibit "full and fair disclosure".

Finally, it is our view that the present practices of conducting public hear
ings before drafting and issuing controversial Opinions and of providing interpretations
subsequent to issuance are satisfactory. At the same time, we believe that they will be
modified from time to time as experience dictates. We also believe the present appeal
procedures are adequate and no new avenues are needed.

Summarized below are what we consider to be our major recommendations:
1.

A full-time paid chairman, independent of professional or business
affiliations .

2.

Increased research and drafting supporting staff.

3.

Increased input of data and views on each project.

4.

Broadening of the bases of membership of subcommittees .

5.

Abolition of permanent seats .

6.

Elimination of the two-third voting rule.

7.

Combination of the activities of the accounting and auditing
committees.

8.

Stiffening of the Institute’s Code of Professional Ethics and other
disciplinary procedures.

We have attempted throughout to make our comments brief. At the same
time, we recognize that some of them may provoke questions on your part. If so, we
will be glad to elaborate, either orally or in writing, at your convenience.
In closing, we would like to state for the record, that whatever the recom
mendations of your Committee may be, they will have the full support of this Firm as
will the action taken on them by the AICPA.

Very truly yours,

HURDMAN AND
CRANSTOUN, PENNEY & CO.
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STANFORD UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
CHARLES T. HORNGREN
Professor of Accounting

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305

November 4, 1971

To:

The Study Group on Establishment
of Accounting Principles

This letter tries to summarize my perception of the present role of the
APB, particularly with respect to its power and its relation to the SEC.
After serving nearly four years on the Board, I think much of the criticism
of the present APB is attributable to at least some misunderstanding of the
Board’s basic function. This misunderstanding is compounded by the Board’s
and the SEC’s public relations stance; Loth seem reluctant to admit that
they set principles in close concert.

From time to time, I have heard grumbling by various APB members that we
do not have to consider the SEC — that we will decide what is right and that
is that. But that is wishful thinking, a clinging to the false idea that a
private body is determining accounting principles. The SEC has all the ul
timate power, and the APB formulates principles subject to whatever con
straints the SEC exerts. This point may be obvious to individuals who are
well acquainted with APB activities, but it is not at all clear to many others.
As a result, the APB has endured some undeserved flak.
In my view, the (informal) organizational relationship is similar to decen
tralized management in industry:

SECtop manage
ment power
The product of this overall organization is a
body of accounting prin
ciples or rules that
govern financial reporting
APB-lower
management:
analyzer,
formulator,
implementer

The products of these organizations
are financial reports that measure
performance and position
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The dashed line indicates the over-all organization. The objective of the
organization in this context is (or should be) the "maximization of society’s
welfare” in the form of optimal financial reporting to investors. That is,
principles (you may prefer rules, concepts, or some other amorphous words) must
be devised in order to specify how measures of financial performance and posi
tion can best serve users.
Top management (the SEC) has all ultimate power to set principles for
financial reporting. It has minimal resources and central staff to do the job,
so it delegates the duty to front-line management (APB). As in all organiza
tions, decentralization is adopted when top management believes that lower
management has more information and capability to make decisions that achieve
the over-all goals of the organization (in this case, optimal financial report
ing to investors). Lower management (APB) is given great freedom to make
decisions because it is deemed sufficiently objective and more knowledgeable
about the technical aspects of the job. Moreover, lower management works for
zero salary and investigates nearly all of the topics chosen by top management.
Obviously, lower management is also free, to investigate many topics of its own
choice.
Of course, as in all decentralized organizations, top management can set
over-all policies and constraints. It can exert veto power. On certain topics,
it may heavily constrain the freedom to make decisions (e.g., the investment
credit and, more recently, marketable securities). But top management cannot
be too heavy-handed too often. Frequent interference with the freedom to make
decisions means that decentralization with its many benefits (for example, the
handy buffer against direct pressure by reporting companies on top management)
is undermined.
Often top management (the SEC) can take the convenient stance
that lower management (APB) makes the decisions and that top management merely
implements them!

As I see it, the SEC (top management) has used decentralization with a
master’s touch. Its lower-level management (APB) does an enormous amount of
work for no salary and has just enough freedom to want to continue the arrange
ment. Moreover, it is dominated by practitioners, the individuals responsible
for implementing the principles chosen. There is an evident efficiency here,
because the work consists of both the formulation of principles and their
implementation --an immensely complex task that will not be performed easily
under any institutional arrangement.
The buffer role is clear:
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The lines represent the probable relative volume and direction of requests, views,
suasion, pressure, etc., among some of the important parties regarding the for
mulation of accounting principles.
I do not claim that the APB insulates the SEC from all pressures or criticisms
*
however, the Board has been unjustifiably criticized for timidity or vacillation on
several occasions when the basic explanation for the Board’s behavior has been no
assurance of support from the SEC. How many lower-level managers will proceed on
critical issues without obtaining reliable assurance of top management support?

The above description is not flawless. Nevertheless, it is time to dispel the
oft-heard myth that a private group is setting the accounting principles which are
then enforced by the policing agency, the SEC. The job of devising accounting prin
ciples is a joint-effort, a private-public institutional arrangement that should be
explicitly admitted and publicized forthrightly by both parties along the top-lower
management lines described above.
I leave it to others to suggest alternative institutional arrangements for the
incredibly difficult task of formulating accounting principles. The focus of this
letter is more narrow; it assumes that the SEC will continue to maintain the ultimate
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power. If so, a modified APB, or some similar successor thereof, necessarily
must work as a lower-level management unit with only as much latitude as the
SEC permits.
Whatever the form, I hope that business executives do not have any larger
direct role in setting accounting principles than they now possess. Their
views should be heard fully, but there is an inherent conflict between their
role as managers and the task of measuring their own performance. An analogy
might be having the baseball batter calling the balls and strikes.
Many business executives have vociferously stated that the APB does not
pay sufficient attention to the views of industry. In my opinion, that is just
not so. If anything, the Board is swamped by industry views. First, industry
has direct representation on the Board. Second, the practitioners who dominate
the Board listen carefully to the views of their clients. After all, in their
everyday work practitioners talk mostly to business executives and to other
practitioners, not to financial analysts and college professors. The opinions
of financial executives come through loud and clear -- and they are given pain
staking consideration. For example, every recent APB Opinion has been changed
considerably in response to industry reactions.

Let me stress that I am grateful for having been a member of the Board.
Under the current setup, considering its many constraints, I think the APB has
performed admirably. Admittedly, I am speculating, but more speed and objec
tivity might result if there were some full-time group that uses majority rule.
This would be a deliberative body that would listen fully to all interested
parties before reaching a decision.
I look forward to seeing your group’s recommendations.

Sincerely,

CTH/acf

cc:

Accounting Principles Board

